Discerning Nigerians were alarmed recently as The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation; Mr. Bello Adoke Exonerated former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Abdulsalami Abubakar of complicity in the Halliburton Bribery Scandal.
Adoke said that contrary to speculations, some highly placed Nigerians were involved in the Halliburton bribe scandal, but only aides of former Presidents Sani Abacha, Abdulasalami Abubakar and Olusegun Obasanjo were involved in the scandal.
Responding to questions from the Members of the Senate Committee on Judiciary during the Ministry's budget defence, the Justice Minister added that their finds indicate that the aides acted on their personal behalf and not on that of their principals.
I am therefore calling for an Independent Committee of Nigerians with Integrity to conduct a full fledged public hearing so that we can really go into the bribery scandal.
We should fully support a member of the Senate Committee, Senator Ikechukwu Obiora, who urged the Senate to conduct a public hearing on the scandal.
He queried: “The special assistant to President Olusegun was paid money in order to influence the award of this contract.
Was the contract a continuous one? So the successive governments were just taking part of what belong to them? But our President, Olusegun Obasanjo’s aide was paid.
Was that meant for the aide or was it meant for the president?
“The Committee need to conduct full fledged public hearing so that we can really go into the bribery scandal.”
.....Let us refresh the minds of Nigerians on the Chronology of Key Events in the Unfolding Bribery Scandal Halliburton and Nigeria:
1988: Dresser Industries acquires M.W. Kellogg, ten years before Dresser merges with Halliburton.
September 1994: M.W. Kellogg and three other companies form a partnership known as TSKJ, incorporated in Medeira, Portugal. Each partner owns a 25 percent equal share. Kellogg's three other partners are Technip of France, Italy's Snamprogetti, and Japan Gasoline Corp.
The partnership submits a bid to Nigeria LNG to build a natural gas plant in Nigeria. Nigeria LNG is owned by the Nigerian government and Royal Dutch/Shell Group. TSKJ's $2 billion bid is not immediately accepted even though it was 5 percent lower than a bid submitted by competitor, Bechtel Group, Inc.
Read more @ http://elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5318%3Ahalliburton-and-nigeria-a-chronology-of-key-events-in-the-unfolding-bribery-scandal&catid=52%3Adaniel-elombah&Itemid=73
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Uduaghan Pally Pastors on Good Governance
* Denies Sponsoring Obi' impeachment
Delta state governor Dr. Emmanuel Uduaghan has said he was not planning to impeach the Speaker of the state House of Assembly Prince Sam Obi.
Dr Uduaghan who made the clarification while addressing Pastors Forum for good governance in Asaba said he has no issue with the Speaker and was therefore not making any move that will lead to the impeachment of the speaker.
He also said that impeachment comes from the House of Assembly explaining that since he was not a member of the House there was no way he could lead such a move.
His words “There is nothing in the impeachment rumour of the speaker. I have no issue with the Speaker and I am not making any move to impeach him.
"There is so much rumour in town about impeachment of the Speaker and I say there is no truth in it”.
The governor said there was no truth in the rumour which he said was being peddled to create disharmony and destabilize the state.
Dr Uduaghan who described the impeachment rumour as wicked unfounded and a big lie said that those behind it will fail.
Explaining further he said “I am declaring before you that there is no plan to impeach the Speaker. I know the implication of lying before Pastors and I again say I have no issue with him and I am not preparing to impeach him".
He therefore called on the clergy to pray against the spirit of hatred which seemed to have enveloped the state.
The governor regretted that there was so much hatred in the state just as he said that it was only intercessory prayers that will bring love harmony and the brotherhood of man to reign in the state.
Dr Uduaghan promised to improve the living standard of Deltans and enjoined the Pastors forum to form cooperative groups so that they can benefit from the micro credit scheme.
The governor however commended the Pastors forum for being supportive and promised to hold regular meetings with the Pastors.
Dr Uduaghan gave assurance that he live up to the expectation of a state bearing the slogan Finger of God.
In his brief remarks the leader of the Forum Rev Jude Akhare said they were interested in good governance and want good governance entrenched in all state governments throughout the Federation.
Rev Akhare said his forum want to partner with the Uduaghan administration on good governance.
He therefore requested the governor to provide dividends of democracy for Deltans especially potable water, good motorable road, electricity and easily accessible and health care delivery.
Delta state governor Dr. Emmanuel Uduaghan has said he was not planning to impeach the Speaker of the state House of Assembly Prince Sam Obi.
Dr Uduaghan who made the clarification while addressing Pastors Forum for good governance in Asaba said he has no issue with the Speaker and was therefore not making any move that will lead to the impeachment of the speaker.
He also said that impeachment comes from the House of Assembly explaining that since he was not a member of the House there was no way he could lead such a move.
His words “There is nothing in the impeachment rumour of the speaker. I have no issue with the Speaker and I am not making any move to impeach him.
"There is so much rumour in town about impeachment of the Speaker and I say there is no truth in it”.
The governor said there was no truth in the rumour which he said was being peddled to create disharmony and destabilize the state.
Dr Uduaghan who described the impeachment rumour as wicked unfounded and a big lie said that those behind it will fail.
Explaining further he said “I am declaring before you that there is no plan to impeach the Speaker. I know the implication of lying before Pastors and I again say I have no issue with him and I am not preparing to impeach him".
He therefore called on the clergy to pray against the spirit of hatred which seemed to have enveloped the state.
The governor regretted that there was so much hatred in the state just as he said that it was only intercessory prayers that will bring love harmony and the brotherhood of man to reign in the state.
Dr Uduaghan promised to improve the living standard of Deltans and enjoined the Pastors forum to form cooperative groups so that they can benefit from the micro credit scheme.
The governor however commended the Pastors forum for being supportive and promised to hold regular meetings with the Pastors.
Dr Uduaghan gave assurance that he live up to the expectation of a state bearing the slogan Finger of God.
In his brief remarks the leader of the Forum Rev Jude Akhare said they were interested in good governance and want good governance entrenched in all state governments throughout the Federation.
Rev Akhare said his forum want to partner with the Uduaghan administration on good governance.
He therefore requested the governor to provide dividends of democracy for Deltans especially potable water, good motorable road, electricity and easily accessible and health care delivery.
Another Hope Betrayed, Another Opportunity wasted.
What is wrong with politicians that they do not trust one another? It is so bad that the people do not trust them and even amongst them, suspicion is the watchword.
Please read the two articles below:
Why ACN/CPC Merger Talks Collapsed - Akande
Gen. Buhari will recall our conversations and efforts to merge our two parties as far back as 2005. As proof of our willingness and sincerity, we even decided to adopt his party’s name and logo. This was when he was in the ANPP. This dream never materialised. Thereafter, we continued to hope that circumstance and national necessity would make for reconsideration. Over a year ago, the circumstance, precisely the urgent need to salvage the country from the cruel hands of the PDP, gave birth to the National Democratic Movement. This was hailed by the teeming, if beleaguered, population of this country. We, on our part, pursued it with enthusiasm, dedication and great hope.
Alas! When we were about to consummate the common platform we had all agreed to, Atiku Abubakar suddenly withdrew and returned to the PDP. Rather disappointingly, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari also left to start building the CPC from scratch.
The letter the CPC wrote the NDM remains an evidence of an insult to the spirit of the whole project and the total absence of the political will to work together in the first place.
Thus, we were left dumbfounded, stranded, and seriously embarrassed with an overwhelming number of our members feeling we had enough of the stand-ups. Those feelings are still very strong, leading in some circumstances, to deep resentment and disinterest in further talks.
This situation, notwithstanding, we have continued to explore avenues of cooperation with strong faith in a merger while your party appears to favour an alliance of some sort, hoping to convince our followership of the national need for the emergent of a virile opposition party to dislodge the PDP.
We have reached a crescendo in this unending symphony. It is absolutely clear to us in the leadership of our party that the vast majority of our members whose views we must respect, no longer sees a merger as possible before the 2011 elections.
There are too many technical hurdles in our ways. As for alliance, it has never been an attractive option and its workability is undoubtedly problematic because of the low level of literacy of the majority of our voters, among others."
The sum total of all these is that:
.The ACN no longer considers a merger feasible.
. The CPC has not demonstrated sufficient seriousness and political will to forge a workable electoral cooperation.
.The ACN therefore considers electoral alliance no longer feasible. We may, however, consider other forms of electoral cooperation that will pool resources and ensure credible election in the forthcoming general elections.
Finally, we shall continue to hope that there will be opportunities after the general elections to explore further cooperation with a view to strengthening democracy and good governance.
We are glad to note that our presidential candidate is in the image of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. We have reasons to believe; therefore,
the room for cooperation will continue to exist between our parties even after the general elections.
We leave these matters for your deep consideration aware that this is a season of extra-ordinary pressure on you and us all. Remain assured of our highest regards."
http://elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5164%3Awhy-acncpc-merger-talks-collapsed-akande&catid=47%3Apolitics&Itemid=65
Another Hope Betrayed, Another Opportunity wasted...Congratulations President Goodluck Jonathan - Daniel Elombah
What is wrong with politicians that they do not trust one another? It is so bad that the people do not trust them and even amongst them, suspicion is the watchword. Today, there is no gainsaying the fact. that the Peoples Democratic Party - a party that started with so much promise and respect has turned out to be seen as the party of thugs and looters, a party that has no respect for votes and rule of law, has fallen out of favour with Nigerians. Yet, the PDP is poised to regain power in this year’s election. Yet again in this year, 2011, the opposition by their failure to work together, has again snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
For those who do not know, just as it was in the 1960’s – when the failure of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo to work together allowed Alhaji Tafawa Balewa to form the first indigenous government - it was the inability Chief Bola Ige and Dr Alex Ekwueme to work together that allowed the retired Generals to hijack the party and hand over power to one of their own.
LET me go down memory lane.
When the G-34, led by former Vice President Dr. Alex Ekwueme, transformed into the PDP in 1998, shortly after the death of late dictator General Sani Abacha, there was a feeling that a great party had been born.
The G-34 members were mainly men of repute like Alex Ekwueme, Bola Ige, Solomon Lar, Abubakar Rimi, Adamu Ciroma. This group had not kept quiet during the reign of terror of Abacha; neither did they join his government to trample on the rights of Nigerians like so many of their contemporaries did.
Secondly, although members of the G-34 were not saints, they were not viewed as corrupt or purposeless leaders during the periods they held political offices.
Chief Bola Ige was the chairman of the constitution drafting committee of what became the PDP. We also had the chairman of the G-34, Dr. Alex Ekwueme, who was respected tremendously and there were many who were looking up to him to assume the Presidency.
At a point, Bola Ige led other politicians from the South West to pull out of the formation. They first went and formed the All Peoples Party, APP. Then they broke away again and formed the Alliance for Democracy, AD.
The primaries of PDP, which had former military leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, and former Vice President, Dr Alex Ekwueme, as the main contenders, produced Obasanjo as the winner. Ironically, Obasanjo was not a member of the G-34 or a founding member of the PDP. Rather, he was drafted into the party because Northern kingmakers that joined the party decided that if power would shift from the North to the South, their fellow General is their man.
But what made it possible for these Joiners to hijack the PDP?
Listen to Dr Iyorchia Ayu, one of the founding members: If Bola Ige and co had not pulled out “those key actors, I mean of that our party at that stage, if someone like Bola Ige was with us, I doubt very much if Obasanjo would have emerged as the candidate of the party”.
Iyorchia continued: As of that time, Obasanjo was still in prison, he was not part of the formation of the PDP. We were 37 and he (Obasanjo) was certainly not one of us.
Along the line, as we kept consulting, two tendencies emerged. One was made up of those who were in support of Dr. Ekwueme. Ultimately, there were those who were looking at Obasanjo who was in prison, released, pardoned and was funded principally by Ibrahim Babangida and T Y Danjuma“ they raised money from their friends or from wherever for Obasanjo I don’t know and in any case I had no money“ decided to support Obasanjo. His financiers were all from the North and the rest is history.
Today, history has repeated itself: The failure of Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change, and Bola Tinubu, of Action Congress of Nigeria to make the needed sacrifices necessary to acquire power at the centre, have again ensured four more years of PDP government.
Is it any surprise that as the opposition struggled to meet INEC deadline for the submission of their candidates list, pick last-minute running mates and kick-start their campaign, President Goodluck Jonathan Friday travelled to Ethiopia for the 16th Ordinary AU Summit and from there to Turkey on Tuesday to begin a two-day state visit to that country. The state visit, the first of its kind by President Jonathan to any country...what confidence!
What Nigerians are saying:
Sitting in some of these "coalition meetings", I could not help come to the conclusion that there are "people who the gods have cracked their palm kernels for"! Jonathan must be high in the list. Not just "gods" but his political opponents are cracking kernels on his behalf. - JOE
The Opposition parties are not serious people. They are not interested in power at the center, as they are not willing to make the sacrifices it requires. They would all rather be big fishes in small ponds - cYBER
I am afraid that the only opportunity to remove PDP from power is being sacrificed on the altar of greed, selfishness and ego! "The only hope for dislodging PDP from power this year lies in the major opposition parties including Action Congress of Nigeria, ACN and CPC forming a coalition. CPC and ACN by going their separate ways would only be regional parties, unable to capture power at the centre".
A lot of us were disappointed on the inability of the CPC and ACN to work together -
http://elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5152%3Aanother-hope-betrayed-another-opportunity-wasted-congratulations-president-goodluck-jonathan&catid=52%3Adaniel-elombah&Itemid=73
Please read the two articles below:
Why ACN/CPC Merger Talks Collapsed - Akande
Gen. Buhari will recall our conversations and efforts to merge our two parties as far back as 2005. As proof of our willingness and sincerity, we even decided to adopt his party’s name and logo. This was when he was in the ANPP. This dream never materialised. Thereafter, we continued to hope that circumstance and national necessity would make for reconsideration. Over a year ago, the circumstance, precisely the urgent need to salvage the country from the cruel hands of the PDP, gave birth to the National Democratic Movement. This was hailed by the teeming, if beleaguered, population of this country. We, on our part, pursued it with enthusiasm, dedication and great hope.
Alas! When we were about to consummate the common platform we had all agreed to, Atiku Abubakar suddenly withdrew and returned to the PDP. Rather disappointingly, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari also left to start building the CPC from scratch.
The letter the CPC wrote the NDM remains an evidence of an insult to the spirit of the whole project and the total absence of the political will to work together in the first place.
Thus, we were left dumbfounded, stranded, and seriously embarrassed with an overwhelming number of our members feeling we had enough of the stand-ups. Those feelings are still very strong, leading in some circumstances, to deep resentment and disinterest in further talks.
This situation, notwithstanding, we have continued to explore avenues of cooperation with strong faith in a merger while your party appears to favour an alliance of some sort, hoping to convince our followership of the national need for the emergent of a virile opposition party to dislodge the PDP.
We have reached a crescendo in this unending symphony. It is absolutely clear to us in the leadership of our party that the vast majority of our members whose views we must respect, no longer sees a merger as possible before the 2011 elections.
There are too many technical hurdles in our ways. As for alliance, it has never been an attractive option and its workability is undoubtedly problematic because of the low level of literacy of the majority of our voters, among others."
The sum total of all these is that:
.The ACN no longer considers a merger feasible.
. The CPC has not demonstrated sufficient seriousness and political will to forge a workable electoral cooperation.
.The ACN therefore considers electoral alliance no longer feasible. We may, however, consider other forms of electoral cooperation that will pool resources and ensure credible election in the forthcoming general elections.
Finally, we shall continue to hope that there will be opportunities after the general elections to explore further cooperation with a view to strengthening democracy and good governance.
We are glad to note that our presidential candidate is in the image of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. We have reasons to believe; therefore,
the room for cooperation will continue to exist between our parties even after the general elections.
We leave these matters for your deep consideration aware that this is a season of extra-ordinary pressure on you and us all. Remain assured of our highest regards."
http://elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5164%3Awhy-acncpc-merger-talks-collapsed-akande&catid=47%3Apolitics&Itemid=65
Another Hope Betrayed, Another Opportunity wasted...Congratulations President Goodluck Jonathan - Daniel Elombah
What is wrong with politicians that they do not trust one another? It is so bad that the people do not trust them and even amongst them, suspicion is the watchword. Today, there is no gainsaying the fact. that the Peoples Democratic Party - a party that started with so much promise and respect has turned out to be seen as the party of thugs and looters, a party that has no respect for votes and rule of law, has fallen out of favour with Nigerians. Yet, the PDP is poised to regain power in this year’s election. Yet again in this year, 2011, the opposition by their failure to work together, has again snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
For those who do not know, just as it was in the 1960’s – when the failure of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo to work together allowed Alhaji Tafawa Balewa to form the first indigenous government - it was the inability Chief Bola Ige and Dr Alex Ekwueme to work together that allowed the retired Generals to hijack the party and hand over power to one of their own.
LET me go down memory lane.
When the G-34, led by former Vice President Dr. Alex Ekwueme, transformed into the PDP in 1998, shortly after the death of late dictator General Sani Abacha, there was a feeling that a great party had been born.
The G-34 members were mainly men of repute like Alex Ekwueme, Bola Ige, Solomon Lar, Abubakar Rimi, Adamu Ciroma. This group had not kept quiet during the reign of terror of Abacha; neither did they join his government to trample on the rights of Nigerians like so many of their contemporaries did.
Secondly, although members of the G-34 were not saints, they were not viewed as corrupt or purposeless leaders during the periods they held political offices.
Chief Bola Ige was the chairman of the constitution drafting committee of what became the PDP. We also had the chairman of the G-34, Dr. Alex Ekwueme, who was respected tremendously and there were many who were looking up to him to assume the Presidency.
At a point, Bola Ige led other politicians from the South West to pull out of the formation. They first went and formed the All Peoples Party, APP. Then they broke away again and formed the Alliance for Democracy, AD.
