King Oba-Ogie
It is obvious that the authorities in Nigeria are playing politics with the issue of religious conflict in the country. And this game of denial and misrepresentation would surely not augur well for the country and its people. During his recent visit to Washington,
Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan told the world that the recurrent conflict in Jos and Plateau state had nothing to do with religion.
Yes he said so and he really meant it!
This pronouncement by President Jonathan outraged all those who had followed the conflict situation in Jos and who thought that the Nigerian helmsman would have used the opportunity to present the real situation to the world. But he didn't.
Our president lied. But it may be that this presidential lied reflected what is now emerging as the national policy on religious crisis in Northern Nigeria. Because the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, Alhaji Lateef Adegbite, in recent lecture in Lagos also echoed the same point. According to Adegbite, the conflict in Jos was mischaracterized as religious. He said the crisis could be traced 'to struggle for control of local resources' The Jos crisis was mischaracterized as religious, right?
So also the Kano religious riot(1991) was mischaracterized as religious? The sharia crisis in 2000 was also mischaracterized as religious? The riots over the beauty pegeantand the Mohammed cartoons were also mistaken to be religious?
And of course we all know that on Tuesday(July 13), clashes between muslims and christians in Wukari in Taraba state left at least 8 people dead and 40 injured. And yesterday -July 16- a muslim scholar in Abuja told Radio France International that the conflict in Taraba had nothing to do with religion.
He said the clashes were caused by poverty, social disequilibrium and mismanagement of national resources by the leaders.Meanwhile it was reported that the construction of a mosque near a police station led to the clashes. Now lets think about this. If poverty is the main reason for the conflict in Jos and in other Northern states then muslims and christians would be fighting and killing each everywhere across the country
But this is not the case.
Personally I think that the Nigerian authorities and their muslim cohorts may have found a way- a politically correct way to misrepresent the religious crisis particularly the problem of islamic fanaticism in Northern Nigeria. By claiming that the conflicts between muslims and christians in Northern Nigeria had nothing to do with religion the Nigerian authorities are running a lot of risk.
Nigeria risks being seen as lacking the political will to tackle religious fundamentalism particularly islamic fanaticism in Northern Nigeria. Because everyone knows that the killings and clashes in Plateau, Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Taraba and other Northern states took place along religious lines. So it requires one being dishonest- deliberately dishonest- to deny or dismiss this urgent reality. Also Nigeria would be missing an opportunity to address this lingering social and security threat once and for all.
Today many people across the are suffering and dying because for too long we lived in denial of the danger and threat of religious fundamentalism globally. Countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia are unsafe and unstable because in the past years, they refused to acknowledge and address the problem of islamic terrorism.
Islamic fanaticism is a major problem in Northern Nigeria. In fact religious fundamentalism is at the root of the sectarian violence that has plagued the country in the past decades. And Nigerian authorities must acknowledge this and put in place necessary measures to tackle and eradicate this deadly cankerworm now before it is too late.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Nepal: ethnic lock, federal key, national door
Oliver Housden
A lengthy political crisis in Nepal has exposed deep divisions over the country’s future, in which matters of identity - national, ethnic, caste, class - are to the fore. A new federal constitution is intended to address these. The obstacles in its way could be removed by rethinking the “identitarian” dimension of the proposed settlement, says Oliver Housden.
The Nepali peace process is entering a critical stage when the country’s democratic future will be decided. Nepal’s very self-definition as a state, in the shape of a new constitution, is at the heart of the process.
If the constitution can be agreed to the satisfaction of all involved, the result could be a catharsis to match the popular uprising of April 2006 which led to a peace agreement with the Maoist movement that ended the decade-long war in November 2006, the democratic elections of 2008, and the removal of the monarchy. If the document proves to be a messy compromise that satisfies no one, the likely result is indefinite political conflict which will impede Nepal’s progress. A key variable in either outcome is how the claims of Nepal’s regions and ethnic groups are represented in the final constitutional settlement.
A hard month
A lengthy standoff between major political forces has increased the partisanship surrounding the constitutional argument. An agreement on the new constitution was scheduled for completion by 28 May 2010, but the persistent bickering forced the issue into extra-time. The primary contention is between (on one side) the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) and (on the other) the ruling Unified Marxist-Leninist Party (UNL) and the Nepali Congress (NC).
The three parties signed a three-point agreement on 28 May to extend the constituent assembly (CA) where the new constitution is being discussed, while remaining deadlocked over substantive issues. Nonetheless, eight weeks after the three-point deal they were able to conclude a schedule for completing the process; 13 April 2011 is now the planned date for promulgation of the constitution (see “Nepali major parties settle on schedule for new constitution”, People’s Daily, 16 July 2010).
