EMMA OKWUAHABA
Long time
Just a short contribution before I revert to "siddon look" status.
I seriously doubt that the full and complete story of the process of
reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation after the civil war has been
told, or ever will.
It must necessarily be a continuum of events that predated the war, starting
with an understanding of the post-independence, pre-War economic and social
environment.
During the war, many measures were taken by contending antagonists to sustain
their war operations while undermining one another, measures that had short and
long term effects for all involved, intended or not.
On the Nigerian side, for example, decrees were promulgated to better control
the wartime Central Bank by, for example, (a) ensuring that monetary and banking
policies were harmonized at FEC level between the Finance Commissioner and the
Central Bank; (b) ensuring that the CBN could not even open new branches or
appoint agents and correspondents without FEC approval; (c) vest in the FEC,
authority for the CBN to spend more than N100,000, set salaries for employees
etc... (d) authorizing the CBN to purchase, sell, discount and rediscount
Treasury Bills and Certificates of the FGN.
Furthermore, there were selective import controls, compulsory savings schemes,
establishment of the Armed Forces Comfort fund, etc...
But all was not rosy. What was intended as a measure to ensure prompt release of
funds from the Finance Ministry to prosecute the war turned out to become the
beginnings of what later became deficit financing, with implications for
systemic inflation.
Given the pressures created by the projected (partly unfulfilled) expenditures
dating back to the 1962-68 1st National Development Plan, unanticipated war
spending, and projections for post war reconstruction and development, drastic
measures were taken, such as the increase in the statutory limit for Treasury
Bills up to 150% of estimated retained revenue of the entire Federal Government
and gross revenue of ALL 12 states in 1970.
At the same time, in 1968, Treasury certificates were issued and the maximum
permitted level of outstanding Treasury certificates as a percentage of Federal
estimated current revenues was set, first at 50%, and later 60% by 1969. Such
revenues supplemented those raised by the Ways and Means Committee.
In the meantime, credit was liberalized, as discount rates and other interest
rates were reduced to reduce the cost of borrowing. The result was that
inflation was fuelled and it led to an increase in general prices.
Another measure used was to increase the use of promissory notes to delay
repayment/debt servicing on less directly war related expenditures.
Other measures included promulgation of decrees to mediate trade disputes,
enforce trade embargoes, pre-empt the illegal use of Nigerian monies burgled by
Biafran troops from Central Bank vaults in Enugu, Benin, and Port Harcourt.
As you recall, the Nigerian currency was changed in 1968, after which a total of
N173 million naira was redeemed. Of this N173 million, N133 million was from the
9 (nine) non eastern states while N40 million was redemmed on the basis of an ex
gratia award to the 3 primary war affected eastern states. This total amounted
to about 96% of the N180.0 million naira in circulation in the entire country as
of December 1967.
Furthermore, marketing boards operations were financed by the CBN (to replace
the Standard Charter of Britain which had become reluctant to fincne them under
the circumstances). Such financing was uneven, clearly a matter of logistics.
Battle grounds hardly possessed the infrastructure for normal operation of
pre-war marketing boards.
But as sections of the secessionist enclave began to fall, Normalcy
Administration Loans were made available from Military Funds to revitalize
various companies in the East. Public Announcements were made asking companies
to submit estimates for reconstrction and recapitalization, which were
eventually reviewed by relevant rehabilitation committees. Furthermore,
employment opportunities were created for displaced persons who elected to
return home to war ravaged areas. This included opportunities in the Police and
Armed Forces for all sorts of security duties to pump money into the system and
put cash into people's hands. This is quite apart from the controversial £20
flat redemption policy for Biafran currency holdings after the war. In many
states, rents (in Nigerian money) of departing landlords who had escaped in 1966
and 1967 were collected and paid back by individuals and state governments (with
the exception of Rivers State). An example, but
by no means unique, was the Midwestern State. A cursory look at federal and
state budgets in 1970 and 1971 and 1972 will reveal some of these measures
captured in appropriations.
