BIAFRA: A WORD OF ADVICE

By Kalu Kalu Kalu

Here we go again!

Igbos always dragging other peoples problems and making it their own. In the 1960s, it was a problem between the NPC and the West, and while Igbos were minding their own business at the apex of Nigeria's administrative and military hierarchy, some misguided Igbo officers spearheaded a  coup that they told no one about. They killed off the military and political leadership of the other regions. 

One thing led to another and after so much Igbo blood was shed and wasted, look at where we are today! The problem in today's Nigeria is more or less between the "victors" of the civil war (the North versus the Niger Delta, the North versus the Middle Belt, and in various ways, the North versus the West). But as has been typical, Ndigbo will not listen or think twice; Ndigbo will not lay back and allow these people to fight it out among themselves. If Nigeria will dissolve, then it will dissolve; but let other people fight for it and shed their own blood this time around. 

But we cannot know that unless we allow it to play itself out. But always and in a haste and not willing to play the devil's advocate or to listen to their own better judgment this time, Igbos are now throwing their lot into the middle of the melee. 

At the moment, the South-South is no more talking about self-determination; the West has been reticent on the issue of their long-sought Oduduwa Republic; and all of them are waiting to see how the Igbos and their "Biafra' play out. They will either pick up the final ruins of the Igbos or they will get their own Republic, but either way, it would be on the back of the Igbos.

Ndigbo need to think very hard before taking even the slightest step; we cannot blind our senses to a practical logic that does not fit our preconceived narrative. Think and think again. For those who are advocating for the state of "Biafra," I will like to know when they sampled the Igbo public opinion to ask tem what they wanted.? Have they consulted with the people of the South-South or the minorities, the same mistake that was made in the first declaration of Biafra. And all this knowing fully well that a Biafra without the South-South or the minorities (of their own willingness and volition) would not be viable. Indications so far point to the fact that they would not go along, at least for reasons of history. With the little space that will then be Biafra (a total land area of about 44000 square kilometers) confining about 36 million people will certainly create conditions where Igbos would set upon each other very quickly in a mad scramble for living space. How sure are the proponents of this Biafra certain that this sort of balkanization would not occur even within Biafra itself. What type of government would it be? Where is the Constitution or the roadmap? How would it generate revenues? How much oil or raw materials products does it have to accommodate its people?

If Nigeria wants to play hardball, they can willfully grant the Igbos Biafra, but made up of only the contiguous five Igbo states. They will cut off  its access to the littoral boundaries or the 200 mile territorial boundary that extends into the Atlantic ocean. They can prevent any export of oil from Biafra (the little that exists) through their territorial maritime boundaries or waters. 

They can close off the Nigerian market by imposing exorbitant export tariffs for Biafran goods into Nigeria; and even at that, they may even close off any interstate trade relations thereby denying the Nigeria market to Biafra. In their recent declaration, the Arewa Youth Group has already indicated its determination to confiscate all Igbo property, land, and investment in the North; and with an independent Biafra on its own, there is nothing  whatsoever that prevents the North from doing that. Do you know how much money is involved here, and how long (if ever) it will take to replicate these investments elsewhere?  

The most pathetic is that by offering to provide 100 buses and to give N500, 000 to every Igbo family in the North to return to the East, is a clear reminder that the five Governors of the southeastern states have not done their homework well and certainly do not understand the strategic interest of the Igbo within the Nigerian federation. Have they thought about what the Igbos would have left behind? Do they have any other plan or strategy in place other than their mass evacuation? By their pronouncement, they have, in fact, succumbed to the threat made by the Arewa Youth, thereby and potentially making the unthinkable a self-fulfilling prophesy.

In the contemporary world, history tells us that there is no group that has found success and peace after secession from a major country. Ask the Eritreans, the South Sudanese, the Kosovars (from Serbia), or East Timor from Indonesia. Igbos are yet to recover from the first secession, yet, some of them want another one, all within the space of 50 years plus. How restless? Again, Igbos should not act based on hysteria and emotion; they must be guided by strategic reasoning, logic, and inquiry repeated as many times as possible. All this because one more inconsiderate mistake could be permanently fatal. The simple reality of the matter  is that Igbos need Nigeria, the living space, the agricultural land, the market and the financial muscle that Lagos offers, plus a platform within which to compete with others, and not only within themselves. Just look at Anambra state, Imo, Enugu, and Abia states, and ask yourself how well that they have competed within themselves, at least politically?

The point made here is that no one or any group of people can decide for the Igbos as a whole without their consent. For starters, Nzeogwu and his brother Ifeajuna had no business pre-empting a coup in Nigeria, and in that process putting the who Igbo race in this hopeless condition. Nigeria then was not the Igbo problem. From the rash action and killings that followed, the event led the Igbos into a war they knew could not be easily won against Nigeria; yet (and to their credit) they continued. When the obvious became very clear that the war would be lost, and there were many ample opportunities to secure an honorable end to the war; yet Ojukwu refused but silenced alternative views. It is clear now that it would have been better to take a negotiated end to the war as opposed to the unconditional surrender that we eventually got. I briefly discussed this matter with the famed Chinua Achebe at the WIC Convention in New York (1997), and his words to me were, to paraphrase: "If the five majors had seen what they did to the Igbos today, and how they sacrificed the fortunes of the Igbos, I wonder how they will feel about it?"

There are two existential realities that stare Igbos in the face: The first is that Igbos cannot fight another war within 50 years and survive as an entity; it must be guaranteed that any war fought by the Igbos must be won (but no one can guarantee that); and even at that, win or lose, any war fought by Igbos at this time will set them back for another 50 plus years. How long will it take and how much will it cost to re-create in "Biafra" all the investment and many years of sacrifice invested in Nigeria? The behavior of some Igbos (I mean those who seem to shout loudest) is compounding and complicating our problems; thus preventing us to engage in sane discourse on the many opportunities and strategic advantages that still present themselves for the Igbos within Nigeria. And there are many!