The two camps are also still split over the composition of a new government, a situation unaffected by the resignation of the UML prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on 30 June 2010. The Maoists had demanded that MK Nepal leave office as per the 28 May deal in order that they could lead a new “unity government” - a key goal of the national bandhs (strikes) coordinated by the Maoists in the first week of May. MK Nepal, backed by the twenty-one other parties who make up the unwieldy ruling coalition, initially refused to step down until the UCPN-M fulfilled its own obligations under the peace process, especially in regards to dismantling the People’s Liberation Army and halting their use of force in grassroots politics; but his resolve ended on 30 June when he left the search for a resolution of the stalemate to his successor, to be chosen on 21 July (see Kanak Mani Dixit, “Nepal moves on”, Himal Southasian, July 2010).
The six-day strike-wave and the party dispute made May 2010 the most difficult month Nepal has faced since the end of the civil war. Amid the polarisation, it is significant that the Maoists - despite the UCPN-M’s remarkable capacity to mobilise support - did not succeed in toppling the government. The ruling coalition kept its resolve, and a demonstration of 25,000 anti-Maoist peace protesters on 7 May showed that it too could reply on strong popular sentiment. In this sense, the events of May suggest that no one power - perhaps other than the Nepali army - is currently able to secure absolute state control. This leaves negotiations and consensus, the buzzwords of Nepali politics that never entirely lose their potency, as indeed essential for the country to move forward.
A federal conundrum
A consensual political deal is the sine qua non of the new constitution. Before the Maoists' strike agitation, a limited consensus over the controversial issue of federalism had been reached. In broad terms, the federal models for Nepal so far proposed conceive federal states either as homogenous entities (based on ethnicity, language or geography) or heterogeneous units (which place greater emphasis on economic and administrative capacity). The UCPN-M, Madhesi groups (those from the Terai plains of southern Nepal) and other historically marginalised ethnic or caste communities are the most vocal supporters of ethnic-based federalism.
These proposed frameworks, along with linguistic models (albeit to a lesser extent) have become the most popular conceptions projected thus far. The supporters of geographical federalism suggest adopting boundaries that cut across Nepal’s diverse ethnic populations, and would allow physical features such as rivers and lakes which transcend Nepal’s varied topography to be shared by multiple communities. Conversely, the established political parties (such as the UML or NC) propose less radical, heterogeneous units which incorporate linguistic, ethnic, religious, caste and geographical diversity but focus on administration and economic capabilities.
All the existing federal designs are provisional and inconsistent. For instance, all sides argue that fiscal authority, defence spending and foreign policy should remain in the national government’s control; but significant disagreements persist over “self-determination”, “autonomy” and the extent to which power should be devolved from the centre to the periphery. These problems must be resolved if federalism is to be a viable apparatus on which to build a new political structure in Nepal.
A matter of identity
Nepal’s ethnic and caste-based social plurality means that contemporary politics are infused by issues of identity. The eclectic alliance of the first people’s movement (or Jan Andolan I) to end authoritarian rule and restore democracy in the late 1980s - which included left- and right-wing democrats, civil-society members, the media and representatives of marginalised ethnic and caste communities - highlighted an increasing awareness of ethnicity and caste in Nepali political identity.
The trend was exacerbated in the 1996-2006 period, as the Maoist rebels played upon various identity-based grievances (ethnic, caste, gender, class, youth) and the failure of the new democracy to end inequality (both vertical and horizontal) in order to mobilise support for their insurgency (see Kanak Mani Dixit, “Letter to the whole-timer”, Himal Southasian, February 2010).
The use of “identity politics” became even more widespread after Jan Andolan II in April 2006 and the rise of activism among the the Madhesi (who historically feel alienated from economic and political development in Kathmandu). In the national elections of 10 April 2008, won by the Maoists, the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) gained fifty-two seats; this planted the Madhes issue at the heart of Kathmandu politics. More generally, the MPRF’s achievement has facilitated a rise in political movements elsewhere in Nepal advocating specific ethnic and caste-based concerns.
An identity beyond ethnicity: the Tharu
The diverse coalition of vocal ethnic actors that emerged during both Jan Andolans, and the profusion of ethnic-based parties which contested the 2008 elections, suggest that Nepal’s burgeoning “identity politics” will become a permanent part of its landscape (thus too making the country part of a wider post-1990 phenomenon in democratising states).