This brief summary will not, however, be complete without identifying some of
the problems and failures in the process. The first post-war Chairman of the
Committee for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was Allison Ayida - who is still
alive. In the book, Allison Akene Ayida, Nigeria's Quintessential Public
Servant, by Kayode and Otobo (Malthouse Press), it states, on page 78:
" Unbelievably, though, the administration of the East Central State, instead of
cooperating with the federal efforts at aleviating the pervasive suffering in
the area, indulged in acts of commission or omission to exacerbate it. For
example, Ayida cited the frustration and pain of federal authorities in trying
to get the East Central State to accept and install 54 generators to provide
electricity for a number of cities in the area. It took all of three months for
the East Central State Government to agree on where the generators would be
installed. In the end, the generators were not installed at all and they had to
be sent to other towns in Nigeria."
It may be well worth your time to track Ayida down and have him expound on his
experiences as Chairperson of the Committee for Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction, and perhaps provide some additional insights.
I do not have the time to delve too deeply into all facets of Civil War era
economics, but you can certainly get yourself these additional books:
Nafziger: The Economics of Political Instability: The Nigeria-Biafra War,
Western Press 1973
RN Ogbudinkpa: The Economics of the Nigerian Civil war and its Prospects for
National Development (1985)
Nowa, thanks for your contribution. I have read Reuben Ogbudinkpa, but I've been
unable, much As I've tried, to get a copy of the biography of Ayida. I always
thought they were his memoirs but it turns out to be an account of his work
rendered by others. Now, Ayida moved as perm sec from Mines to Economic
development and then to Finance under Shagari as Fed. Commissioner,, and took
over from H. Ejieyutche as SFG. He certainly is worth debriefing. I frankly find
his account interesting about the rehabilitation of the East. He implies that
the problem with the East Central State was that people were fighting over the
installation of generators sent from Lagos. Perhaps there is, here, an example
of administrative lapse or incompetence. If there was really a program of
rehabilitation, the committee would have constituted a task force made of
engineers, sociologist, town planners, administrators, accountants, town council
executives etc - and they would have
identified areas of special and immediate need, where these equipment were to
be installed; where roads where to be rebuilt, where power stations and power
grids were to be re-installed, etc. The point is the Ayida committee did not
rehabilitate the East according to the mandate given to them - in his
confession, they diverted materials meant for Eastern rehabilitation to other
towns in Nigeria. It is a punishabe offence, because the rehabilitation fund was
specifically budgeted for the purpose of rehabilitation and reconstruction of
war ravaged areas. Ayida's confession speaks directly to the damage done to the
public service by those who had inherited it, and who in the flush of post-war
"victory" thought they could do anything to the East. Listen to him again, and
ask yourself if the Chairman of the Rehabilitation committee accomplished the
task, irrespective of his excuse. Meanwhile, that is his view, I shall also ask
Prof. Ukwu I. Ukwu, who was on
the ground as the Commissioner for Economic Development in Asika's regime in
East Central State, and also once Director of the Institute of Development
Studies at the University of Nigeria, Center for Development Studies in Enugu to
clarify Ayida's claims. I salute you.
Obi Nwakanma
The reference I gave you is his biography. What you say you have not been able
to find is his autobiography.
I do not think Ayida was "confessing" anything.
He was expressing a frustration specifically with the government of then East
Central State (under Ukpabi Asika - RIP) and the
politics/infighting/incompetence that bogged down efforts at post-war
rehabilitation in that state.
Many other states were affected by the war (although not as much as East
Central, followed by SouthEast and Rivers, then the Midwest, and then others, in
declining level of seriousness) and they would all have been making demands of
the FG Rehabilitation Committees and the federal budget. It would have been
intolerable to leave dozens of generators lying fallow and deteriorating because
one state could not decide for months on end what to do with them while others
needed them too.
States claimed that they (more than the feds) knew where they most needed help.
The FG thus deferred to them in making decisions about deployment of resources
to communities - except in the case of purely federal establishments. The
responsibility here lay squarely with the East Central government.
Ayida is still alive. You probably do need to talk to him if you want to know
more.
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