The primaries of PDP, which had former military leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, and former Vice President, Dr Alex Ekwueme, as the main contenders, produced Obasanjo as the winner. Ironically, Obasanjo was not a member of the G-34 or a founding member of the PDP. Rather, he was drafted into the party because Northern kingmakers that joined the party decided that if power would shift from the North to the South, their fellow General is their man.
But what made it possible for these Joiners to hijack the PDP?
Listen to Dr Iyorchia Ayu, one of the founding members: If Bola Ige and co had not pulled out “those key actors, I mean of that our party at that stage, if someone like Bola Ige was with us, I doubt very much if Obasanjo would have emerged as the candidate of the party”.
Iyorchia continued: As of that time, Obasanjo was still in prison, he was not part of the formation of the PDP. We were 37 and he (Obasanjo) was certainly not one of us.
Along the line, as we kept consulting, two tendencies emerged. One was made up of those who were in support of Dr. Ekwueme. Ultimately, there were those who were looking at Obasanjo who was in prison, released, pardoned and was funded principally by Ibrahim Babangida and T Y Danjuma“ they raised money from their friends or from wherever for Obasanjo I don’t know and in any case I had no money“ decided to support Obasanjo. His financiers were all from the North and the rest is history.
Today, history has repeated itself: The failure of Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change, and Bola Tinubu, of Action Congress of Nigeria to make the needed sacrifices necessary to acquire power at the centre, have again ensured four more years of PDP government.
Is it any surprise that as the opposition struggled to meet INEC deadline for the submission of their candidates list, pick last-minute running mates and kick-start their campaign, President Goodluck Jonathan Friday travelled to Ethiopia for the 16th Ordinary AU Summit and from there to Turkey on Tuesday to begin a two-day state visit to that country. The state visit, the first of its kind by President Jonathan to any country...what confidence!
What Nigerians are saying:
Sitting in some of these "coalition meetings", I could not help come to the conclusion that there are "people who the gods have cracked their palm kernels for"! Jonathan must be high in the list. Not just "gods" but his political opponents are cracking kernels on his behalf. - JOE
The Opposition parties are not serious people. They are not interested in power at the center, as they are not willing to make the sacrifices it requires. They would all rather be big fishes in small ponds - cYBER
I am afraid that the only opportunity to remove PDP from power is being sacrificed on the altar of greed, selfishness and ego! "The only hope for dislodging PDP from power this year lies in the major opposition parties including Action Congress of Nigeria, ACN and CPC forming a coalition. CPC and ACN by going their separate ways would only be regional parties, unable to capture power at the centre".
A lot of us were disappointed on the inability of the CPC and ACN to work together -
http://elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5152%3Aanother-hope-betrayed-another-opportunity-wasted-congratulations-president-goodluck-jonathan&catid=52%3Adaniel-elombah&Itemid=73
Libya turmoil could hurt regional food security -UN
The United Nations expressed serious concern on Friday about the impact of the Libyan uprising on food security across North Africa because of the region's dependency on cereal imports.
"The ongoing crisis will likely have a significant impact on food security in Libya and in nearby crisis-affected areas," the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization said in a statement on Friday.
It added that possible disruptions to the flow of goods and services and population displacements were also of concern.
An uprising against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has led to escalating violence between rebels and security forces, rising casualties, threats of hunger and a refugee crisis as thousands of people flee the country.
"The situation is very dynamic and very volatile and risks changing on a day-by-day basis in the coming weeks and months," Daniele Donati, chief of FAO's Emergency Operations Service said in an interview with Reuters.
He said it could lead to a sudden disruption of imports and the collapse of the internal food distribution system.
Disruption to markets from which farmers secure seeds and fertilisers also threatened agricultural production and food security, the FAO said.
Donati saw no immediate risk to food availability in North Africa but said that could change if the conflict drags on.
He did not expect the situation to impact cereals markets but noted heightened tension due to rising food prices.
Libya, which relies on imports for more than 90 percent of its food, is believed to have about four months of food supplies in the country, the U.N.'s World Food Programme said.
The estimate was based on information from Libyan authorities, WFP spokeswoman Emilia Casella said.
"As a net food importer, Libya does need to be able to bring food into the country and given the current security situation those food imports are not able to get in the way they would normally be flowing," Casella told reporters in Geneva.
Other major grain importers in North Africa include Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
In Egypt, FAO said, the sharp rise in international wheat prices would also add substantially to the cost of imports in 2010/11 and to the government's bread subsidy programme, which helps cushion the consumer from rising prices.
The FAO said it would set up a monitoring system with the WFP covering Libya and neighbouring countries to be able to advise on policies to help reduce the risk of food-related problems. (Reporting by Catherine Hornby and Eleanor Biles in Rome and Stephanie Nebehay in Geneva; editing by Anthony Barker)
"The ongoing crisis will likely have a significant impact on food security in Libya and in nearby crisis-affected areas," the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization said in a statement on Friday.
It added that possible disruptions to the flow of goods and services and population displacements were also of concern.
An uprising against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has led to escalating violence between rebels and security forces, rising casualties, threats of hunger and a refugee crisis as thousands of people flee the country.
"The situation is very dynamic and very volatile and risks changing on a day-by-day basis in the coming weeks and months," Daniele Donati, chief of FAO's Emergency Operations Service said in an interview with Reuters.
He said it could lead to a sudden disruption of imports and the collapse of the internal food distribution system.
Disruption to markets from which farmers secure seeds and fertilisers also threatened agricultural production and food security, the FAO said.
Donati saw no immediate risk to food availability in North Africa but said that could change if the conflict drags on.
He did not expect the situation to impact cereals markets but noted heightened tension due to rising food prices.
Libya, which relies on imports for more than 90 percent of its food, is believed to have about four months of food supplies in the country, the U.N.'s World Food Programme said.
The estimate was based on information from Libyan authorities, WFP spokeswoman Emilia Casella said.
"As a net food importer, Libya does need to be able to bring food into the country and given the current security situation those food imports are not able to get in the way they would normally be flowing," Casella told reporters in Geneva.
Other major grain importers in North Africa include Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
In Egypt, FAO said, the sharp rise in international wheat prices would also add substantially to the cost of imports in 2010/11 and to the government's bread subsidy programme, which helps cushion the consumer from rising prices.
The FAO said it would set up a monitoring system with the WFP covering Libya and neighbouring countries to be able to advise on policies to help reduce the risk of food-related problems. (Reporting by Catherine Hornby and Eleanor Biles in Rome and Stephanie Nebehay in Geneva; editing by Anthony Barker)
How Nigeria is being destroyed by Religion
ANY society that prioritises ignorance will fail to live up to its potential.That was the crux of Damola Awoyokun's piece "The Next Einstein and the Expressway Churches" published in The Guardian of May 22. In contemporary Nigeria, the miracle-hawking Pentecostal churches are the bastions of the crude tendency to ignorance.
For them, God is Mr. Fix-It-All who will descend in full glory to solve all our personal and national problems. Consequently, diseases are cured not by demanding for a well-equipped public health care system and functioning research laboratories but by prayers.
Accidents are prevented not by good motorways, effective traffic policing, and sane road habits but by prayers. Examinations are passed not by diligent study but by praying.
Armed robbery attacks are foiled not by a revamped police force and the provision of enough jobs for the unemployed but with prayers. What these
churches find primary is being dabbed on the head with anointing oil by pastors speaking with false American accents, with each pastor clad in a designer suit and wearing a gold wristwatch that costs more than the average monthly income of his impoverished congregation. Seek ye first the anointing oil of a prosperity preacher and every other thing shall be added: this is the prevailing creed.
Mention must also be made of how these establishments encourage corruption by placing the tags of miracles on suddenly-acquired wealth. Questions are not asked about the provenance of the riches, as evidenced by the recent case of an employee who looted money from the coffers of his workplace, an upscale hotel in Victoria Island, and donated it to one of the more visible miracle churches in Lagos.
The only thing that matters is the paying of one's tithe, even from fraudulent funds. Obviously, when a delusion afflicts a sizable chunk of the population, people tend to forget it is a psychosis and they begin calling it a religion. A delusion though remains a delusion even when championed by millions of believers. Remember: the fact that millions once believed the earth was flat did not make it less spherical.
Regrettably, Jude Fashagba's piece "Einstein and the People of Faith" published in The Guardian on Sunday of June 1 failed to engage with these
relevant issues. Rather than writing a worthwhile response to Mr. Awoyokun's submission, Mr. Fashagba preoccupied himself with stringing together
disconnected and evasive sentences.
Resorting to such a stratagem is the only option when one has a bad product to sell, and there are few products less marketable than Mr. Fashagba's pitch that science and faith are not oppositional. Science foregrounds observable evidence as it is basis for understanding the world; faith, in contrast, privileges the unquestioning adherence to a body of received claims even when unsupported by evidence.
A committee of the National Academy of Sciences recently said "the goal of science is to seek naturalistic explanations for phenomena... within the
operational rule of testability" while St. Paul wrote in the Book of Hebrews that "faith is the assurance of things hoped for and the certainty
of things not seen."
Anyone who fails to see a fundamental difference in both approaches needs to get himself a better education. Science is a
continuous process of empirical inquiry, not a static body of knowledge. That is why there is something known as the scientific method. Science does not fear change because its method is served, not compromised, by new insights;religion, on the other hand, finds nothing more frightening than new ways of thinking which it labels heresy.
Those who revised Dalton's atomic theory were not burnt at the stake by scientists; prelates of the medieval Church murdered Giordano Bruno for querying the validity of their theology. It is because of this open-mindedness that science has explained and predicted the universe better than any religion and, despite the lamentations of people like Mr. Fashagba, will continue to do so.
Since Jude Fashagba is a staunch believer in miracles, he could consider it a major miracle that his write-up did not choke on the barrage of its
diversionary questions. The Bible teacher wondered if Albert Einstein was the atheist he was "painted" to be. It is on record that Einstein
considered all religions to be childish superstitions.
The scientist wrote: "The word god is for me nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of honourable, but still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty childish. No interpretation no matter how subtle can change this."
Attempting to exhaustively answer Jude Fashagba's avalanche of questions would only succeed in dignifying his pathetic red herrings. He could spend his time more profitably in researching answers to his endless questions rather than indulging in the voyeuristic sport of "googling" out Mr. Awoyokun's name on the internet. And what connection does a person's accomplishment have with the validity of his or her statements?
It is instructive to remember the case of James D. Watson, a Nobel Prize winner in Medicine, who was fired from his prestigious position in 2007 after making racist statements that lacked any scientific backing about the intelligence of black people. Perceptive human beings know how to separate a person from the validity of his or her assertions. Clearly, Mr. Fashagba is not so discerning.
At this juncture in our national life when Nigeria is troubled by a myriad of social and economic problems, what the citizens need is clear-sighted reasoning and not mystical abracadabras. In the decades during which religious fervour has gained ascendancy in Nigeria, it has become obvious that blind faith is creating more problems rather than solving the ones on ground.
Witness the routine traffic hell caused on the Lagos-Ibadan expressway by the Pentecostal business centres situated along the route. And the ongoing case of Pastor King. And the Miss World and the Danish cartoon riots. And many other cases too numerous to list. Religions do not encourage reasoning; instead they promote rationalisation, something entirely different.
This was why St. Augustine, a prominent theologian of the Church, said: "I believe so that I can understand." Blind faith comes first and then
justifications for it follow. For the centuries Europe followed that precept, its citizens were locked in the Dark Ages, and only when the Renaissance
ruptured that dogmatic mode did Europe begin making intellectual progress.
In the liberal era of Averroes, Al-Razi, and Avicenna, learning was far more advanced in the Islamic world than in the West; not until religious suffocation came in the wake of Al-Ghazali's attacks on rationalism did that civilisation fall way behind. The fate of the forerunner who tumbled into a pit should suffice to instruct those coming behind, says an African proverb. In relation to the matter at hand, one can only hope it does.
Jude Fashagba should be advocating the entrenchment of a logical and evidential attitude in the decision making process of Nigerians, both in our personal and public lives, not the opposite. We are bored with seeing political figures consecrated in public by religious leaders, only for us to watch in horror as these public officers go ahead to spend eight years looting the treasuries and committing atrocious human rights abuses.
Mr. Fashagba is also an architect. I hope he does not believe that the epidemic of collapsed buildings in Lagos was caused by the machinations of evil spirits. If he does, it will be of great relief to all if he restricts himself to designing his personal residence and to his other profession of Bible teaching.
In his second calling, he could promise his congregation a thousand miracles and deliver zero. None of his credulous flock would find it necessary to bring him to book.
http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5191%3Ahow-nigeria-is-being-destroyed-by-religion&catid=49%3Ahardtalk&Itemid=75
...Babatunde's latest play was commissioned by Riksteatern (Sweden's National Theatre), Stockholm
Kola Afolabi..France.
Written by R Babatunde & K. Afolabi
For them, God is Mr. Fix-It-All who will descend in full glory to solve all our personal and national problems. Consequently, diseases are cured not by demanding for a well-equipped public health care system and functioning research laboratories but by prayers.
Accidents are prevented not by good motorways, effective traffic policing, and sane road habits but by prayers. Examinations are passed not by diligent study but by praying.
Armed robbery attacks are foiled not by a revamped police force and the provision of enough jobs for the unemployed but with prayers. What these
churches find primary is being dabbed on the head with anointing oil by pastors speaking with false American accents, with each pastor clad in a designer suit and wearing a gold wristwatch that costs more than the average monthly income of his impoverished congregation. Seek ye first the anointing oil of a prosperity preacher and every other thing shall be added: this is the prevailing creed.
Mention must also be made of how these establishments encourage corruption by placing the tags of miracles on suddenly-acquired wealth. Questions are not asked about the provenance of the riches, as evidenced by the recent case of an employee who looted money from the coffers of his workplace, an upscale hotel in Victoria Island, and donated it to one of the more visible miracle churches in Lagos.
The only thing that matters is the paying of one's tithe, even from fraudulent funds. Obviously, when a delusion afflicts a sizable chunk of the population, people tend to forget it is a psychosis and they begin calling it a religion. A delusion though remains a delusion even when championed by millions of believers. Remember: the fact that millions once believed the earth was flat did not make it less spherical.
Regrettably, Jude Fashagba's piece "Einstein and the People of Faith" published in The Guardian on Sunday of June 1 failed to engage with these
relevant issues. Rather than writing a worthwhile response to Mr. Awoyokun's submission, Mr. Fashagba preoccupied himself with stringing together
disconnected and evasive sentences.
Resorting to such a stratagem is the only option when one has a bad product to sell, and there are few products less marketable than Mr. Fashagba's pitch that science and faith are not oppositional. Science foregrounds observable evidence as it is basis for understanding the world; faith, in contrast, privileges the unquestioning adherence to a body of received claims even when unsupported by evidence.
A committee of the National Academy of Sciences recently said "the goal of science is to seek naturalistic explanations for phenomena... within the
operational rule of testability" while St. Paul wrote in the Book of Hebrews that "faith is the assurance of things hoped for and the certainty
of things not seen."
Anyone who fails to see a fundamental difference in both approaches needs to get himself a better education. Science is a
continuous process of empirical inquiry, not a static body of knowledge. That is why there is something known as the scientific method. Science does not fear change because its method is served, not compromised, by new insights;religion, on the other hand, finds nothing more frightening than new ways of thinking which it labels heresy.
Those who revised Dalton's atomic theory were not burnt at the stake by scientists; prelates of the medieval Church murdered Giordano Bruno for querying the validity of their theology. It is because of this open-mindedness that science has explained and predicted the universe better than any religion and, despite the lamentations of people like Mr. Fashagba, will continue to do so.
Since Jude Fashagba is a staunch believer in miracles, he could consider it a major miracle that his write-up did not choke on the barrage of its
diversionary questions. The Bible teacher wondered if Albert Einstein was the atheist he was "painted" to be. It is on record that Einstein
considered all religions to be childish superstitions.
The scientist wrote: "The word god is for me nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of honourable, but still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty childish. No interpretation no matter how subtle can change this."
Attempting to exhaustively answer Jude Fashagba's avalanche of questions would only succeed in dignifying his pathetic red herrings. He could spend his time more profitably in researching answers to his endless questions rather than indulging in the voyeuristic sport of "googling" out Mr. Awoyokun's name on the internet. And what connection does a person's accomplishment have with the validity of his or her statements?
It is instructive to remember the case of James D. Watson, a Nobel Prize winner in Medicine, who was fired from his prestigious position in 2007 after making racist statements that lacked any scientific backing about the intelligence of black people. Perceptive human beings know how to separate a person from the validity of his or her assertions. Clearly, Mr. Fashagba is not so discerning.
At this juncture in our national life when Nigeria is troubled by a myriad of social and economic problems, what the citizens need is clear-sighted reasoning and not mystical abracadabras. In the decades during which religious fervour has gained ascendancy in Nigeria, it has become obvious that blind faith is creating more problems rather than solving the ones on ground.
Witness the routine traffic hell caused on the Lagos-Ibadan expressway by the Pentecostal business centres situated along the route. And the ongoing case of Pastor King. And the Miss World and the Danish cartoon riots. And many other cases too numerous to list. Religions do not encourage reasoning; instead they promote rationalisation, something entirely different.
This was why St. Augustine, a prominent theologian of the Church, said: "I believe so that I can understand." Blind faith comes first and then
justifications for it follow. For the centuries Europe followed that precept, its citizens were locked in the Dark Ages, and only when the Renaissance
ruptured that dogmatic mode did Europe begin making intellectual progress.
In the liberal era of Averroes, Al-Razi, and Avicenna, learning was far more advanced in the Islamic world than in the West; not until religious suffocation came in the wake of Al-Ghazali's attacks on rationalism did that civilisation fall way behind. The fate of the forerunner who tumbled into a pit should suffice to instruct those coming behind, says an African proverb. In relation to the matter at hand, one can only hope it does.