Yet a more nuanced reading of Nepali politics suggests this may simplify the ground-level reality and fail to capture the inherently localised nature of Nepali power-politics. A case in point is the Tharu ethnic community, the oldest indigenous community currently living in the Terai region. Tharu leaders, like representatives of other ethnic or caste communities in Nepal, are anxious to preserve their cultural heritage and identity within Nepal’s coming political framework as a federal republic (specified by the interim-constitution’s second amendment).
Tharu political associations - such as the Tharuhut Autonomous State Council (TASC) or Tharuhut Struggle Committee (TSC) - demand an autonomous “Tharuhut” state which includes Terai and hill-districts in the mid- and far-west of the country. This state, for Tharu leaders, would not discriminate against other ethnicities living within its boundaries, but must act as guarantor of Tharu cultural and linguistic rights (especially the right to teach children in their mother-tongue rather than just Nepali). Furthermore, the TASC and TSC leaderships frequently cite article 15.1 of the International Labour Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169, ratified by the Nepali government in August 2007, to justify their right to extract natural resources from any future Tharu state.
But Tharu leaders, again similar to Nepal’s other identity-based political movements, have found it difficult to form a cohesive political struggle. Interviews with senior figures from the Tharu movement suggest that a history of oppression, and associated limits on education and political awareness, have constrained its political growth. Tharus were historically subjugated by the Muluki Ain (national code) in 1854, an act which formally institutionalised the hierarchical caste-system in Nepali society. Although caste-based discrimination was made illegal in 1963, many poorer Tharus continued to be exploited by the Kamaiya (bonded-labour) system that was finally outlawed only in 2000.
At the same time, the obstacles to forming a united Tharu political identity go deeper than historic structural inequality. Most of the Tharu population of 1.2m lives in mid-western districts such as Bardiya, Dang and Banke, but a sizeable chunk also inhabits the east. Crucially, the cultural, intellectual and economic development of the respective eastern and mid-western Tharu populations has been markedly different, consequently leading to competing descriptions of Tharu identity, ambitions and demands.
For example, some Tharus in the east have overcome barriers to education and employment to become wealthy landowners and prosperous businesspeople (notably the current deputy prime minister, Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar). This is less common in the west, where proportionally far more Tharus were kept as Kamaiyas. Moreover, the most frequent concerns raised in interviews with everyday Tharus are access to land, employment opportunities and education for their children. Knowledge and support for an autonomous Tharu state is patchy and seldom raised unless prompted.
A resilient identity: Nepali
There is no doubt that ethnicity is central to Tharu political and social life. Ethnic consciousness has consolidated Tharu non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Tharu Welfare Society or the Backward Society Education-Nepal (BASE), which have worked tirelessly for Tharu issues such as the preservation of cultural heritage, access to education, increasing political awareness and campaigning against the Kamaiya system. The Maoists were able to capture Tharu support during the civil war by exploiting their existing ethnic grievances behind their insurgency. It is no coincidence that Laxman Tharu, one of the most vocal and polemical Tharu political leaders today, is a former Maoist rebel.
That said, the pan-Tharu identity which transcends geographical, class and caste barriers and unifies their population is a fantasy that is promulgated chiefly by an ethnic elite. The failure of this aspiration to resonate with the wider Tharu public may owe something to limited political awareness and division within the Tharu movement, but it must also be attributed to the continuing salience of national identity in Nepal.
Indeed, new religious, caste, ethnic and class voices in the multi-party democratic era have come to challenge and question what it means to be Nepali - rather than rejecting this concept altogether. There is also a concern with resources here. Apart from militant fringe groups that demand secession, most ethnic-based political movements and their representative communities want the right to autonomy within a proposed federal unit yet also to have access to top public- and private-sector jobs, and remain part of Nepal.
Moreover, a report by the Carter Center on local perceptions of federalism has observed increasing antipathy and disillusion toward the federal project, as many Nepalis fear it would trigger the country’s disintegration. Such worries may be unfounded, and exacerbated by poor education of the constitution-drafting process; but they nevertheless demonstrate that being Nepali is still a pertinent aspect of identity amongst the population.
A last chance
The brutal reality is that whatever the content of the new constitution, low-intensity political violence, bandhs and deteriorating security will continue in Nepal for some time. In this light, there is a temptation for Nepali political actors to press constitution-drafters to adopt a quick-fix solution to appease current unrest (see “The Maoist-non-Maoist Polarisation”, Himal Southasian, June 2010).
This would be a mistake. Nepal should not undervalue its rich ethnic, linguistic and cultural mosaic; but an ethnic-based federalist politics is but a cosmetic solution to the problems which a democratising Nepal is facing. Even this brief appraisal of identity politics illustrates that ethnicity is only one of many important aspects of Nepali identity. Nepal is indeed one of the most ethnically diverse states in the world, recording 103 castes and ethnicities speaking 93 languages. But it cannot be assumed that ethnicity or caste are more influential than numerous other tenets of identity (class, gender, occupation, age, nationality, religion, region and language) among all these communities.
In any event, it is beyond dispute that radical (and to many painful) steps must be taken in the constitution to open up centralised power to new political voices. Nepal’s most impressive achievement since 1990 is the remarkable emancipation of marginalised ethnic and caste communities and their subsequent inclusion in national political dialogue. But ensuring the rights of historically excluded ethnic and caste minorities must also be realised through sustained awareness, education and advocacy work; these projects demand dedication and hard graft, but will provide the most durable solutions to statebuilding in Nepal.
The constitution’s architects should seize the final opportunity presented by the constitution deadline’s extension to 13 April 2011. The politicians involved say that the drafting committees have completed 70%-80% of their obligations. The outstanding issues - including federalism, control of the judiciary, and a parliamentary vs presidential system - will be hard to resolve. The next months will be crucial in persuading politicians to set aside their differences (internal and cross-party) and implement the constitution.
The roles of India (Nepal’s traditional “big brother”) and to a lesser extent the United Nations Mission in Nepal (whose mandate has been extended until 15 September 2010) will be essential in facilitating an agreement. Another prolongation of the constitutional deadline would lead to nationwide violence and the strong possibility of a military coup. Nepalis and their democracy deserve better than that.
A lengthy political crisis in Nepal has exposed deep divisions over the country’s future, in which matters of identity - national, ethnic, caste, class - are to the fore. A new federal constitution is intended to address these. The obstacles in its way could be removed by rethinking the “identitarian” dimension of the proposed settlement, says Oliver Housden.
The Nepali peace process is entering a critical stage when the country’s democratic future will be decided. Nepal’s very self-definition as a state, in the shape of a new constitution, is at the heart of the process.
If the constitution can be agreed to the satisfaction of all involved, the result could be a catharsis to match the popular uprising of April 2006 which led to a peace agreement with the Maoist movement that ended the decade-long war in November 2006, the democratic elections of 2008, and the removal of the monarchy. If the document proves to be a messy compromise that satisfies no one, the likely result is indefinite political conflict which will impede Nepal’s progress. A key variable in either outcome is how the claims of Nepal’s regions and ethnic groups are represented in the final constitutional settlement.
A hard month
A lengthy standoff between major political forces has increased the partisanship surrounding the constitutional argument. An agreement on the new constitution was scheduled for completion by 28 May 2010, but the persistent bickering forced the issue into extra-time. The primary contention is between (on one side) the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) and (on the other) the ruling Unified Marxist-Leninist Party (UNL) and the Nepali Congress (NC).
The three parties signed a three-point agreement on 28 May to extend the constituent assembly (CA) where the new constitution is being discussed, while remaining deadlocked over substantive issues. Nonetheless, eight weeks after the three-point deal they were able to conclude a schedule for completing the process; 13 April 2011 is now the planned date for promulgation of the constitution (see “Nepali major parties settle on schedule for new constitution”, People’s Daily, 16 July 2010).
The two camps are also still split over the composition of a new government, a situation unaffected by the resignation of the UML prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal on 30 June 2010. The Maoists had demanded that MK Nepal leave office as per the 28 May deal in order that they could lead a new “unity government” - a key goal of the national bandhs (strikes) coordinated by the Maoists in the first week of May. MK Nepal, backed by the twenty-one other parties who make up the unwieldy ruling coalition, initially refused to step down until the UCPN-M fulfilled its own obligations under the peace process, especially in regards to dismantling the People’s Liberation Army and halting their use of force in grassroots politics; but his resolve ended on 30 June when he left the search for a resolution of the stalemate to his successor, to be chosen on 21 July (see Kanak Mani Dixit, “Nepal moves on”, Himal Southasian, July 2010).