Jude Fashagba should be advocating the entrenchment of a logical and evidential attitude in the decision making process of Nigerians, both in our personal and public lives, not the opposite. We are bored with seeing political figures consecrated in public by religious leaders, only for us to watch in horror as these public officers go ahead to spend eight years looting the treasuries and committing atrocious human rights abuses.
Mr. Fashagba is also an architect. I hope he does not believe that the epidemic of collapsed buildings in Lagos was caused by the machinations of evil spirits. If he does, it will be of great relief to all if he restricts himself to designing his personal residence and to his other profession of Bible teaching.
In his second calling, he could promise his congregation a thousand miracles and deliver zero. None of his credulous flock would find it necessary to bring him to book.
http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5191%3Ahow-nigeria-is-being-destroyed-by-religion&catid=49%3Ahardtalk&Itemid=75
...Babatunde's latest play was commissioned by Riksteatern (Sweden's National Theatre), Stockholm
Kola Afolabi..France.
Written by R Babatunde & K. Afolabi
The global democratic revolution: a new stage
The epic events across the Arab world in the first months of 2011, diverse and many-sided as they are, can be understood as a single episode: the latest phase in the worldwide democratic revolution which has been remaking the world since the 1980s.
The process that began in Tunisia in mid-December 2010 and led to the overthrow of the country’s president a month later, achieved a similar outcome in Egypt following over two weeks of mass mobilisations there, and has spread from Yemen in the east to Morocco in the west.
True, the very different experiences of Arab countries - including the continuing strife in Libya, the protests in Bahrain, and the elite concessions in Jordan and Saudi Arabia - underline how variegated the process is and how uncertain the precise outcome in each case. And it is too early to say whether the changes in Tunisia and Egypt (and the results elsewhere) will lead to the creation of recognisably democratic states, let alone what the regional and global impact of the events will be.
But everywhere, the unifying thread is opposition to authoritarianism and aspiration to democratic rule; and the sense of a psychological break with the dictatorial past is unmistakable.
The immense movement in Egypt in particular - the middle-east’s largest and most influential country - has opened the space for politics, in a way that has ramifications far beyond the region. It is notable in this respect that authoritarian regimes from Tehran to Beijing have curtailed access to information about the Egyptian and other dramas. Their fear is a tribute to the achievement of this “Arab awakening”, however provisional the achievement remains in practical terms.
Democracy and revolution
It is salutary to recall that even in 1960, parliamentary democracy was mostly confined to the core western societies of northwestern Europe, north America, and Australasia - though notably too in various southern countries (India, Sri Lanka, and Chile, for example).
In 1910, democracy was still fully to be established even in this core - there were limits in several places on universal male suffrage, and female suffrage still had to be fought for (with New Zealand and Australia pioneers in this regard). The struggle for democracy was intertwined with social campaigns by labour, women and (in India) for national independence. What is now taken for granted is a hard-won and historically recent achievement.
Moreover, the inter-war period saw grave setbacks for democracy, as Europe succumbed to fascist and Stalinist totalitarianism: only the Allied victory in the second world war “normalised” it once more in its northern heartlands. But the cold-war’s entrenchment in the late 1940s and 1950s made democratic outcomes the exception.
In eastern Europe, Soviet rule extinguished the seeds of pluralism that had briefly emerged in (for example) Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; in Africa, military rule became the norm in several post-colonial independent states; in Asia, revolutions won via Mao Zedong’s “barrel of a gun” turned into dictatorships; in the middle east too, military coups installed authoritarian regimes, and monarchical states learned how to rely on force to secure their power. Everywhere outside the Soviet “sphere of influence”, the United States viewed dictatorships as pillars against communism.
The longer historical sweep of democracy’s evolution and setbacks also reveals that the modern experience of revolution has so often oscillated between democracy and dictatorship. France in 1789, Russia in 1917, Iran in 1979 - these are but the major landmarks of a familiar trajectory where spontaneous mass movements sparked by a democratic impulse gradually fissured, polarised, and eventually captured by dictatorial tendencies.
The direction of travel here was systematised in the speeches and writings of Stalin and Mao (and indeed “theorised” by their intellectual bedfellows to give them a wider legitimacy), to an extent that the very idea of revolution seemed to contain within it an endorsement of violent and oppressive rule.
A different kind of revolution
Yet in parallel to the cold war’s larger story of superpower politics, a new kind of democratic revolution which consciously rejected the model and the temptations of authoritarian “capture” has also taken root. The popular upsurges in East Germany in 1953, and in Hungary and Poland in 1956, sought an end to dictatorship and to establish a political space of genuine freedom. In 1968, a reform process in Czechoslovakia mushroomed into a society-wide movement for change.
Also in 1968, student movements pioneered new ideas of participatory democracy which challenged the rigidities of western parliamentary systems as well as authoritarian regimes. The protests of that year reverberated across the cold-war world - from Washington, Berlin and Paris to Karachi, Tokyo and Mexico City. Their aftershocks were felt until at least the mid-1970s.
These movements were mostly unsuccessful in achieving fundamental political change. In the east, the Red Army was the ultimate bulwark of Stalinist order, with Moscow’s local factotums only too willing to keep tight order; in the west, the US could rely on an array of military-authoritarian rulers to obstruct change.
There was an exception to the pattern in southern Europe, where - in Portugal (after the revolution of 1974), Greece (after the military junta of 1967-74), and Spain (after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975) - a revived democracy was consolidated through integration into European institutions.
In the later stages of the cold war, movements emerged that anticipated the landslide to come. The discrediting of military rule in Latin America led to a wave of democratisation in the 1980s, even as vicious counterinsurgency wars were waged in the isthmus. The “people power” insurgency in the Philippines in 1986 that unseated Ferdinand Marcos was another harbinger. In 1980-81 in Poland, the Solidarity trade union had created a new model of mass mobilisation that sought to bypass rather than directly challenge the regime. It was crushed by the coup of December 1981, but was another of the seeds of great convulsion of 1989 that swept east-central Europe.
1989: a global shift begins
In a global perspective, 1989 is a double-sided moment: both a paradigmatic case of “people power” driving permanent political change, and (in China) of the violent reassertion of dictatorship. But it also anticipated further democratic upheavals, and thus became part of the wider historical unfolding of democracy of which the Arab world’s revolt is the latest example.
In that historic year, a serendipitous international conjuncture - democratic consolidation and integration in western Europe, Soviet reform under Mikhail Gorbachev (who crucially indicated that he would no longer use his military to block change in Moscow’s zone) - enabled the success of the “velvet” revolutions.
In this respect, it is right to emphasise the importance of “the pull of the west” in 1989, and that this “is weaker and more complex” in the case of Egypt. But the rejection of Soviet rule in 1989 was also the trigger of a wave of worldwide democratic upheavals in US-allied states in the first half of the 1990s - which notably removed long-standing authoritarian regimes in South Korea, South Africa, Indonesia.
The “Arab democratic revolution” can be seen to fit this pattern, and thus link in to the broader post-1989 trend. But the fact that it was so long “delayed” also raises the question of why, a degree of local change notwithstanding, the worldwide pattern of upheaval had been slowing down.
After 9/11: a failed substitutionism
The answer to this questions is complex, but has a lot to do with both unresolved conflicts in the middle-east (the major regional exception to democratisation until now) and the United States’s response to 9/11.
The effect of the US’s post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and (to a greater extent) Iraq, the intensification of Washington’s tensions with Iran, and its role in the Israel-Palestine conflict has been to ensure that the strategic interests of the main players have stifled the possibility of democratic change. This is most clearly seen in Lebanon and Gaza, where calculations of power and interest vis-a-vis Hizbollah and Hamas have taken precedence over encouragement of even limited democratic progress.
At the same time, 9/11 hugely boosted the most anti-democratic forces in the Arab and Muslim worlds. A small but significant element among young Muslims was attracted to the spectacular violence of al-Qaida, and governments everywhere sought to tighten security in ways that curtailed liberties.
George W Bush’s invasion of Iraq fused all these tendencies. The assault was wrapped in the language of “democracy promotion”, in practice implying that military power - not democratic organisation - was the route to “regime change”. In effect this was a massive substitution of armed force for proper democratic action, which left little room for peaceful contributions by the Iraqis themselves. Instead, the invasion was the catalyst for a bloody, locally genocidal war between armed Iraqi factions which set back the cause of democratic change - in the wider region as well as Iraq.
It is only after Bush became history and the “war on terror” became less dominant (even if it still being waged under Barack Obama) that the possibility of real democratic change have reopened, both in the middle east and in countries relatively removed from the disasters of the Bush years.
The “colour” revolutions, and contradiction
Even when the obstacles in the way of democratic revolution are removed, however, the two decades since the end of the cold war show that the consolidation of democracy once it is established can be very difficult.
Democracy in the west itself is in many respects incomplete, limited, and subject to great pressure from corporate and other interests. The examples are legion, from the United States to Britain (whose coalition government is after less than a year in power imposing destructive policies for which it gained no electoral mandate) and Italy (whose authoritarian-populist ruler Silvio Berlusconi embodies a dangerous fusion of media control, political power, and undermining of the law).
But it is in countries with a more recent experience of democracy that the problems of consolidation are usually more acute. They face the daunting challenge of maintaining the dynamic of change and creating democratic institutions - after the old ruler has gone but when many of his allies, including the army, remain in the shadows. This is why Marxists called for the formation of a revolutionary vanguard, partly by recruiting the rank-and-file infantry to weaken the military and enable a seizure of power in the name of the people.
Such vanguards are no longer in fashion in the Facebook age, and their historical record is not good. But the absence of some such dynamic and unifying force makes division and perhaps loss of impetus among the original revolutionary impetus (as in Georgia after 2003 and Ukraine after 2004, for example) difficult to avoid.
A core problem is that even if electoral democracy is instituted, rulers - whether old ones under new democratic labels, or new ones thrown up by street protest - will still try to cling to power by authoritarian means, not least by rigging elections. Such manipulation can be achieved even in western countries by heavy manipulation of the media (Berlusconi again) or skulduggery in the voting process (Florida, 2000). Elsewhere, the right result is secured by intimidation, violence, and control over the voting process and the count (as, recently, in Iran and the Ivory Coast). The latter is a new norm in a democratising world.
A rigged election can itself be a catalyst for revolt: the cycle becoming a “revlection” (Timothy Garton Ash coined the term to describe what happened when Slobodan Milosevic fixed the Serbian election in 2000).
Then there are repeated democratic revolutions, as successive rulers fall prey to corruption and authoritarianism (Georgia’s experience, with the post-Soviet leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia giving way to Eduard Shevardnadze, and the latter being overthrown in the uprising that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power - though the ingredients of democracy in some of these changes need to be examined).
If this sounds bad, there is worse. For a process of nationalist-led democratisation in the republics of former Yugoslavia contributed to the disastrous genocidal wars of the 1990s; United Nations-sponsored “power-sharing” and democratisation in Rwanda helped lead to the genocide of 1994; elections have been catalysts of violence in Iraq; and the manipulation of Kenya’s election in 2008 triggered a wave of genocidal violence in which thousands died and hundreds of thousands were expelled. Zimbabwe and (again) the Ivory Coast offer their own contributions to the link between elections and violence. Democratic change, clearly, is a high-risk business.
An unfinished process
Thus, the worldwide democratic revolution faces many problems. It is also greatly limited still in geographical scope. China is the biggest question. How long can the Chinese Communist Party stall real democratic change, and is it conceivable that it can continue to implement reforms without provoking even greater mass action than in Tiananmen Square in 1989? Egypt suggests that there is a time-limit to authoritarian rule, and China’s deep social tensions and economic inequality make the prospect of another mass uprising at least feasible.
But the revolution is unfinished in a more profound sense, to do with qualitative depth. Free speech and fair elections remain compelling aspirations for much of the world. But they are only the beginnings of change: both because more is needed to guarantee democratic accountability, and because major inequalities in a country make social democracy essential for political democracy to realise its full potential.
But democratic revolution - as seen in the Arab risings - is also a contagion that spreads from country to country, and becomes regional, even global. It also increasingly takes place under the gaze of global media, with more and more citizens having access to information about what is happening as it happens. As much as in Europe in 1989, the middle-east movements are both national and international at their very heart.
In this sense, the worldwide pattern of (national) democratic revolutions and changes is also part of a global (as well as international) trend. Democratisation reflects the growing global consciousness of interdependence and shared values. It poses a huge double-challenge: of consolidating democracy and rights worldwide, and of creating institutions which can create joined-up democracy on regional and global scales. This is the test for the next decades, one that events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere bring into even sharper focus.
Martin Shaw is professorial fellow in international relations and human rights at Roehampton University, London, and an honorary research professor of international relations at the University of Sussex.
The process that began in Tunisia in mid-December 2010 and led to the overthrow of the country’s president a month later, achieved a similar outcome in Egypt following over two weeks of mass mobilisations there, and has spread from Yemen in the east to Morocco in the west.
True, the very different experiences of Arab countries - including the continuing strife in Libya, the protests in Bahrain, and the elite concessions in Jordan and Saudi Arabia - underline how variegated the process is and how uncertain the precise outcome in each case. And it is too early to say whether the changes in Tunisia and Egypt (and the results elsewhere) will lead to the creation of recognisably democratic states, let alone what the regional and global impact of the events will be.
But everywhere, the unifying thread is opposition to authoritarianism and aspiration to democratic rule; and the sense of a psychological break with the dictatorial past is unmistakable.
The immense movement in Egypt in particular - the middle-east’s largest and most influential country - has opened the space for politics, in a way that has ramifications far beyond the region. It is notable in this respect that authoritarian regimes from Tehran to Beijing have curtailed access to information about the Egyptian and other dramas. Their fear is a tribute to the achievement of this “Arab awakening”, however provisional the achievement remains in practical terms.
Democracy and revolution
It is salutary to recall that even in 1960, parliamentary democracy was mostly confined to the core western societies of northwestern Europe, north America, and Australasia - though notably too in various southern countries (India, Sri Lanka, and Chile, for example).
In 1910, democracy was still fully to be established even in this core - there were limits in several places on universal male suffrage, and female suffrage still had to be fought for (with New Zealand and Australia pioneers in this regard). The struggle for democracy was intertwined with social campaigns by labour, women and (in India) for national independence. What is now taken for granted is a hard-won and historically recent achievement.
Moreover, the inter-war period saw grave setbacks for democracy, as Europe succumbed to fascist and Stalinist totalitarianism: only the Allied victory in the second world war “normalised” it once more in its northern heartlands. But the cold-war’s entrenchment in the late 1940s and 1950s made democratic outcomes the exception.
In eastern Europe, Soviet rule extinguished the seeds of pluralism that had briefly emerged in (for example) Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; in Africa, military rule became the norm in several post-colonial independent states; in Asia, revolutions won via Mao Zedong’s “barrel of a gun” turned into dictatorships; in the middle east too, military coups installed authoritarian regimes, and monarchical states learned how to rely on force to secure their power. Everywhere outside the Soviet “sphere of influence”, the United States viewed dictatorships as pillars against communism.
The longer historical sweep of democracy’s evolution and setbacks also reveals that the modern experience of revolution has so often oscillated between democracy and dictatorship. France in 1789, Russia in 1917, Iran in 1979 - these are but the major landmarks of a familiar trajectory where spontaneous mass movements sparked by a democratic impulse gradually fissured, polarised, and eventually captured by dictatorial tendencies.
The direction of travel here was systematised in the speeches and writings of Stalin and Mao (and indeed “theorised” by their intellectual bedfellows to give them a wider legitimacy), to an extent that the very idea of revolution seemed to contain within it an endorsement of violent and oppressive rule.
A different kind of revolution
Yet in parallel to the cold war’s larger story of superpower politics, a new kind of democratic revolution which consciously rejected the model and the temptations of authoritarian “capture” has also taken root. The popular upsurges in East Germany in 1953, and in Hungary and Poland in 1956, sought an end to dictatorship and to establish a political space of genuine freedom. In 1968, a reform process in Czechoslovakia mushroomed into a society-wide movement for change.
Also in 1968, student movements pioneered new ideas of participatory democracy which challenged the rigidities of western parliamentary systems as well as authoritarian regimes. The protests of that year reverberated across the cold-war world - from Washington, Berlin and Paris to Karachi, Tokyo and Mexico City. Their aftershocks were felt until at least the mid-1970s.
These movements were mostly unsuccessful in achieving fundamental political change. In the east, the Red Army was the ultimate bulwark of Stalinist order, with Moscow’s local factotums only too willing to keep tight order; in the west, the US could rely on an array of military-authoritarian rulers to obstruct change.
There was an exception to the pattern in southern Europe, where - in Portugal (after the revolution of 1974), Greece (after the military junta of 1967-74), and Spain (after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975) - a revived democracy was consolidated through integration into European institutions.
In the later stages of the cold war, movements emerged that anticipated the landslide to come. The discrediting of military rule in Latin America led to a wave of democratisation in the 1980s, even as vicious counterinsurgency wars were waged in the isthmus. The “people power” insurgency in the Philippines in 1986 that unseated Ferdinand Marcos was another harbinger. In 1980-81 in Poland, the Solidarity trade union had created a new model of mass mobilisation that sought to bypass rather than directly challenge the regime. It was crushed by the coup of December 1981, but was another of the seeds of great convulsion of 1989 that swept east-central Europe.
1989: a global shift begins
In a global perspective, 1989 is a double-sided moment: both a paradigmatic case of “people power” driving permanent political change, and (in China) of the violent reassertion of dictatorship. But it also anticipated further democratic upheavals, and thus became part of the wider historical unfolding of democracy of which the Arab world’s revolt is the latest example.
In that historic year, a serendipitous international conjuncture - democratic consolidation and integration in western Europe, Soviet reform under Mikhail Gorbachev (who crucially indicated that he would no longer use his military to block change in Moscow’s zone) - enabled the success of the “velvet” revolutions.
In this respect, it is right to emphasise the importance of “the pull of the west” in 1989, and that this “is weaker and more complex” in the case of Egypt. But the rejection of Soviet rule in 1989 was also the trigger of a wave of worldwide democratic upheavals in US-allied states in the first half of the 1990s - which notably removed long-standing authoritarian regimes in South Korea, South Africa, Indonesia.
The “Arab democratic revolution” can be seen to fit this pattern, and thus link in to the broader post-1989 trend. But the fact that it was so long “delayed” also raises the question of why, a degree of local change notwithstanding, the worldwide pattern of upheaval had been slowing down.
After 9/11: a failed substitutionism
The answer to this questions is complex, but has a lot to do with both unresolved conflicts in the middle-east (the major regional exception to democratisation until now) and the United States’s response to 9/11.
The effect of the US’s post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and (to a greater extent) Iraq, the intensification of Washington’s tensions with Iran, and its role in the Israel-Palestine conflict has been to ensure that the strategic interests of the main players have stifled the possibility of democratic change. This is most clearly seen in Lebanon and Gaza, where calculations of power and interest vis-a-vis Hizbollah and Hamas have taken precedence over encouragement of even limited democratic progress.
At the same time, 9/11 hugely boosted the most anti-democratic forces in the Arab and Muslim worlds. A small but significant element among young Muslims was attracted to the spectacular violence of al-Qaida, and governments everywhere sought to tighten security in ways that curtailed liberties.
George W Bush’s invasion of Iraq fused all these tendencies. The assault was wrapped in the language of “democracy promotion”, in practice implying that military power - not democratic organisation - was the route to “regime change”. In effect this was a massive substitution of armed force for proper democratic action, which left little room for peaceful contributions by the Iraqis themselves. Instead, the invasion was the catalyst for a bloody, locally genocidal war between armed Iraqi factions which set back the cause of democratic change - in the wider region as well as Iraq.
It is only after Bush became history and the “war on terror” became less dominant (even if it still being waged under Barack Obama) that the possibility of real democratic change have reopened, both in the middle east and in countries relatively removed from the disasters of the Bush years.
The “colour” revolutions, and contradiction
Even when the obstacles in the way of democratic revolution are removed, however, the two decades since the end of the cold war show that the consolidation of democracy once it is established can be very difficult.
Democracy in the west itself is in many respects incomplete, limited, and subject to great pressure from corporate and other interests. The examples are legion, from the United States to Britain (whose coalition government is after less than a year in power imposing destructive policies for which it gained no electoral mandate) and Italy (whose authoritarian-populist ruler Silvio Berlusconi embodies a dangerous fusion of media control, political power, and undermining of the law).
But it is in countries with a more recent experience of democracy that the problems of consolidation are usually more acute. They face the daunting challenge of maintaining the dynamic of change and creating democratic institutions - after the old ruler has gone but when many of his allies, including the army, remain in the shadows. This is why Marxists called for the formation of a revolutionary vanguard, partly by recruiting the rank-and-file infantry to weaken the military and enable a seizure of power in the name of the people.
Such vanguards are no longer in fashion in the Facebook age, and their historical record is not good. But the absence of some such dynamic and unifying force makes division and perhaps loss of impetus among the original revolutionary impetus (as in Georgia after 2003 and Ukraine after 2004, for example) difficult to avoid.
A core problem is that even if electoral democracy is instituted, rulers - whether old ones under new democratic labels, or new ones thrown up by street protest - will still try to cling to power by authoritarian means, not least by rigging elections. Such manipulation can be achieved even in western countries by heavy manipulation of the media (Berlusconi again) or skulduggery in the voting process (Florida, 2000). Elsewhere, the right result is secured by intimidation, violence, and control over the voting process and the count (as, recently, in Iran and the Ivory Coast). The latter is a new norm in a democratising world.
A rigged election can itself be a catalyst for revolt: the cycle becoming a “revlection” (Timothy Garton Ash coined the term to describe what happened when Slobodan Milosevic fixed the Serbian election in 2000).
Then there are repeated democratic revolutions, as successive rulers fall prey to corruption and authoritarianism (Georgia’s experience, with the post-Soviet leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia giving way to Eduard Shevardnadze, and the latter being overthrown in the uprising that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power - though the ingredients of democracy in some of these changes need to be examined).
If this sounds bad, there is worse. For a process of nationalist-led democratisation in the republics of former Yugoslavia contributed to the disastrous genocidal wars of the 1990s; United Nations-sponsored “power-sharing” and democratisation in Rwanda helped lead to the genocide of 1994; elections have been catalysts of violence in Iraq; and the manipulation of Kenya’s election in 2008 triggered a wave of genocidal violence in which thousands died and hundreds of thousands were expelled. Zimbabwe and (again) the Ivory Coast offer their own contributions to the link between elections and violence. Democratic change, clearly, is a high-risk business.
An unfinished process
Thus, the worldwide democratic revolution faces many problems. It is also greatly limited still in geographical scope. China is the biggest question. How long can the Chinese Communist Party stall real democratic change, and is it conceivable that it can continue to implement reforms without provoking even greater mass action than in Tiananmen Square in 1989? Egypt suggests that there is a time-limit to authoritarian rule, and China’s deep social tensions and economic inequality make the prospect of another mass uprising at least feasible.
But the revolution is unfinished in a more profound sense, to do with qualitative depth. Free speech and fair elections remain compelling aspirations for much of the world. But they are only the beginnings of change: both because more is needed to guarantee democratic accountability, and because major inequalities in a country make social democracy essential for political democracy to realise its full potential.
But democratic revolution - as seen in the Arab risings - is also a contagion that spreads from country to country, and becomes regional, even global. It also increasingly takes place under the gaze of global media, with more and more citizens having access to information about what is happening as it happens. As much as in Europe in 1989, the middle-east movements are both national and international at their very heart.
In this sense, the worldwide pattern of (national) democratic revolutions and changes is also part of a global (as well as international) trend. Democratisation reflects the growing global consciousness of interdependence and shared values. It poses a huge double-challenge: of consolidating democracy and rights worldwide, and of creating institutions which can create joined-up democracy on regional and global scales. This is the test for the next decades, one that events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere bring into even sharper focus.
Martin Shaw is professorial fellow in international relations and human rights at Roehampton University, London, and an honorary research professor of international relations at the University of Sussex.
Gov debate: Randle threatens to sue Fashola
The governorship candidate of the Social Democratic Mega Party in Lagos State, Chief Jaiye Randle, is concluding plans to take the state Governor, Mr. Babatunde Fashola (SAN), to court over the governor’s comments during a debate among the governorship candidates in the state.
The debate, organised by Channels TV and ThisDay, had featured five candidates. In the course of the debate, Randle had complained about his failure to have access to the governor. Fashola replied that Randle wanted to see him about the criminal case he had in court and about the house he built on a drain which constituted environmental nuisance.
Randle said at a recent press conference, “He has not heard the last of the issues. My lawyers are still studying everything and we will take the right action soon. It is just that the elections are serious business and we don’t want to detract from that for now. I assure you, he has not heard the last of it. I know it was a debate. You can say what you like but it must be truthful and verifiable. My lawyers are asking for the verbatim tape.”
Do you feel Fashola took issues personal or think that JK Randle shouldn't have raised such a "mean" issue at a debate? Lets hear your view.
The debate, organised by Channels TV and ThisDay, had featured five candidates. In the course of the debate, Randle had complained about his failure to have access to the governor. Fashola replied that Randle wanted to see him about the criminal case he had in court and about the house he built on a drain which constituted environmental nuisance.
Randle said at a recent press conference, “He has not heard the last of the issues. My lawyers are still studying everything and we will take the right action soon. It is just that the elections are serious business and we don’t want to detract from that for now. I assure you, he has not heard the last of it. I know it was a debate. You can say what you like but it must be truthful and verifiable. My lawyers are asking for the verbatim tape.”
Do you feel Fashola took issues personal or think that JK Randle shouldn't have raised such a "mean" issue at a debate? Lets hear your view.
Israel and the Arab awakening
Guy Rolnik, the editor of Israel's leading economic newspaper The Marker, recently wrote a scathing condemnation of the nation’s complacency over the wave of revolution sweeping through Arab countries. Under the headline - “State of a nation, rolling in slime” - was a catalogue of incidents of sleaze, corruption, criminality and abuse of public trust among Israel's political and economic leaders.
The article, published in the newspaper Ha'aretz drew a pointed conclusion for Israel from the Arab upheaval: “Its sheer speed and the intensity of the surprise portend an era of many crises, which will all be unexpected and tremendously powerful.”
Rolnik is here attacking the “it couldn't happen here” attitude prevalent in much public commentary on the astonishingly rapid collapse of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. And as events have gathered pace there and elsewhere in the Arab world, he also reflects a general shift in the Israeli media towards sharper criticism of the perceived inadequacy of the official and diplomatic responses to the turmoil.
A brittle mindset
The word “hypocrisy” has begun to appear more often in broadcast and written opinion - used mainly in reference to past suggestions by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu that Israel could not engage properly with Arab states unless they democratised. Now, even as democracy appeared to be erupting in Cairo's Tahrir Square, Netanyahu was openly pressuring President Barack Obama's administration to do everything possible to keep Hosni Muburak in power on the grounds that his fall would have dire consequences for the whole region.
Fawaz A Gerges,professor of middle eastern politics and international relations at the London School of Economics (and contributor to openDemocracy) assessed the implications in an article for BBC News:
“Regionally, Israel is the biggest loser. It has put all its eggs into the basket of Arab dictators and autocrats, like Egypt’s deposed Hosni Mubarak. Israel fought tooth and nail to support Mr. Mubarak, who played a key role in tightening the siege of Gaza and the noose around Hamas’s neck. Time and again, the Israeli political class has proven to be its own worst enemy.”
This is a view now common in the “democracy hypocrisy” debate in Israel. The democracy that Israeli leaders once patronisingly recommended to their neighbours is now viewed by many of the country’s current leaders as a serious threat. Democracy, the argument goes, will sweep Islamic radicals into power (Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood being the favourite bogeyman) and allow Iran to fish for advantages in the troubled regional waters.
The French political commentator Corinne Mellul, also writing in Ha’aretz, wondered “why so many Israelis watch in anguish” as the democratic tidal wave sweeps onwards. “Why did a panicked Netanyahu keep waving ... the red flag of an Islamic threat - one of two pillars of legitimacy for his brand of leadership, the other being Ahmadinejad's Iran?”
In this respect, the innocuous passage of two Iranian destroyers through the Suez canal on 21 February en route to Latakia port in Syria was a gift to the government, giving it a brief and (as it proved) largely ineffectual opportunity to raise alarmist claims that Tehran was taking advantage of the hiatus in Egypt to send warships through the canal for the first time.
Yoram Meital, who heads the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, said that “Israel very cynically played with this ship movement.” In an interview I undertook on behalf of openDemocracy, Meital said:
“There was very little sign of anything new in this move. Israeli ships, both civilian and naval, including submarines, also use the Suez canal, so it's not a sign there is a change in Israel's perspective of Iran or Iran's perspective of Israel. Both Israel and Iran are trying to play their cards amid new developments in the middle east, but they play under the rules of the very old game. There’s nothing new here.”
While no one could have predicted the course of events unleashed by a marketplace incident in Tunisia, it could be assumed that Israel, like other governments, would have contingency plans on file for reacting to sudden crises - such as the overthrow of Mubarak. The flailing Israeli government responses made it appear to Meital that there had been no such planning.
“Over the past few years I got the impression that Israeli decision makers, including the security establishment, paid very little attention to internal political developments in Arab states, including the countries that Israel has peace treaties with, and very little attention even to the political power struggle between various groups and parties in Egypt”, Meital said.
“Yes, there were voices raised sometimes about the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood. But this reading of the internal situation in Egypt was not based on a serious study of the political forces. When Mubarak resigned they were statements by senior Israeli officers saying that tomorrow the Muslim Brotherhood would take power - actually a very simplistic reading of the political struggle. ... Even now, in the post-Mubarak era, they stick to this simplistic view and ignore the fact that we are on a new tack in the political life of Egypt.”
Fouad Ajami, a professor and middle-east expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said in an interview with Ha’aretz that Israel had nothing to fear from Arab democracy:
“Natan Sharansky has pointed out that democrats who hate you are less dangerous than dictators who love you. There is a certain level of security that comes from autocracies, and Israel is not alone in this. ... But the bargain with an autocrat is never a good bargain. Israel had made peace with pharaohs, but the peace between Israel and the Arab people has not yet come.”
Yoram Meital said it is important for Israelis to understand that the Arab uprisings are national in character. “There were some voices with a pan-Arab or Islamic discourse, but these are not the mainstream, not the voices of the vast majority of the people on the streets. The first struggle in Tunisia was wrapped in national Tunisian colours, and it's the same in Egypt and in Libya.”
Meital said the interim authorities in Egypt have made it clear that they intended to honour international treaties and agreements, including peace with Israel and its rights of passage through the Suez canal.
“However”, he said, “I assume an elected Egyptian leadership will have to express the real criticism which is prevalent among the Egyptian people regarding Israel and its policy toward the Palestinians. This may have an effect on the relationship between the two countries - I’m differentiating here between the relationships of countries on one hand, and the state keeping commitments to the peace treaty on the other.”
Meital said it should be noted that the response of the Palestinian leadership to events in Egypt mirrored those in Israel - astonishment and fear. The Palestinian Authority of President Mahmoud Abbas, based in Ramallah, had lost its main supporter, Mubarak, in its internal political struggle with Hamas.
“Egypt will now most likely open a new page with the Palestinians, especially in relation to Hamas and the Gaza strip. This will have an impact not only on Abu Mazen [Abbas], but on the way Israeli-Egyptian relations could develop in the coming new status era.”
Meital dismissed Netanyahu's recent promises of a new peace initiative to break the stalemate with the Palestinians as “mainly trying to buy time and defuse some of the criticism coming his way from home an abroad.” He said Netanyahu had been particularly shocked by an angry attack on his polices in late February from Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, since Germany for decades has been Israel’s staunchest and most uncritical supporter in Europe.
“The bottom line is that we must look at these events in the Arab states with more respect and with a more positive attitude”, Meital said. “We should give a lot of credit to the civil society forces within the Arab world. For far too long we have talked and written about Arab public opinion in a very orientalist and negative manner.”
A matter of time
In concluding his article on Israeli complacency, Guy Rolnik wrote: “If the beneficiaries of the status quo don't come to their senses and start pursuing reforms, and change their thinking about the rest of Israeli society, they will wake up one morning, be it in 10 or 20 years, like the leaders of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia - in the middle of a nightmare.”
By contrast, Yoram Meital is guardedly optimistic. The starting position is now far more promising than it was under the old Arab regimes, he says:
“I see more chances or more opportunities than risk in this new development. I don't belong to the pessimists' camp, and you know that we have a lot of these voices in Israel. ... The vast majority of Israeli society is still thinking inside a middle-east box of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes. They have no choice but to start thinking outside this box - hopefully soon, but it will take time for Israeli public opinion and politicians to do this.”
“Do they have time?”
“That’s exactly the problem. They think they have time, but we don’t.”
Thomas O'Dwyer is a writer and journalist based in Israel
The article, published in the newspaper Ha'aretz drew a pointed conclusion for Israel from the Arab upheaval: “Its sheer speed and the intensity of the surprise portend an era of many crises, which will all be unexpected and tremendously powerful.”
Rolnik is here attacking the “it couldn't happen here” attitude prevalent in much public commentary on the astonishingly rapid collapse of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. And as events have gathered pace there and elsewhere in the Arab world, he also reflects a general shift in the Israeli media towards sharper criticism of the perceived inadequacy of the official and diplomatic responses to the turmoil.
A brittle mindset
The word “hypocrisy” has begun to appear more often in broadcast and written opinion - used mainly in reference to past suggestions by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu that Israel could not engage properly with Arab states unless they democratised. Now, even as democracy appeared to be erupting in Cairo's Tahrir Square, Netanyahu was openly pressuring President Barack Obama's administration to do everything possible to keep Hosni Muburak in power on the grounds that his fall would have dire consequences for the whole region.
Fawaz A Gerges,professor of middle eastern politics and international relations at the London School of Economics (and contributor to openDemocracy) assessed the implications in an article for BBC News:
“Regionally, Israel is the biggest loser. It has put all its eggs into the basket of Arab dictators and autocrats, like Egypt’s deposed Hosni Mubarak. Israel fought tooth and nail to support Mr. Mubarak, who played a key role in tightening the siege of Gaza and the noose around Hamas’s neck. Time and again, the Israeli political class has proven to be its own worst enemy.”
This is a view now common in the “democracy hypocrisy” debate in Israel. The democracy that Israeli leaders once patronisingly recommended to their neighbours is now viewed by many of the country’s current leaders as a serious threat. Democracy, the argument goes, will sweep Islamic radicals into power (Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood being the favourite bogeyman) and allow Iran to fish for advantages in the troubled regional waters.
The French political commentator Corinne Mellul, also writing in Ha’aretz, wondered “why so many Israelis watch in anguish” as the democratic tidal wave sweeps onwards. “Why did a panicked Netanyahu keep waving ... the red flag of an Islamic threat - one of two pillars of legitimacy for his brand of leadership, the other being Ahmadinejad's Iran?”
In this respect, the innocuous passage of two Iranian destroyers through the Suez canal on 21 February en route to Latakia port in Syria was a gift to the government, giving it a brief and (as it proved) largely ineffectual opportunity to raise alarmist claims that Tehran was taking advantage of the hiatus in Egypt to send warships through the canal for the first time.
Yoram Meital, who heads the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, said that “Israel very cynically played with this ship movement.” In an interview I undertook on behalf of openDemocracy, Meital said:
“There was very little sign of anything new in this move. Israeli ships, both civilian and naval, including submarines, also use the Suez canal, so it's not a sign there is a change in Israel's perspective of Iran or Iran's perspective of Israel. Both Israel and Iran are trying to play their cards amid new developments in the middle east, but they play under the rules of the very old game. There’s nothing new here.”