The six-day strike-wave and the party dispute made May 2010 the most difficult month Nepal has faced since the end of the civil war. Amid the polarisation, it is significant that the Maoists - despite the UCPN-M’s remarkable capacity to mobilise support - did not succeed in toppling the government. The ruling coalition kept its resolve, and a demonstration of 25,000 anti-Maoist peace protesters on 7 May showed that it too could reply on strong popular sentiment. In this sense, the events of May suggest that no one power - perhaps other than the Nepali army - is currently able to secure absolute state control. This leaves negotiations and consensus, the buzzwords of Nepali politics that never entirely lose their potency, as indeed essential for the country to move forward.
A federal conundrum
A consensual political deal is the sine qua non of the new constitution. Before the Maoists' strike agitation, a limited consensus over the controversial issue of federalism had been reached. In broad terms, the federal models for Nepal so far proposed conceive federal states either as homogenous entities (based on ethnicity, language or geography) or heterogeneous units (which place greater emphasis on economic and administrative capacity). The UCPN-M, Madhesi groups (those from the Terai plains of southern Nepal) and other historically marginalised ethnic or caste communities are the most vocal supporters of ethnic-based federalism.
These proposed frameworks, along with linguistic models (albeit to a lesser extent) have become the most popular conceptions projected thus far. The supporters of geographical federalism suggest adopting boundaries that cut across Nepal’s diverse ethnic populations, and would allow physical features such as rivers and lakes which transcend Nepal’s varied topography to be shared by multiple communities. Conversely, the established political parties (such as the UML or NC) propose less radical, heterogeneous units which incorporate linguistic, ethnic, religious, caste and geographical diversity but focus on administration and economic capabilities.
All the existing federal designs are provisional and inconsistent. For instance, all sides argue that fiscal authority, defence spending and foreign policy should remain in the national government’s control; but significant disagreements persist over “self-determination”, “autonomy” and the extent to which power should be devolved from the centre to the periphery. These problems must be resolved if federalism is to be a viable apparatus on which to build a new political structure in Nepal.
A matter of identity
Nepal’s ethnic and caste-based social plurality means that contemporary politics are infused by issues of identity. The eclectic alliance of the first people’s movement (or Jan Andolan I) to end authoritarian rule and restore democracy in the late 1980s - which included left- and right-wing democrats, civil-society members, the media and representatives of marginalised ethnic and caste communities - highlighted an increasing awareness of ethnicity and caste in Nepali political identity.
The trend was exacerbated in the 1996-2006 period, as the Maoist rebels played upon various identity-based grievances (ethnic, caste, gender, class, youth) and the failure of the new democracy to end inequality (both vertical and horizontal) in order to mobilise support for their insurgency (see Kanak Mani Dixit, “Letter to the whole-timer”, Himal Southasian, February 2010).
The use of “identity politics” became even more widespread after Jan Andolan II in April 2006 and the rise of activism among the the Madhesi (who historically feel alienated from economic and political development in Kathmandu). In the national elections of 10 April 2008, won by the Maoists, the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) gained fifty-two seats; this planted the Madhes issue at the heart of Kathmandu politics. More generally, the MPRF’s achievement has facilitated a rise in political movements elsewhere in Nepal advocating specific ethnic and caste-based concerns.
An identity beyond ethnicity: the Tharu
The diverse coalition of vocal ethnic actors that emerged during both Jan Andolans, and the profusion of ethnic-based parties which contested the 2008 elections, suggest that Nepal’s burgeoning “identity politics” will become a permanent part of its landscape (thus too making the country part of a wider post-1990 phenomenon in democratising states).
Yet a more nuanced reading of Nepali politics suggests this may simplify the ground-level reality and fail to capture the inherently localised nature of Nepali power-politics. A case in point is the Tharu ethnic community, the oldest indigenous community currently living in the Terai region. Tharu leaders, like representatives of other ethnic or caste communities in Nepal, are anxious to preserve their cultural heritage and identity within Nepal’s coming political framework as a federal republic (specified by the interim-constitution’s second amendment).
Tharu political associations - such as the Tharuhut Autonomous State Council (TASC) or Tharuhut Struggle Committee (TSC) - demand an autonomous “Tharuhut” state which includes Terai and hill-districts in the mid- and far-west of the country. This state, for Tharu leaders, would not discriminate against other ethnicities living within its boundaries, but must act as guarantor of Tharu cultural and linguistic rights (especially the right to teach children in their mother-tongue rather than just Nepali). Furthermore, the TASC and TSC leaderships frequently cite article 15.1 of the International Labour Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169, ratified by the Nepali government in August 2007, to justify their right to extract natural resources from any future Tharu state.