While no one could have predicted the course of events unleashed by a marketplace incident in Tunisia, it could be assumed that Israel, like other governments, would have contingency plans on file for reacting to sudden crises - such as the overthrow of Mubarak. The flailing Israeli government responses made it appear to Meital that there had been no such planning.
“Over the past few years I got the impression that Israeli decision makers, including the security establishment, paid very little attention to internal political developments in Arab states, including the countries that Israel has peace treaties with, and very little attention even to the political power struggle between various groups and parties in Egypt”, Meital said.
“Yes, there were voices raised sometimes about the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood. But this reading of the internal situation in Egypt was not based on a serious study of the political forces. When Mubarak resigned they were statements by senior Israeli officers saying that tomorrow the Muslim Brotherhood would take power - actually a very simplistic reading of the political struggle. ... Even now, in the post-Mubarak era, they stick to this simplistic view and ignore the fact that we are on a new tack in the political life of Egypt.”
Fouad Ajami, a professor and middle-east expert at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said in an interview with Ha’aretz that Israel had nothing to fear from Arab democracy:
“Natan Sharansky has pointed out that democrats who hate you are less dangerous than dictators who love you. There is a certain level of security that comes from autocracies, and Israel is not alone in this. ... But the bargain with an autocrat is never a good bargain. Israel had made peace with pharaohs, but the peace between Israel and the Arab people has not yet come.”
Yoram Meital said it is important for Israelis to understand that the Arab uprisings are national in character. “There were some voices with a pan-Arab or Islamic discourse, but these are not the mainstream, not the voices of the vast majority of the people on the streets. The first struggle in Tunisia was wrapped in national Tunisian colours, and it's the same in Egypt and in Libya.”
Meital said the interim authorities in Egypt have made it clear that they intended to honour international treaties and agreements, including peace with Israel and its rights of passage through the Suez canal.
“However”, he said, “I assume an elected Egyptian leadership will have to express the real criticism which is prevalent among the Egyptian people regarding Israel and its policy toward the Palestinians. This may have an effect on the relationship between the two countries - I’m differentiating here between the relationships of countries on one hand, and the state keeping commitments to the peace treaty on the other.”
Meital said it should be noted that the response of the Palestinian leadership to events in Egypt mirrored those in Israel - astonishment and fear. The Palestinian Authority of President Mahmoud Abbas, based in Ramallah, had lost its main supporter, Mubarak, in its internal political struggle with Hamas.
“Egypt will now most likely open a new page with the Palestinians, especially in relation to Hamas and the Gaza strip. This will have an impact not only on Abu Mazen [Abbas], but on the way Israeli-Egyptian relations could develop in the coming new status era.”
Meital dismissed Netanyahu's recent promises of a new peace initiative to break the stalemate with the Palestinians as “mainly trying to buy time and defuse some of the criticism coming his way from home an abroad.” He said Netanyahu had been particularly shocked by an angry attack on his polices in late February from Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, since Germany for decades has been Israel’s staunchest and most uncritical supporter in Europe.
“The bottom line is that we must look at these events in the Arab states with more respect and with a more positive attitude”, Meital said. “We should give a lot of credit to the civil society forces within the Arab world. For far too long we have talked and written about Arab public opinion in a very orientalist and negative manner.”
A matter of time
In concluding his article on Israeli complacency, Guy Rolnik wrote: “If the beneficiaries of the status quo don't come to their senses and start pursuing reforms, and change their thinking about the rest of Israeli society, they will wake up one morning, be it in 10 or 20 years, like the leaders of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia - in the middle of a nightmare.”
By contrast, Yoram Meital is guardedly optimistic. The starting position is now far more promising than it was under the old Arab regimes, he says:
“I see more chances or more opportunities than risk in this new development. I don't belong to the pessimists' camp, and you know that we have a lot of these voices in Israel. ... The vast majority of Israeli society is still thinking inside a middle-east box of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes. They have no choice but to start thinking outside this box - hopefully soon, but it will take time for Israeli public opinion and politicians to do this.”
“Do they have time?”
“That’s exactly the problem. They think they have time, but we don’t.”
Thomas O'Dwyer is a writer and journalist based in Israel
UN YEAR OF GLOBAL CULTURAL RAPPROCHEMENT CLOSES WITH WARNING OF CHALLENGES AHEAD
The United Nations today formally closed the year it had dedicated to bridging the gulf between the world’s various cultures, with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warning that bigotry and intolerance still cast a long, dark shadow over planet Earth.
The General Assembly proclaimed 2010 the International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures, with a slew of events to promote inter-religious and intercultural dialogue and understanding, as the crowning moment of the first decade of the new millennium which it had already declared the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World.
“Bridges were built that I hope will be reinforced in the years ahead,” Mr. Ban said at the closing ceremony at UN Headquarters in New York, hosted by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which the Assembly designated the lead UN body for the event.
“But the human family continues to face serious challenges and obstacles – conflicts, violence, bigotry, intolerance and exclusion, in old forms and new. This dark reality compels us to continue the efforts that animated the Decade and Year. While those observances are over, the imperative remains: building a sustainable future underpinned by human solidarity and universal values.”
The closing ceremonies coincided with a meeting of the High Panel on Peace and Dialogue among Cultures, set up last year by UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova to chart new avenues for peace and promote cultural diversity in a globalized world.
Its members include former Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio, Mr. Ban’s High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative launched in 2005 by Spain and Turkey under UN auspices to promote better cross-cultural relations worldwide.
“Reconciliation is one of the great challenges of this early century,” Ms. Bokova told the closing ceremony. “We must work against forces that fragment human society and strengthen values and aspirations that are common to all. No State and no people can afford to retreat into fear. A culture of exclusion cannot be allowed.”
Mr. Sampaio highlighted cooperation, partnership and coordination as key to progress on rapprochement. “The Alliance is a global matchmaker, bringing together multiple sectors to bridge divides,” he said. “We should consolidate and work together to reconcile cultural diversity and social cohesion.
“Cultural diversity should be seen as a resource for sustainable development,” he added, stressing the role youth has to play on the issue.
The General Assembly proclaimed 2010 the International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures, with a slew of events to promote inter-religious and intercultural dialogue and understanding, as the crowning moment of the first decade of the new millennium which it had already declared the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World.
“Bridges were built that I hope will be reinforced in the years ahead,” Mr. Ban said at the closing ceremony at UN Headquarters in New York, hosted by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which the Assembly designated the lead UN body for the event.
“But the human family continues to face serious challenges and obstacles – conflicts, violence, bigotry, intolerance and exclusion, in old forms and new. This dark reality compels us to continue the efforts that animated the Decade and Year. While those observances are over, the imperative remains: building a sustainable future underpinned by human solidarity and universal values.”
The closing ceremonies coincided with a meeting of the High Panel on Peace and Dialogue among Cultures, set up last year by UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova to chart new avenues for peace and promote cultural diversity in a globalized world.
Its members include former Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio, Mr. Ban’s High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative launched in 2005 by Spain and Turkey under UN auspices to promote better cross-cultural relations worldwide.
“Reconciliation is one of the great challenges of this early century,” Ms. Bokova told the closing ceremony. “We must work against forces that fragment human society and strengthen values and aspirations that are common to all. No State and no people can afford to retreat into fear. A culture of exclusion cannot be allowed.”
Mr. Sampaio highlighted cooperation, partnership and coordination as key to progress on rapprochement. “The Alliance is a global matchmaker, bringing together multiple sectors to bridge divides,” he said. “We should consolidate and work together to reconcile cultural diversity and social cohesion.
“Cultural diversity should be seen as a resource for sustainable development,” he added, stressing the role youth has to play on the issue.
Nigerian Presidential Debates co-anchored by CNN's Jonathan Mann - Kolo mentality
The battle for the soul of Nigeria for me doesn’t start with registering or voting. For me it starts with boycotting NN24s Jonathan Mann co-anchored Presidential debate (Nigerian Khadaria Ahmed of NEXT will be co-anchoring). I am appalled the candidates have not complained and believe those who will attend do not deserve my vote. This isn’t rocket science; from MKO vs Tofa in 93 we have done this severally. I cannot take the participants seriously on ANY statement about loving Nigeria.
I do not see this as an indictment on the capabilities of Nigerian broadcast media professionals or public speakers whom I see guiding and participating in high level conversations all over the world.
I see this as an indictment on the organisers, participants and funders of this fiasco. It is not a ground breaking activity as I pointed out it has been done during a military regime and subsequently since with success.
I see this as a deep disconnect with Nigerians, the same ones who are being admonished to steer Nigeria to greatness through voting, the same ones who are being told despite evidence to the contrary that they matter.
I see this as a deep disconnect with reality. How effectively can Mann helm this debate? That NN24 and friends believe he can navigate or understand the nuances and histories of Nigeria (indeed candidates like Buhari have backgrounds dating decades) is ludicrous, deluded and more than a little sad. But no, foreign is better. Any connection with the CNN brand is “prestigious”. It doesn’t matter if most Nigerians do not know who the anchor is or can even understand or want to understand his accent.
That “neutral” Jonathan Mann is the “prestige” cherry on the cake on what now seems to me to be an ego stroking vanity project is very telling. Who is the debate meant for? Nigerians? Really?
Ha! NN24, a channel on DSTVs satellite platform hoping to be the African and Nigerian answer to CNN, does not have the in-house capacity to moderate a Nigerian Presidential debate? NTA did it. Channels did it. Why are they in business? Let’s ignore the fact that the pay for viewing platform is accessible to only a miniscule proportion of Nigerians anyway although I believe they planned to rebroadcast on free to air stations.
I have heard all manner of defences for this lunacy and started responding to them in this piece and then changed my mind and pressed delete. Even engaging in a conversation about the cons is drinking the kool aid.
As a Nigerian who struggles daily with diminishing earning opportunities which our dysfunctional value system contributes to, I regard a country of 150 million reaching out to CNNs Jonathan Mann to helm a NIGERIAN Presidential debate the equivalent of poking fingers into both my eyes... with pepper.
If they have no confidence in Nigerians and Nigeria, I need to shout out loud that I have confidence in myself. I may be frustrated, economically challenged (fancy word for impoverished middle class) and tired but I am not some idiot statistic than can be bamboozled by vanity project.
I am hoping all broadcast professionals and decent hardworking Nigerians will be angry enough to express displeasure and boycott this nonsense which raises the bar on mediocrity and self loathing.
I’m deeply disappointed that no candidate has complained about this. Have they ever seen the US or Ghanaian Presidential debates being anchored by Nigerian born Nigerians? Their participation for me will be a vote of no confidence on Nigeria and a vote of no confidence in me. Why should I vote for any of them?
.... and no I’m not a broadcaster angling for a job. I’m just Nigerian.
As FELA said, na colonial mentality dey worry us...
Pamela Braide
The battle for the soul of Nigeria for me doesn’t start with registering or voting. For me it starts with boycotting NN24s Jonathan Mann co-anchored Presidential debate (Nigerian Khadaria Ahmed of NEXT will be co-anchoring). I am appalled the candidates have not complained and believe those who will attend do not deserve my vote. This isn’t rocket science; from MKO vs Tofa in 93 we have done this severally. I cannot take the participants seriously on ANY statement about loving Nigeria.
I do not see this as an indictment on the capabilities of Nigerian broadcast media professionals or public speakers whom I see guiding and participating in high level conversations all over the world.
I see this as an indictment on the organisers, participants and funders of this fiasco. It is not a ground breaking activity as I pointed out it has been done during a military regime and subsequently since with success.
I see this as a deep disconnect with Nigerians, the same ones who are being admonished to steer Nigeria to greatness through voting, the same ones who are being told despite evidence to the contrary that they matter.
I see this as a deep disconnect with reality. How effectively can Mann helm this debate? That NN24 and friends believe he can navigate or understand the nuances and histories of Nigeria (indeed candidates like Buhari have backgrounds dating decades) is ludicrous, deluded and more than a little sad. But no, foreign is better. Any connection with the CNN brand is “prestigious”. It doesn’t matter if most Nigerians do not know who the anchor is or can even understand or want to understand his accent.
That “neutral” Jonathan Mann is the “prestige” cherry on the cake on what now seems to me to be an ego stroking vanity project is very telling. Who is the debate meant for? Nigerians? Really?
Ha! NN24, a channel on DSTVs satellite platform hoping to be the African and Nigerian answer to CNN, does not have the in-house capacity to moderate a Nigerian Presidential debate? NTA did it. Channels did it. Why are they in business? Let’s ignore the fact that the pay for viewing platform is accessible to only a miniscule proportion of Nigerians anyway although I believe they planned to rebroadcast on free to air stations.
I have heard all manner of defences for this lunacy and started responding to them in this piece and then changed my mind and pressed delete. Even engaging in a conversation about the cons is drinking the kool aid.
As a Nigerian who struggles daily with diminishing earning opportunities which our dysfunctional value system contributes to, I regard a country of 150 million reaching out to CNNs Jonathan Mann to helm a NIGERIAN Presidential debate the equivalent of poking fingers into both my eyes... with pepper.
If they have no confidence in Nigerians and Nigeria, I need to shout out loud that I have confidence in myself. I may be frustrated, economically challenged (fancy word for impoverished middle class) and tired but I am not some idiot statistic than can be bamboozled by vanity project.
I am hoping all broadcast professionals and decent hardworking Nigerians will be angry enough to express displeasure and boycott this nonsense which raises the bar on mediocrity and self loathing.
I’m deeply disappointed that no candidate has complained about this. Have they ever seen the US or Ghanaian Presidential debates being anchored by Nigerian born Nigerians? Their participation for me will be a vote of no confidence on Nigeria and a vote of no confidence in me. Why should I vote for any of them?
.... and no I’m not a broadcaster angling for a job. I’m just Nigerian.
As FELA said, na colonial mentality dey worry us...
Pamela Braide
The Arab revolt and the colour revolutions
The Arab revolt of 2010-11 has spread with intense speed and magnitude. A protest that began in the provincial Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in mid-December 2010 has in under three months become a wave of rebellion that has deposed two presidents; stretches from Morocco to Iraqi Kurdistan; has revived the fires of the Iranian opposition; and continues to burn in Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and beyond.
This remarkable regional phenomenon has inspired a search for precedents. It has been compared to the great revolutionary wave in Europe in 1848 with its “springtime of nations”, and to 1989 and the liberation of east-central Europe (the “Arab spring”); as well as explained with reference to the techniques of communication used by activists (the “facebook” or “twitter” revolution).
These parallels and elements have limited force, however. The events of 1989 in eastern Europe were unique in that they accomplished the “undoing” of the 1917 revolution and (over the next two years) sparked several revolutions in one: the implosion of a system (the command economy), the fall of an empire (the Warsaw pact), the withering of a state (the Soviet Union) and the collapse of a global ideology (Soviet communism).
The new technologies to a degree play the role of the printing press in 1848. They have been used with great aptitude in Tunisia and Egypt, and are influential in the movements elsewhere. But the exaggerated focus on these tools tends to suggest that what is happening in the middle east and north Africa is a middle-class revolution driven by a “normalising” correction of the region’s “historical exception”, in ways that channel it towards the comforting thought that “they” are going to become just like “us”.
The colour codes
Any reference-point suggested to make sense of the Arab revolt needs to be used with caution and in ways that recognise the complexity (and unfinished nature) of the events. With this qualification in mind, some insight may be gained into their depth and possible trajectory by viewing them through the lens of the so-called “colour revolutions” that hit regimes in parts of Europe and central Asia in the early-mid 2000s.
The cycle of protests and regime changes that came to acquire the description of “colour revolutions” (after the dominant shade or flower worn by those seeking change) affected a swathe of countries: Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005). Other attempts at a similar outcome - in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Lebanon (the ambiguous “cedar” revolution of 2005), and Burma (the “saffron” wave of 2007) are sometimes considered to be part of the same wave.
Each national experience was distinct, yet there were also common features. First, the colour revolutions followed fraudulent elections by semi-autocratic regimes, with a prominent role being played by organised groups of young people adept at combining clever slogans with creative non-violent action to spread their message. Otpor (“resistance”) in Serbia, Kmara (“enough”) in Georgia, and Pora (“It’s time”) in Ukraine were the most visible part of these countries’ anti-authoritarian rebellions. The Kefaya (“enough”) movement founded in Egypt in 2004 with the purpose of mobilising for change against the Hosni Mubarak regime was directly influenced by these predecessors.
Second, although popular mobilisation was the driving force, the colour revolutions were also led by individuals who had already occupied high political positions. Mikheil Saakashvili had been Georgia’s justice minister during Eduard Shevardnadze’s period as president and a member of the country’s ruling party less than two years before becoming the “rose revolution’s” figurehead; Viktor Yushchenko had been Ukraine’s prime minister before the “orange revolution”, and Kurmanbek Bakiyev had been Kyrgyzstan’s.
In this sense, the revolutions also had an element of intra-elite rivalry: a radical wing had realised that there was no way to rotation of power through elections, and that popular mobilisation in the main squares of the capital was needed for change to happen.
Third, the colour revolutions were non-violent, in contrast with the “classical” revolutions of France or Russia. This informed the ideal of opposition to a corrupt political regime determined to cling to power (by electoral fraud, and itself often prepared to use violence); but it was also related to the intention of the “revolutionaries” to implement a reformist political agenda (which some of their predecessors had proclaimed, though failed to realise): democratisation, pro-market reforms, and more integration with the west.
Fourth, the colour revolutions showed that a repressive state can find it impossible to contain mass popular revolt. When tens of thousands of people gather in the streets, and when doubts grow over the loyalty of security forces to the state (for example if the army is called in and the rank-and-file refuses to open fire), the balance of advantage can quickly shift to the demonstrators. This happened in Serbia in October 2000, when the special Serbian police units known as “red berets” refused to open fire on the protesters in Belgrade and left Slobodan Milosevic exposed.
But the state’s use of violence too can be a sign of weakness and a prelude to its fall. In Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, Kurmanbek Bakiyev (who himself had ridden to power in the popular revolt of 2005) ordered police to fire on a demonstration of over 10,000 people in the capital, Bishkek. There were eighty-six people killed and over 1,000 wounded, yet this only intensified people’s anger; the presidential offices were stormed and Bakiyev fled the next day.
The contrasts
The traces of these events in the Tunisian and Egyptian tumult are clear, not least the inability of repression to stem the tide, and the shift of loyalty among troops from the old dictators isolated in their palaces to the young demonstrators defying batons and arrests on the street.
But the differences between the colour revolutions and the Arab rising may be more instructive. First, there may be overlaps in the role of educated young people, but the engine of the later revolt - youth anger against hopeless social conditions and the lack of employment possibilities - is hardly the same. Second, the old Arab opposition elites are often marginalised after years of constraint, removed from the scene, and caught by surprise at the popular upsurge.
Third, the motivations of protest diverge. In Georgia and Ukraine, people rebelled against political remnants of the Soviet era: aging rulers unable to reform the political system and modernise the economy. In Yugoslavia, young people had enjoyed greater freedoms than in the Soviet-dominated communist countries; by 2000, two decades after Tito’s death and a decade after the country’s disintegration, the next young generation in Serbia saw Poland and Hungary moving ahead to become part of the European Union.
Their counterparts in Georgia and Ukraine similarly viewed the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, while they had barely begun a “transition” to western-style democracy and market economy. A peaceful revolution was a way to mark their detachment from the older generations for failing to be “modern” and “western”.
By contrast, the hopelessness created by a lack of any perspectives for change has helped to drive the Arab movement. Its most graphic representation is the harraga in Algeria or Tunisia (a description of would-be migrants hoping to reach the shores of Europe on boats or improvised rafts). It also seems that the overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali at least has not ended the desperate exodus of young people from Tunisia.
Fourth, the respective presence and absence of an international dimension is striking. The participants of the colour revolutions were rebelling against the remnants of a fallen (Soviet) empire, and attracted by the victorious (western) one; in effect they desired to join the “new world order”. The west encouraged, supported, in some cases even financed the popular revolt in Serbia, and to a lesser degree those in Georgia and Ukraine.
Where the Arab rebellion is concerned, the west is completely absent. The extensive security cooperation between western states and Arab regimes is part of the explanation, but this is only one part of a post-colonial policy in the region that entails oil-based economies completely dependent on western economic systems; extensive financial corruption; and a policy over Palestine that no democratic Arab system could support. In this respect, western powers (especially European) would be well advised to take a new approach founded on principled solidarity with Arab democracy.
The lessons
The outcomes of the colour revolutions might also carry lessons for the Arab revolt, which faces even deeper socio-political problems than those faced by (for example) Serbia or Ukraine.
The first is that overthrowing an old dictator does not mean changing the system. There are two models here. In Ukraine, the post-orange- revolution president Viktor Yushchenko failed to bring much change beyond respecting free elections, with the eventual result of the return of his rival Viktor Yanukovich to power in February 2010 and subsequent pressure on civic rights; in post-rose-revolution Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili established a centralised government where the parliament was under the complete control of the ruling party, and the media had even less freedom after the change. In other words, the end result of the rose revolution in Georgia strongly resembles the starting point of Arab revolt.
The second, daunting or a spur to further action as it may be (or both), is that the forces for change in Tunisia and Egypt - and other countries yet to change their governments - will need to go much further to turn revolt into revolution. The youth movements such as Kmara or Pora did not in the end produce a new political force; Kmara dissolved itself into Georgia’s new ruling party, and Pora - initially associated with Yushchenko’s party - contested the parliamentary elections in 2006, without success.
The social composition of the Arab rebellion makes it potentially more radical than the colour revolutions. But there remain many uncertainties, some of them surrounding its lack of leadership. Will young Arabs continue to topple dictators, perhaps then to allow others to profit from the resulting vacuum; or will they move on to create new institutions and a new political culture? Any historical comparison can only go so far. The future is not fated; it is being created on the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Benghazi and Sana'a.
Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva. He is the author of War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (C Hurst / Columbia University Press, 2009), Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva. He is the author of War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (C Hurst, 2009; Columbia University Press, 2009), and From Perestroika to Rainbow Revolutions: Reform and Revolution After Socialism (C Hurst, 2011)
This remarkable regional phenomenon has inspired a search for precedents. It has been compared to the great revolutionary wave in Europe in 1848 with its “springtime of nations”, and to 1989 and the liberation of east-central Europe (the “Arab spring”); as well as explained with reference to the techniques of communication used by activists (the “facebook” or “twitter” revolution).
These parallels and elements have limited force, however. The events of 1989 in eastern Europe were unique in that they accomplished the “undoing” of the 1917 revolution and (over the next two years) sparked several revolutions in one: the implosion of a system (the command economy), the fall of an empire (the Warsaw pact), the withering of a state (the Soviet Union) and the collapse of a global ideology (Soviet communism).
The new technologies to a degree play the role of the printing press in 1848. They have been used with great aptitude in Tunisia and Egypt, and are influential in the movements elsewhere. But the exaggerated focus on these tools tends to suggest that what is happening in the middle east and north Africa is a middle-class revolution driven by a “normalising” correction of the region’s “historical exception”, in ways that channel it towards the comforting thought that “they” are going to become just like “us”.
The colour codes
Any reference-point suggested to make sense of the Arab revolt needs to be used with caution and in ways that recognise the complexity (and unfinished nature) of the events. With this qualification in mind, some insight may be gained into their depth and possible trajectory by viewing them through the lens of the so-called “colour revolutions” that hit regimes in parts of Europe and central Asia in the early-mid 2000s.
The cycle of protests and regime changes that came to acquire the description of “colour revolutions” (after the dominant shade or flower worn by those seeking change) affected a swathe of countries: Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005). Other attempts at a similar outcome - in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Lebanon (the ambiguous “cedar” revolution of 2005), and Burma (the “saffron” wave of 2007) are sometimes considered to be part of the same wave.
Each national experience was distinct, yet there were also common features. First, the colour revolutions followed fraudulent elections by semi-autocratic regimes, with a prominent role being played by organised groups of young people adept at combining clever slogans with creative non-violent action to spread their message. Otpor (“resistance”) in Serbia, Kmara (“enough”) in Georgia, and Pora (“It’s time”) in Ukraine were the most visible part of these countries’ anti-authoritarian rebellions. The Kefaya (“enough”) movement founded in Egypt in 2004 with the purpose of mobilising for change against the Hosni Mubarak regime was directly influenced by these predecessors.
Second, although popular mobilisation was the driving force, the colour revolutions were also led by individuals who had already occupied high political positions. Mikheil Saakashvili had been Georgia’s justice minister during Eduard Shevardnadze’s period as president and a member of the country’s ruling party less than two years before becoming the “rose revolution’s” figurehead; Viktor Yushchenko had been Ukraine’s prime minister before the “orange revolution”, and Kurmanbek Bakiyev had been Kyrgyzstan’s.
In this sense, the revolutions also had an element of intra-elite rivalry: a radical wing had realised that there was no way to rotation of power through elections, and that popular mobilisation in the main squares of the capital was needed for change to happen.
Third, the colour revolutions were non-violent, in contrast with the “classical” revolutions of France or Russia. This informed the ideal of opposition to a corrupt political regime determined to cling to power (by electoral fraud, and itself often prepared to use violence); but it was also related to the intention of the “revolutionaries” to implement a reformist political agenda (which some of their predecessors had proclaimed, though failed to realise): democratisation, pro-market reforms, and more integration with the west.
Fourth, the colour revolutions showed that a repressive state can find it impossible to contain mass popular revolt. When tens of thousands of people gather in the streets, and when doubts grow over the loyalty of security forces to the state (for example if the army is called in and the rank-and-file refuses to open fire), the balance of advantage can quickly shift to the demonstrators. This happened in Serbia in October 2000, when the special Serbian police units known as “red berets” refused to open fire on the protesters in Belgrade and left Slobodan Milosevic exposed.
But the state’s use of violence too can be a sign of weakness and a prelude to its fall. In Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, Kurmanbek Bakiyev (who himself had ridden to power in the popular revolt of 2005) ordered police to fire on a demonstration of over 10,000 people in the capital, Bishkek. There were eighty-six people killed and over 1,000 wounded, yet this only intensified people’s anger; the presidential offices were stormed and Bakiyev fled the next day.
The contrasts
The traces of these events in the Tunisian and Egyptian tumult are clear, not least the inability of repression to stem the tide, and the shift of loyalty among troops from the old dictators isolated in their palaces to the young demonstrators defying batons and arrests on the street.
But the differences between the colour revolutions and the Arab rising may be more instructive. First, there may be overlaps in the role of educated young people, but the engine of the later revolt - youth anger against hopeless social conditions and the lack of employment possibilities - is hardly the same. Second, the old Arab opposition elites are often marginalised after years of constraint, removed from the scene, and caught by surprise at the popular upsurge.
Third, the motivations of protest diverge. In Georgia and Ukraine, people rebelled against political remnants of the Soviet era: aging rulers unable to reform the political system and modernise the economy. In Yugoslavia, young people had enjoyed greater freedoms than in the Soviet-dominated communist countries; by 2000, two decades after Tito’s death and a decade after the country’s disintegration, the next young generation in Serbia saw Poland and Hungary moving ahead to become part of the European Union.
Their counterparts in Georgia and Ukraine similarly viewed the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, while they had barely begun a “transition” to western-style democracy and market economy. A peaceful revolution was a way to mark their detachment from the older generations for failing to be “modern” and “western”.
By contrast, the hopelessness created by a lack of any perspectives for change has helped to drive the Arab movement. Its most graphic representation is the harraga in Algeria or Tunisia (a description of would-be migrants hoping to reach the shores of Europe on boats or improvised rafts). It also seems that the overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali at least has not ended the desperate exodus of young people from Tunisia.
Fourth, the respective presence and absence of an international dimension is striking. The participants of the colour revolutions were rebelling against the remnants of a fallen (Soviet) empire, and attracted by the victorious (western) one; in effect they desired to join the “new world order”. The west encouraged, supported, in some cases even financed the popular revolt in Serbia, and to a lesser degree those in Georgia and Ukraine.
Where the Arab rebellion is concerned, the west is completely absent. The extensive security cooperation between western states and Arab regimes is part of the explanation, but this is only one part of a post-colonial policy in the region that entails oil-based economies completely dependent on western economic systems; extensive financial corruption; and a policy over Palestine that no democratic Arab system could support. In this respect, western powers (especially European) would be well advised to take a new approach founded on principled solidarity with Arab democracy.
The lessons
The outcomes of the colour revolutions might also carry lessons for the Arab revolt, which faces even deeper socio-political problems than those faced by (for example) Serbia or Ukraine.
The first is that overthrowing an old dictator does not mean changing the system. There are two models here. In Ukraine, the post-orange- revolution president Viktor Yushchenko failed to bring much change beyond respecting free elections, with the eventual result of the return of his rival Viktor Yanukovich to power in February 2010 and subsequent pressure on civic rights; in post-rose-revolution Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili established a centralised government where the parliament was under the complete control of the ruling party, and the media had even less freedom after the change. In other words, the end result of the rose revolution in Georgia strongly resembles the starting point of Arab revolt.
The second, daunting or a spur to further action as it may be (or both), is that the forces for change in Tunisia and Egypt - and other countries yet to change their governments - will need to go much further to turn revolt into revolution. The youth movements such as Kmara or Pora did not in the end produce a new political force; Kmara dissolved itself into Georgia’s new ruling party, and Pora - initially associated with Yushchenko’s party - contested the parliamentary elections in 2006, without success.
The social composition of the Arab rebellion makes it potentially more radical than the colour revolutions. But there remain many uncertainties, some of them surrounding its lack of leadership. Will young Arabs continue to topple dictators, perhaps then to allow others to profit from the resulting vacuum; or will they move on to create new institutions and a new political culture? Any historical comparison can only go so far. The future is not fated; it is being created on the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Benghazi and Sana'a.
Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva. He is the author of War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (C Hurst / Columbia University Press, 2009), Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva. He is the author of War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (C Hurst, 2009; Columbia University Press, 2009), and From Perestroika to Rainbow Revolutions: Reform and Revolution After Socialism (C Hurst, 2011)
Delta State Youth have limitless self development opportunities.......Uduaghan
Delta state governor Dr Emmanuel Uduaghan has promised to continue to give youths in the state the opportunity to develop their talents to enable them be useful to themselves and society.
Dr Uduaghan who made the promise while addressing Delta youths talent Quest participants in Asaba said the state government will open opportunities for them in music, theater arts, film production, modeling among others.
He therefore enjoined them to embrace the programme and train adequately to enable them make the best of it.
The governor said there were a lot of prospects in some of the areas they were currently acquiring knowledge explaining that in life it was those who worked hard that made it.
His words “There is a lot to be done in life and you should be hardworking to enable you make progress in this programmes”.
Dr Uduaghan reminded them that it was not only those in oil companies that made it explaining that these in the film industry and other areas are creating wealth and making waves.
He called on criminally minded youths to direct their energy into meaningful ventures so that instead of destroying themselves they will contribute to the development of the state.
Explaining further he said “some youths are lazy and criminally minded and instead of engaging in meaningful ventures they go into crime”.
The governor commended the participants of the Delta Talent Quest for their perseverance and assured them that they will not regret their action.
The acting coach of Delta Talent Quest Mr. Norbert Young said the programme was put together by Ministry of Culture & Tourism to enable youths acquire talents in music, theater arts and other areas.
Mr. Young said the participants were doing well and will soon graduate.
The participants later demonstrated some drama sketches in English and other languages.
Dr Uduaghan who made the promise while addressing Delta youths talent Quest participants in Asaba said the state government will open opportunities for them in music, theater arts, film production, modeling among others.
He therefore enjoined them to embrace the programme and train adequately to enable them make the best of it.
The governor said there were a lot of prospects in some of the areas they were currently acquiring knowledge explaining that in life it was those who worked hard that made it.
His words “There is a lot to be done in life and you should be hardworking to enable you make progress in this programmes”.
Dr Uduaghan reminded them that it was not only those in oil companies that made it explaining that these in the film industry and other areas are creating wealth and making waves.
He called on criminally minded youths to direct their energy into meaningful ventures so that instead of destroying themselves they will contribute to the development of the state.
Explaining further he said “some youths are lazy and criminally minded and instead of engaging in meaningful ventures they go into crime”.
The governor commended the participants of the Delta Talent Quest for their perseverance and assured them that they will not regret their action.
The acting coach of Delta Talent Quest Mr. Norbert Young said the programme was put together by Ministry of Culture & Tourism to enable youths acquire talents in music, theater arts and other areas.
Mr. Young said the participants were doing well and will soon graduate.
The participants later demonstrated some drama sketches in English and other languages.
Libya: the prospect of war
The conflict in Libya is taking on the character of a civil war as Muammar Gaddafi’s regime recovers from its earlier reversals and consolidates its forces. Its substantial support is concentrated mainly in western Libya, especially around the greater Tripoli area which has nearly one-third of the country’s 6 million population (see Alison Pargeter, "Libya: a hard road ahead", 8 March 2011).
The course of the conflict as it enters this new phase will depend largely on the regime’s strategy over the next week. Gaddafi’s success requires the effective deployment of his military and paramilitary forces, by no means all of which are reliable. In addition, the escalation of conflict inside Libya raises the possibility of external military intervention. These two issues - the internal war, and the influence of outside powers - will be considered in turn.
The military realities
Libya’s navy is small and is of little consequence, although it might have some capacity to damage oil facilities if needed. The army has more than 40,000 troops, but half of these are conscripts and largely incompetent. The most effective unit is the elite 32nd brigade, with around 4,000 well-equipped and loyal troops. There are also mercenaries in varying numbers being imported, who however would depart rapidly in the face of any substantive reversals (see “Libya: the Washington-London dilemma”, 3 March 2011).
Libya’s air-force has over 300 combat-aircraft, but most are Soviet-era planes with a limited capability, and many are in storage - though there are also some Mirage F-1 planes that have been upgraded by French technicians. The force's strike-aircraft could have an impact if the conflict moves east towards the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, as equally could the substantial number of transport-aircraft and attack-helicopters. Again, the sudden reversal of alliances is highlighted by the presence in Libya’s transport fleet of fifteen C-130H Hercules planes from the United States, and by the Italian arms company Finmeccanica’s recent refurbishment of CH-47 transport helicopters.
These are the military realities. The larger strategic issue is that the Gaddafi regime will only survive beyond the short term if it regains control of most of Libya’s oil-and-gas industry. These resources are widely scattered; most of the energy fields are in the east and southeast of the country which accounts for around 80% of current production, with the remaining fields south of Tripoli in the west.
But the numerous oilfields, wherever they are located, are much less important than Libya’s coastal processing plants, refineries and export terminals. These are the strategically important centres, and the regime has to retrieve the majority of them without delay.
Zawiya, west of Tripoli towards the border with Tunisia, is one of the main outlets for the western oilfields. The Az-Zawiya oil-refinery west of the city is a key facility that the regime needs in order to maintain its own fuel supplies. This explains why the town has become is a key site of conflict between Gaddafi's forces and his opponents who have been occupying the city (see "The colonel fights back", Economist, 10 March 2011).
In addition to the plants near Tripoli, five terminals that handle oil-and-gas exports from eastern Libya generate the great majority of the country’s export revenues. The easternmost one is the large Marsa El Hariga terminal at Tobruk, on the border with Egypt; to the west are the Zuetina and Marsa El Brega tterminals south of Benghazi, the latter the site of Libya's liquefied natural-gas plant. These three are beyond Gaddafi's reach at present, while the two others - at Ras Lanuf (already the centre of conflict) and Es Sider (beside Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte) are being closely contested by Gaddafi’s forces.
The three sites west of Benghazi - Zuetina, Brega and Ras Lanuf - are likely to be the Gaddafi loyalists’ key objectives in coming days. The central challenge for Gaddafi's military planners is to move ground forces eastwards: a difficult logistical task since any large armoured vehicles, and especially tanks and self-propelled artillery, must be moved by road on large articulated transporters. Libya has relatively few of these and they can be rendered impotent by sabotage of bridges. Smaller vehicles may be able to divert across a dried-up river-bed but tank transporters most definitely can't.
In turn this means that airpower - transport aircraft as well as helicopters and strike-aircraft - will become increasingly important as the civil war develops. Both the direct military implications of this shift, and the possibility of greater numbers of civilians being killed by air-strikes, raises the second crucial issue in the evolving conflict: whether outside intervention will prevent Libya’s air-force from operating.
The view from outside
The intensifying conflict has led the Barack Obama administration to consider - gradually and reluctantly - some kind of intervention (see Jim Lobe, “Obama Inches closer to Military Intervention”, TerraViva/IPS, 7 March 2011). Its calculations are taking place against the background of vigorous pressure from conservatives in the United States for military action against Gaddafi; some even call for the defence secretary Robert M Gates - who has been notably dismissive of the idea of imposing a “no-fly zone” - to resign (see William Kristol, “The Gates of Resignation”, Weekly Standard, 14 March 2011).
So far the United States has moved an amphibious task-group into the eastern Mediterranean, though the aircraft-carrier battle-group centred on the USS Enterprise has not yet transited the Suez canal from the Red Sea. There are no indications either of a carrier battle-group being deployed from the eastern United States.
This still leaves the possibility of some kind of intervention, perhaps involving US military bases in Italy and Greece. The large naval air station at Sigonella, sixteen kilometres southwest of Catania, could readily accommodate aircraft redeployed from other US bases in northern Italy; the smaller naval-support facility at Souda Bay in Crete (which is collocated with a large Greek air-force complex) could also cope with planes brought in from elsewhere.
Nato is already involved, as confirmed by the best independent source available - NATO Watch. A current briefing reports regular Awac flights from southern Europe and a move to 24/7 surveillance flights (see NATO Watch Briefing Paper, 18); other sources quoted by NATO Watch report that a Nato team entered eastern Libya by the beginning of March comprising “experts in airlift and command and control operations based at NATO headquarters in Brussels” (see Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 March 2011).
A number of Arab League states and some rebel groups within Libya are calling for a no-fly zone. But the most accurate assessment in this very uncertain period is that US and European planners are investigating a variety of approaches - many of which fall short of the no-fly option.
These include arming rebels (especially with sophisticated portable anti-aircraft missiles);signal-jamming of Libyan command-and-control systems; and even inserting special-operation teams to link with rebel groups (see Thom Shanker, “U.S. Weighs Options, On Air and Sea”, New York Times, 7 March 2011).
The cost of conflict
An important part of understanding the present situation, however, is also to look at it from the viewpoint of Muammar Gaddafi and his military coterie. This, after all, is a regime that has held power for forty-two years with all the elemental political skill - as well as the range of enemies made - that that implies (see Fred Halliday, "Libya's regime at 40: a state of kleptocracy", 8 September 2009).
The regime’s aim can be assumed to be short-term survival followed by the longer-term recovery of the whole of Libya. In that case its appropriate military posture is calibrated actions designed to wear down the opposition while not going so far as to provoke foreign military intervention, such as a no-fly zone.
The regime is aided here by the deep reluctance of western politicians, especially Barack Obama and his associates, to slip into yet another war in the region. In this respect, the Iraq disaster casts a long shadow - something the Gaddafi network knows only too well (see Godfrey Hodgson, “America and the Arab revolts: faces of power”, 8 March 2011).
If this analysis is correct, and the regime succeeds in maintaining its basic equilibrium, then a long drawn-out conflict may be a realistic prognosis. The resulting costs will be measured in human lives; but also in the prospects for deepening the “Arab spring” that first bloomed in Tunisia and Egypt, the countries on either side of Libya.
Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001, and writes an international-security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010)
The course of the conflict as it enters this new phase will depend largely on the regime’s strategy over the next week. Gaddafi’s success requires the effective deployment of his military and paramilitary forces, by no means all of which are reliable. In addition, the escalation of conflict inside Libya raises the possibility of external military intervention. These two issues - the internal war, and the influence of outside powers - will be considered in turn.
The military realities
Libya’s navy is small and is of little consequence, although it might have some capacity to damage oil facilities if needed. The army has more than 40,000 troops, but half of these are conscripts and largely incompetent. The most effective unit is the elite 32nd brigade, with around 4,000 well-equipped and loyal troops. There are also mercenaries in varying numbers being imported, who however would depart rapidly in the face of any substantive reversals (see “Libya: the Washington-London dilemma”, 3 March 2011).
Libya’s air-force has over 300 combat-aircraft, but most are Soviet-era planes with a limited capability, and many are in storage - though there are also some Mirage F-1 planes that have been upgraded by French technicians. The force's strike-aircraft could have an impact if the conflict moves east towards the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, as equally could the substantial number of transport-aircraft and attack-helicopters. Again, the sudden reversal of alliances is highlighted by the presence in Libya’s transport fleet of fifteen C-130H Hercules planes from the United States, and by the Italian arms company Finmeccanica’s recent refurbishment of CH-47 transport helicopters.
These are the military realities. The larger strategic issue is that the Gaddafi regime will only survive beyond the short term if it regains control of most of Libya’s oil-and-gas industry. These resources are widely scattered; most of the energy fields are in the east and southeast of the country which accounts for around 80% of current production, with the remaining fields south of Tripoli in the west.
But the numerous oilfields, wherever they are located, are much less important than Libya’s coastal processing plants, refineries and export terminals. These are the strategically important centres, and the regime has to retrieve the majority of them without delay.
Zawiya, west of Tripoli towards the border with Tunisia, is one of the main outlets for the western oilfields. The Az-Zawiya oil-refinery west of the city is a key facility that the regime needs in order to maintain its own fuel supplies. This explains why the town has become is a key site of conflict between Gaddafi's forces and his opponents who have been occupying the city (see "The colonel fights back", Economist, 10 March 2011).
In addition to the plants near Tripoli, five terminals that handle oil-and-gas exports from eastern Libya generate the great majority of the country’s export revenues. The easternmost one is the large Marsa El Hariga terminal at Tobruk, on the border with Egypt; to the west are the Zuetina and Marsa El Brega tterminals south of Benghazi, the latter the site of Libya's liquefied natural-gas plant. These three are beyond Gaddafi's reach at present, while the two others - at Ras Lanuf (already the centre of conflict) and Es Sider (beside Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte) are being closely contested by Gaddafi’s forces.
The three sites west of Benghazi - Zuetina, Brega and Ras Lanuf - are likely to be the Gaddafi loyalists’ key objectives in coming days. The central challenge for Gaddafi's military planners is to move ground forces eastwards: a difficult logistical task since any large armoured vehicles, and especially tanks and self-propelled artillery, must be moved by road on large articulated transporters. Libya has relatively few of these and they can be rendered impotent by sabotage of bridges. Smaller vehicles may be able to divert across a dried-up river-bed but tank transporters most definitely can't.
In turn this means that airpower - transport aircraft as well as helicopters and strike-aircraft - will become increasingly important as the civil war develops. Both the direct military implications of this shift, and the possibility of greater numbers of civilians being killed by air-strikes, raises the second crucial issue in the evolving conflict: whether outside intervention will prevent Libya’s air-force from operating.
The view from outside
The intensifying conflict has led the Barack Obama administration to consider - gradually and reluctantly - some kind of intervention (see Jim Lobe, “Obama Inches closer to Military Intervention”, TerraViva/IPS, 7 March 2011). Its calculations are taking place against the background of vigorous pressure from conservatives in the United States for military action against Gaddafi; some even call for the defence secretary Robert M Gates - who has been notably dismissive of the idea of imposing a “no-fly zone” - to resign (see William Kristol, “The Gates of Resignation”, Weekly Standard, 14 March 2011).
So far the United States has moved an amphibious task-group into the eastern Mediterranean, though the aircraft-carrier battle-group centred on the USS Enterprise has not yet transited the Suez canal from the Red Sea. There are no indications either of a carrier battle-group being deployed from the eastern United States.
This still leaves the possibility of some kind of intervention, perhaps involving US military bases in Italy and Greece. The large naval air station at Sigonella, sixteen kilometres southwest of Catania, could readily accommodate aircraft redeployed from other US bases in northern Italy; the smaller naval-support facility at Souda Bay in Crete (which is collocated with a large Greek air-force complex) could also cope with planes brought in from elsewhere.
Nato is already involved, as confirmed by the best independent source available - NATO Watch. A current briefing reports regular Awac flights from southern Europe and a move to 24/7 surveillance flights (see NATO Watch Briefing Paper, 18); other sources quoted by NATO Watch report that a Nato team entered eastern Libya by the beginning of March comprising “experts in airlift and command and control operations based at NATO headquarters in Brussels” (see Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 March 2011).
A number of Arab League states and some rebel groups within Libya are calling for a no-fly zone. But the most accurate assessment in this very uncertain period is that US and European planners are investigating a variety of approaches - many of which fall short of the no-fly option.
These include arming rebels (especially with sophisticated portable anti-aircraft missiles);signal-jamming of Libyan command-and-control systems; and even inserting special-operation teams to link with rebel groups (see Thom Shanker, “U.S. Weighs Options, On Air and Sea”, New York Times, 7 March 2011).
The cost of conflict
An important part of understanding the present situation, however, is also to look at it from the viewpoint of Muammar Gaddafi and his military coterie. This, after all, is a regime that has held power for forty-two years with all the elemental political skill - as well as the range of enemies made - that that implies (see Fred Halliday, "Libya's regime at 40: a state of kleptocracy", 8 September 2009).
The regime’s aim can be assumed to be short-term survival followed by the longer-term recovery of the whole of Libya. In that case its appropriate military posture is calibrated actions designed to wear down the opposition while not going so far as to provoke foreign military intervention, such as a no-fly zone.
The regime is aided here by the deep reluctance of western politicians, especially Barack Obama and his associates, to slip into yet another war in the region. In this respect, the Iraq disaster casts a long shadow - something the Gaddafi network knows only too well (see Godfrey Hodgson, “America and the Arab revolts: faces of power”, 8 March 2011).
If this analysis is correct, and the regime succeeds in maintaining its basic equilibrium, then a long drawn-out conflict may be a realistic prognosis. The resulting costs will be measured in human lives; but also in the prospects for deepening the “Arab spring” that first bloomed in Tunisia and Egypt, the countries on either side of Libya.
Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001, and writes an international-security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010)
Thirty U.N. rescue teams on standby to help Japan
Thirty international search and rescue teams stand ready to go to Japan to provide assistance following a major earthquake, the United Nations said on Friday.
"We stand ready to assist as usual in such cases," Elisabeth Byrs of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) told Reuters in Geneva. "Thirty international search and rescue teams are on alert and monitoring the situation and stand ready to assist if necessary."
U.N. disaster assessment and coordination teams, who deploy in emergencies worldwide to try to locate and treat survivors, normally include sniffer dogs and medical teams.
The biggest earthquake to hit Japan in 140 years struck the northeast coast on Friday, triggering a 10-metre tsunami that swept away everything in its path, including houses, cars and farm buildings on fire. (Reporting by Stephanie Nebehay; Editing by Louise Ireland)
"We stand ready to assist as usual in such cases," Elisabeth Byrs of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) told Reuters in Geneva. "Thirty international search and rescue teams are on alert and monitoring the situation and stand ready to assist if necessary."
U.N. disaster assessment and coordination teams, who deploy in emergencies worldwide to try to locate and treat survivors, normally include sniffer dogs and medical teams.
The biggest earthquake to hit Japan in 140 years struck the northeast coast on Friday, triggering a 10-metre tsunami that swept away everything in its path, including houses, cars and farm buildings on fire. (Reporting by Stephanie Nebehay; Editing by Louise Ireland)
Crisis Engulfs Nigeria Judiciary; as PDP and ACN Engage in a battle of Wits
Should the Nigerian Judiciary have any role to play in the forthcoming elections, particularly any Presidential election petition or should the Nigerian electorate and court of public opinion have the final say?
That is the question burning in the Mind of Observers as the his face-off between the President of the Court of Appeal, Justices Ayo, Salami and Justice Alloysius Katsina-Alu’s Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) escalates.
Hot on the heels of his face-off with the President of the Court of Appeal, Justices Ayo, Salami, another controversy raises dust in judicial and political circles. The Osun and Ekiti state chapters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) today submitted two petitions containing phone call logs retrieved pertaining to calls made between operatives of rival Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the president of the court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Salami, during the last gubernatorial appeal tribunal sittings that upstaged two of its governors.
Read the two petitions and the controversy @http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5400%3Acrisis-engulfs-nigeria-judiciary-as-pdp-and-acn-engage-in-a-battle-of-wits&catid=1%3Alatest-news&Itemid=67
That is the question burning in the Mind of Observers as the his face-off between the President of the Court of Appeal, Justices Ayo, Salami and Justice Alloysius Katsina-Alu’s Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) escalates.
Hot on the heels of his face-off with the President of the Court of Appeal, Justices Ayo, Salami, another controversy raises dust in judicial and political circles. The Osun and Ekiti state chapters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) today submitted two petitions containing phone call logs retrieved pertaining to calls made between operatives of rival Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the president of the court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Salami, during the last gubernatorial appeal tribunal sittings that upstaged two of its governors.
Read the two petitions and the controversy @http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5400%3Acrisis-engulfs-nigeria-judiciary-as-pdp-and-acn-engage-in-a-battle-of-wits&catid=1%3Alatest-news&Itemid=67
Nigerians Hopeful for Credible Elections in April Despite Continuing Challenges
Statement of IRI’s Pre-Election Assessment Mission Abuja, Nigeria
– The citizens of Nigeria will go to the polls in April, engaging in the largest electoral exercise in Africa in 2011. The elections in Nigeria are critical to the future well-being of this nation; bu...t they are also of great importance to the continent of Africa and especially the
sub-region of West Africa.
The balloting will begin with the national assembly elections on April 2, followed by presidential and vice presidential elections on April 9, and concluding with state level (governors and state assembly) elections on April 16. To assess the legal and political environment prior to this
exercise of the franchise, the International Republican Institute (IRI) deployed an assessment mission to Nigeria from February 28 to March 3, 2011. Led by His Excellency John Kufuor, former president of the Republic of Ghana (2001-2009), this mission met with almost all major stakeholders involved in the 2011 election cycle.
The IRI delegation met with the Chairman and commissioners of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), members of the National Assembly, the President of the Court of Appeal, and the Inspector General of Police (IGP), as well as presidential candidates, religious leaders, representatives of political parties, civil society organizations, including women’s activists, the media, and international development partners.
The mission was assured by both the INEC and IGP that the government has provided adequate funding to conduct the April elections.
The delegation noted with satisfaction the commitment by INEC Chairman Attahiru Jega, who, a few days prior to the mission’s arrival, made the following public statement, “The commission will spare no effort on its promise that the elections will be free, fair and credible. We recognize that a major step towards achieving that goal is to be transparent with our operations.”
Chairman Jega reaffirmed this commitment in the meeting with the IRI delegation. In every one of its meetings, the delegation heard praise for the INEC chairman. It is clear that the Nigerian people have confidence in Chairman Jega’s commitment to transparent, free and fair elections.
Nigeria is fortunate in having an INEC Chairman praised across the political spectrum. However it is also critical that this confidence in the Chairman’s integrity extends to the entire INEC structure. The means for achieving this is for all INEC personnel to exercise the utmost professionalism and impartiality in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. The delegation further noted a strong desire from Nigerian stakeholders to raise the quality of their electoral processes and, equally of note, was encouraged by the stakeholders’ respective commitment to an improved process.
There are still some challenges to address with less than a month to go before the first of the series of important elections in April 2011. The delegation offers the following observations and recommendations:
·
All stakeholders should continue to support the electoral process by renewing their public commitment, through words and deeds, to respect the independence of INEC, the sanctity of the electoral process and respect for the rule of law.
·
Some stakeholders expressed concerns about security. The delegation was informed that full funding and an operational plan for the deployment of security personnel is in place for the elections.
The appropriate authorities are urged to continue to take steps to allay these fears.
·
The Nigerian Judiciary, which is already confronted with an overburdened docket, has had added to its responsibilities a role of adjudicating electoral disputes. This has allowed for situations through which candidates can thwart the will of voters as well as placing the courts in a politicized environment detrimental to public confidence in the integrity of the judicial branch of government.
It is recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of an administrative review process of petitions before
they reach the court to determine whether they are frivolous or would materially affect the outcome of an election and thus merit judicial hearing. It is also recommended that, for these April elections, Nigerians only refer electoral disputes to the courts once all other means of resolution have been exhausted.
·
Another concern presented to the delegation was that of unequal access to state media.
Given Nigeria’s political landscape, the ability of political actors to have access to the media remains central to a fair election process.
All those who feel aggrieved are encouraged to document unequal access and submit their complaints to the appropriate media regulatory agencies and INEC. Media outlets are encouraged to ensure fair coverage of political activities.
·
The delegation welcomes the cooperation between INEC and the political parties in the development of a Code of Conduct for the parties, which is scheduled to be signed by all political parties and INEC on March 8.
This is an important initiative by INEC and the parties, but it will be imperative that parties ensure that their candidates and supporters strictly adhere to the code.
·
In early February 2011 the INEC completed what many Nigerian stakeholders consider to be a successful voter registration exercise. The commission decided not to use the old, flawed, voter register and, instead, developed a completely new register using biometrics.
INEC reported that it registered more than 67.7 million voter names.
The INEC should build on this register to undertake continuous voter registration after the 2011 elections to improve the quality of the data captured.
·
The delegation was encouraged by the decision of INEC to address past election problems related to the integrity of the ballot process. In an attempt to strengthen the independence of poll workers, INEC has announced its intention to deploy members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) as poll workers.
However, based on reports that NYSC members, in some instances, were not well trained to handle the voter registration process, it is imperative that the commission ensures the proper and timely training of these workers before the elections commence.
·
It was highlighted to the delegation that election offences have gone unpunished in Nigeria. In order to send a forceful message that Nigeria is serious about remedying this history and promoting respect for the law, the appropriate authorities should take the necessary legal actions to prosecute individuals, including election officials, flouting the election law and committing such offences.
·
The delegation was concerned to hear about and see media reports of inflammatory rhetoric, including such characterizations by political actors as these elections being “do or die politics.” This neither promotes a respectful and thoughtful process nor encourages participation
. Political parties, candidates and supporters should refrain from using inflammatory language in the run up to the elections.
·
The manipulation of youth to perpetrate violence on behalf of political actors continues to be a significant threat to the integrity of the electoral process. For the benefit of the April elections, as well as the long term health of Nigerian democracy, it is recommended that those who engage in election-related violence in 2011 be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. There should be no tolerance for those who engage in violence.
·
It was reported to the delegation that, in past elections, there has been a failure to adequately pay polling staff and police, resulting in a circumstance that can make these individuals susceptible to being compromised.
The appropriate authorities should ensure the provision of sufficient and timely funding to enable these persons to fulfill their electoral duties.
·
The delegation was advised that the “modified open ballot system” would be used for the 2011 elections in an attempt to reduce multiple voting and other fraud on Election Day.
This is a significant change from the system used in 2007.
It is recommended that there be vigorous and extensive voter education between now and Election Day to emphasize this change.
·
There exist strong barriers, including the use of violence and intimidation, to the full participation of women in Nigeria’s political life.
Political parties should ensure that women have equal access to leadership opportunities, including the ability to run for office at all levels of government. Political parties are encouraged to examine party structures and procedures with the objective of removing all barriers against the
participation of women.
·
The delegation heard numerous concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability of Nigeria’s campaign financing system. The deficiencies and abuses of this system continue to undercut the credibility of the electoral process.
The delegation strongly recommends that, at a minimum, political parties and candidates fully adhere to current financial disclosure rules. Further, for the longer-term confidence in the election system, the delegation recommends the establishment of a national commission to develop a comprehensive framework to strengthen the reporting of all expenditures related to the activities of political parties and candidates and the prosecution of campaign finance violations.
In addition to His Excellency John Kufuor, the delegation included Dan Fisk, IRI’s Vice President for Policy and Strategic Planning; Martin Kimani, Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, the Atlantic Council; Fernand Julien Gauze, Secretary General of the Convention of Ivorian Civil Society; Charles Lasham, Electoral Consultant; and Frank Agyekum, Spokesperson for President Kufuor. Supporting the delegation were Paul E. Fagan, IRI’s Regional Director for Africa; Mourtada Deme, IRI’s Resident Country Director in Nigeria; Sarah Aldrich, IRI Assistant Program Officer for Africa and the IRI in-country team.
Since 1999, IRI’s Nigeria program has focused on enhancing the credibility of the electoral process. With the 2011 elections approaching, IRI is working across the nation with a variety of stakeholders including political parties, youth, women, media, persons with disabilities and civil
society groups. IRI will send a delegation to observe the elections in April 2011.
IRI has monitored more than 135 elections in more than 40 countries, including Nigeria’s 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections.
The delegation is grateful to all who took the time to meet with them and for sharing their views and opinions on the current state of the electoral process in Nigeria.
– The citizens of Nigeria will go to the polls in April, engaging in the largest electoral exercise in Africa in 2011. The elections in Nigeria are critical to the future well-being of this nation; bu...t they are also of great importance to the continent of Africa and especially the
sub-region of West Africa.
The balloting will begin with the national assembly elections on April 2, followed by presidential and vice presidential elections on April 9, and concluding with state level (governors and state assembly) elections on April 16. To assess the legal and political environment prior to this
exercise of the franchise, the International Republican Institute (IRI) deployed an assessment mission to Nigeria from February 28 to March 3, 2011. Led by His Excellency John Kufuor, former president of the Republic of Ghana (2001-2009), this mission met with almost all major stakeholders involved in the 2011 election cycle.
The IRI delegation met with the Chairman and commissioners of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), members of the National Assembly, the President of the Court of Appeal, and the Inspector General of Police (IGP), as well as presidential candidates, religious leaders, representatives of political parties, civil society organizations, including women’s activists, the media, and international development partners.
The mission was assured by both the INEC and IGP that the government has provided adequate funding to conduct the April elections.
The delegation noted with satisfaction the commitment by INEC Chairman Attahiru Jega, who, a few days prior to the mission’s arrival, made the following public statement, “The commission will spare no effort on its promise that the elections will be free, fair and credible. We recognize that a major step towards achieving that goal is to be transparent with our operations.”
Chairman Jega reaffirmed this commitment in the meeting with the IRI delegation. In every one of its meetings, the delegation heard praise for the INEC chairman. It is clear that the Nigerian people have confidence in Chairman Jega’s commitment to transparent, free and fair elections.
Nigeria is fortunate in having an INEC Chairman praised across the political spectrum. However it is also critical that this confidence in the Chairman’s integrity extends to the entire INEC structure. The means for achieving this is for all INEC personnel to exercise the utmost professionalism and impartiality in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. The delegation further noted a strong desire from Nigerian stakeholders to raise the quality of their electoral processes and, equally of note, was encouraged by the stakeholders’ respective commitment to an improved process.
There are still some challenges to address with less than a month to go before the first of the series of important elections in April 2011. The delegation offers the following observations and recommendations:
·
All stakeholders should continue to support the electoral process by renewing their public commitment, through words and deeds, to respect the independence of INEC, the sanctity of the electoral process and respect for the rule of law.
·
Some stakeholders expressed concerns about security. The delegation was informed that full funding and an operational plan for the deployment of security personnel is in place for the elections.
The appropriate authorities are urged to continue to take steps to allay these fears.
·
The Nigerian Judiciary, which is already confronted with an overburdened docket, has had added to its responsibilities a role of adjudicating electoral disputes. This has allowed for situations through which candidates can thwart the will of voters as well as placing the courts in a politicized environment detrimental to public confidence in the integrity of the judicial branch of government.
It is recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of an administrative review process of petitions before
they reach the court to determine whether they are frivolous or would materially affect the outcome of an election and thus merit judicial hearing. It is also recommended that, for these April elections, Nigerians only refer electoral disputes to the courts once all other means of resolution have been exhausted.
·
Another concern presented to the delegation was that of unequal access to state media.
Given Nigeria’s political landscape, the ability of political actors to have access to the media remains central to a fair election process.
All those who feel aggrieved are encouraged to document unequal access and submit their complaints to the appropriate media regulatory agencies and INEC. Media outlets are encouraged to ensure fair coverage of political activities.
·
The delegation welcomes the cooperation between INEC and the political parties in the development of a Code of Conduct for the parties, which is scheduled to be signed by all political parties and INEC on March 8.
This is an important initiative by INEC and the parties, but it will be imperative that parties ensure that their candidates and supporters strictly adhere to the code.
·
In early February 2011 the INEC completed what many Nigerian stakeholders consider to be a successful voter registration exercise. The commission decided not to use the old, flawed, voter register and, instead, developed a completely new register using biometrics.
INEC reported that it registered more than 67.7 million voter names.
The INEC should build on this register to undertake continuous voter registration after the 2011 elections to improve the quality of the data captured.
·
The delegation was encouraged by the decision of INEC to address past election problems related to the integrity of the ballot process. In an attempt to strengthen the independence of poll workers, INEC has announced its intention to deploy members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) as poll workers.
However, based on reports that NYSC members, in some instances, were not well trained to handle the voter registration process, it is imperative that the commission ensures the proper and timely training of these workers before the elections commence.
·
It was highlighted to the delegation that election offences have gone unpunished in Nigeria. In order to send a forceful message that Nigeria is serious about remedying this history and promoting respect for the law, the appropriate authorities should take the necessary legal actions to prosecute individuals, including election officials, flouting the election law and committing such offences.
·
The delegation was concerned to hear about and see media reports of inflammatory rhetoric, including such characterizations by political actors as these elections being “do or die politics.” This neither promotes a respectful and thoughtful process nor encourages participation
. Political parties, candidates and supporters should refrain from using inflammatory language in the run up to the elections.
·
The manipulation of youth to perpetrate violence on behalf of political actors continues to be a significant threat to the integrity of the electoral process. For the benefit of the April elections, as well as the long term health of Nigerian democracy, it is recommended that those who engage in election-related violence in 2011 be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. There should be no tolerance for those who engage in violence.
·
It was reported to the delegation that, in past elections, there has been a failure to adequately pay polling staff and police, resulting in a circumstance that can make these individuals susceptible to being compromised.
The appropriate authorities should ensure the provision of sufficient and timely funding to enable these persons to fulfill their electoral duties.
·
The delegation was advised that the “modified open ballot system” would be used for the 2011 elections in an attempt to reduce multiple voting and other fraud on Election Day.
This is a significant change from the system used in 2007.
It is recommended that there be vigorous and extensive voter education between now and Election Day to emphasize this change.
·
There exist strong barriers, including the use of violence and intimidation, to the full participation of women in Nigeria’s political life.
Political parties should ensure that women have equal access to leadership opportunities, including the ability to run for office at all levels of government. Political parties are encouraged to examine party structures and procedures with the objective of removing all barriers against the
participation of women.
·
The delegation heard numerous concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability of Nigeria’s campaign financing system. The deficiencies and abuses of this system continue to undercut the credibility of the electoral process.
The delegation strongly recommends that, at a minimum, political parties and candidates fully adhere to current financial disclosure rules. Further, for the longer-term confidence in the election system, the delegation recommends the establishment of a national commission to develop a comprehensive framework to strengthen the reporting of all expenditures related to the activities of political parties and candidates and the prosecution of campaign finance violations.
In addition to His Excellency John Kufuor, the delegation included Dan Fisk, IRI’s Vice President for Policy and Strategic Planning; Martin Kimani, Director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, the Atlantic Council; Fernand Julien Gauze, Secretary General of the Convention of Ivorian Civil Society; Charles Lasham, Electoral Consultant; and Frank Agyekum, Spokesperson for President Kufuor. Supporting the delegation were Paul E. Fagan, IRI’s Regional Director for Africa; Mourtada Deme, IRI’s Resident Country Director in Nigeria; Sarah Aldrich, IRI Assistant Program Officer for Africa and the IRI in-country team.
Since 1999, IRI’s Nigeria program has focused on enhancing the credibility of the electoral process. With the 2011 elections approaching, IRI is working across the nation with a variety of stakeholders including political parties, youth, women, media, persons with disabilities and civil
society groups. IRI will send a delegation to observe the elections in April 2011.
IRI has monitored more than 135 elections in more than 40 countries, including Nigeria’s 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections.
The delegation is grateful to all who took the time to meet with them and for sharing their views and opinions on the current state of the electoral process in Nigeria.
Chechnya women's Islamic dress code: Russia blamed
Russia has been criticised for letting Chechen authorities impose a compulsory Islamic dress code for women.
A report by Human Rights Watch includes testimonies from dozens of Chechen women who were threatened or even attacked with paintballs by young men enforcing the 'virtue campaign'.
The rights group says some attacks involved Chechen security forces.
The campaign has the backing of President Ramzan Kadyrov, relied on by Moscow to stabilise the region.
In 2007, President Kadyrov issued an edict that banned bareheaded women from entering state buildings. Though this is in direct violation of Russian law, it is strictly followed today.
Since then, an unofficial campaign limiting Chechen women's freedoms has been gaining strength, Human Rights Watch says.
A Russian rights activist, Natalya Estemirova, who had publicly criticised the Islamic dress campaign, was abducted from Grozny in July 2009 and her body was later found in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia.
Bruised and scared
In June 2010, dozens of women were targeted in paintball attacks for not donning headscarves or because their skirts or sleeves were not long enough.
One woman interviewed for the report described her terror as she thought a real gun was being aimed at her. She said the incident left her bruised and scared ever to leave the house without a headscarf again.
Chechnyan President Ramzan Kadyrov before an exhibition football match in Grozny on 8 March, 2011 Mr Kadyrov praised the paintball attackers
President Kadyrov praised the paintball attackers, and leaflets later surfaced warning that women who failed to wear headscarves could face "more persuasive measures".
"The enforcement of a compulsory Islamic dress code on women in Chechnya violates their rights to private life, personal autonomy, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion, thought, and conscience," the HRW report says. "It is also a form of gender-based discrimination prohibited under international treaties to which Russia is a party."
"These attacks against women are outrageous, and the alleged involvement of law enforcement officials is of special concern," HRW's Russia researcher Tanya Lokshina says. "The Kremlin should publicly and unambiguously make clear... that Chechen women, like Russian women, are free to dress as they choose."
Chechnya was devastated by two separatist wars following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
34-year-old Mr Kadyrov has been credited with bringing some stability to the region but he has come under heavy criticism from international rights groups over alleged human rights abuses.
A report by Human Rights Watch includes testimonies from dozens of Chechen women who were threatened or even attacked with paintballs by young men enforcing the 'virtue campaign'.
The rights group says some attacks involved Chechen security forces.
The campaign has the backing of President Ramzan Kadyrov, relied on by Moscow to stabilise the region.
In 2007, President Kadyrov issued an edict that banned bareheaded women from entering state buildings. Though this is in direct violation of Russian law, it is strictly followed today.
Since then, an unofficial campaign limiting Chechen women's freedoms has been gaining strength, Human Rights Watch says.
A Russian rights activist, Natalya Estemirova, who had publicly criticised the Islamic dress campaign, was abducted from Grozny in July 2009 and her body was later found in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia.
Bruised and scared
In June 2010, dozens of women were targeted in paintball attacks for not donning headscarves or because their skirts or sleeves were not long enough.
One woman interviewed for the report described her terror as she thought a real gun was being aimed at her. She said the incident left her bruised and scared ever to leave the house without a headscarf again.
Chechnyan President Ramzan Kadyrov before an exhibition football match in Grozny on 8 March, 2011 Mr Kadyrov praised the paintball attackers
President Kadyrov praised the paintball attackers, and leaflets later surfaced warning that women who failed to wear headscarves could face "more persuasive measures".
"The enforcement of a compulsory Islamic dress code on women in Chechnya violates their rights to private life, personal autonomy, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion, thought, and conscience," the HRW report says. "It is also a form of gender-based discrimination prohibited under international treaties to which Russia is a party."
"These attacks against women are outrageous, and the alleged involvement of law enforcement officials is of special concern," HRW's Russia researcher Tanya Lokshina says. "The Kremlin should publicly and unambiguously make clear... that Chechen women, like Russian women, are free to dress as they choose."
Chechnya was devastated by two separatist wars following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
34-year-old Mr Kadyrov has been credited with bringing some stability to the region but he has come under heavy criticism from international rights groups over alleged human rights abuses.
ELECTORAL CANDIDATES SELECTION CRITERIA (Renaissance NIGERIA)
Now that the Voter Registration Exercise is over, we must begin the process of evaluating the candidates for the various elective offices: State House of Assembly, Federal House of Representatives, the Senate, Governorship, and the Presidency.
Most people unduly focus on the Presidency and ignore the other offices which probably actually impact on our lives more. We must take active interest in goings-on at the State level and in who our legislative representatives are in both the State Houses of Assembly and the National Assembly.
We must be well-informed to make the right choices. So, please take time and begin to do some research:
Some of the things you need to find out are:
* Who are the candidates?
* What are their antecedents?
* What do they stand for?
* Are they people of integrity?
* Are they community-minded people?
* What value are they presently adding through their current engagements in the polity, governance, business or as social entrepreneurs?
* Have they been faithful stewards in their past public service?
* What is their track record?
* What are their manifestos?
* Can they truly represent YOUR interest?
* Do you trust them?
* Can you trust them?
* Are they easily accessible to you?
* What are the sources of their income?
* What is their public reputation?
* Are they faithful husbands or wives?
* Are the loyal friends?
* Do they have a genuine fear of God?
* Do they love people?
* Are they loved by the people?
* How are the children they have raised or are raising?
...........etc. etc.
Yes, these are probing questions and some may even appear private; but a person seeking your vote really has no "privacy" any more since he or she has opted to step into the public domain. If the answers to these questions and other questions are not convincing enough for you, then hold back your vote.
You must SELECT wisely! Share this message with all you Friends NOW! God bless you. GOD BLESS NIGERIA!"
YOU are the BEST,
Amedu Monday Amedu
08096393404, 07036014740
Most people unduly focus on the Presidency and ignore the other offices which probably actually impact on our lives more. We must take active interest in goings-on at the State level and in who our legislative representatives are in both the State Houses of Assembly and the National Assembly.
We must be well-informed to make the right choices. So, please take time and begin to do some research:
Some of the things you need to find out are:
* Who are the candidates?
* What are their antecedents?
* What do they stand for?
* Are they people of integrity?
* Are they community-minded people?
* What value are they presently adding through their current engagements in the polity, governance, business or as social entrepreneurs?
* Have they been faithful stewards in their past public service?
* What is their track record?
* What are their manifestos?
* Can they truly represent YOUR interest?
* Do you trust them?
* Can you trust them?
* Are they easily accessible to you?
* What are the sources of their income?
* What is their public reputation?
* Are they faithful husbands or wives?
* Are the loyal friends?
* Do they have a genuine fear of God?
* Do they love people?
* Are they loved by the people?
* How are the children they have raised or are raising?
...........etc. etc.
Yes, these are probing questions and some may even appear private; but a person seeking your vote really has no "privacy" any more since he or she has opted to step into the public domain. If the answers to these questions and other questions are not convincing enough for you, then hold back your vote.
You must SELECT wisely! Share this message with all you Friends NOW! God bless you. GOD BLESS NIGERIA!"
YOU are the BEST,
Amedu Monday Amedu
08096393404, 07036014740
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