But Tharu leaders, again similar to Nepal’s other identity-based political movements, have found it difficult to form a cohesive political struggle. Interviews with senior figures from the Tharu movement suggest that a history of oppression, and associated limits on education and political awareness, have constrained its political growth. Tharus were historically subjugated by the Muluki Ain (national code) in 1854, an act which formally institutionalised the hierarchical caste-system in Nepali society. Although caste-based discrimination was made illegal in 1963, many poorer Tharus continued to be exploited by the Kamaiya (bonded-labour) system that was finally outlawed only in 2000.
At the same time, the obstacles to forming a united Tharu political identity go deeper than historic structural inequality. Most of the Tharu population of 1.2m lives in mid-western districts such as Bardiya, Dang and Banke, but a sizeable chunk also inhabits the east. Crucially, the cultural, intellectual and economic development of the respective eastern and mid-western Tharu populations has been markedly different, consequently leading to competing descriptions of Tharu identity, ambitions and demands.
For example, some Tharus in the east have overcome barriers to education and employment to become wealthy landowners and prosperous businesspeople (notably the current deputy prime minister, Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar). This is less common in the west, where proportionally far more Tharus were kept as Kamaiyas. Moreover, the most frequent concerns raised in interviews with everyday Tharus are access to land, employment opportunities and education for their children. Knowledge and support for an autonomous Tharu state is patchy and seldom raised unless prompted.
A resilient identity: Nepali
There is no doubt that ethnicity is central to Tharu political and social life. Ethnic consciousness has consolidated Tharu non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Tharu Welfare Society or the Backward Society Education-Nepal (BASE), which have worked tirelessly for Tharu issues such as the preservation of cultural heritage, access to education, increasing political awareness and campaigning against the Kamaiya system. The Maoists were able to capture Tharu support during the civil war by exploiting their existing ethnic grievances behind their insurgency. It is no coincidence that Laxman Tharu, one of the most vocal and polemical Tharu political leaders today, is a former Maoist rebel.
That said, the pan-Tharu identity which transcends geographical, class and caste barriers and unifies their population is a fantasy that is promulgated chiefly by an ethnic elite. The failure of this aspiration to resonate with the wider Tharu public may owe something to limited political awareness and division within the Tharu movement, but it must also be attributed to the continuing salience of national identity in Nepal.
Indeed, new religious, caste, ethnic and class voices in the multi-party democratic era have come to challenge and question what it means to be Nepali - rather than rejecting this concept altogether. There is also a concern with resources here. Apart from militant fringe groups that demand secession, most ethnic-based political movements and their representative communities want the right to autonomy within a proposed federal unit yet also to have access to top public- and private-sector jobs, and remain part of Nepal.
Moreover, a report by the Carter Center on local perceptions of federalism has observed increasing antipathy and disillusion toward the federal project, as many Nepalis fear it would trigger the country’s disintegration. Such worries may be unfounded, and exacerbated by poor education of the constitution-drafting process; but they nevertheless demonstrate that being Nepali is still a pertinent aspect of identity amongst the population.
A last chance
The brutal reality is that whatever the content of the new constitution, low-intensity political violence, bandhs and deteriorating security will continue in Nepal for some time. In this light, there is a temptation for Nepali political actors to press constitution-drafters to adopt a quick-fix solution to appease current unrest (see “The Maoist-non-Maoist Polarisation”, Himal Southasian, June 2010).
This would be a mistake. Nepal should not undervalue its rich ethnic, linguistic and cultural mosaic; but an ethnic-based federalist politics is but a cosmetic solution to the problems which a democratising Nepal is facing. Even this brief appraisal of identity politics illustrates that ethnicity is only one of many important aspects of Nepali identity. Nepal is indeed one of the most ethnically diverse states in the world, recording 103 castes and ethnicities speaking 93 languages. But it cannot be assumed that ethnicity or caste are more influential than numerous other tenets of identity (class, gender, occupation, age, nationality, religion, region and language) among all these communities.
In any event, it is beyond dispute that radical (and to many painful) steps must be taken in the constitution to open up centralised power to new political voices. Nepal’s most impressive achievement since 1990 is the remarkable emancipation of marginalised ethnic and caste communities and their subsequent inclusion in national political dialogue. But ensuring the rights of historically excluded ethnic and caste minorities must also be realised through sustained awareness, education and advocacy work; these projects demand dedication and hard graft, but will provide the most durable solutions to statebuilding in Nepal.
The constitution’s architects should seize the final opportunity presented by the constitution deadline’s extension to 13 April 2011. The politicians involved say that the drafting committees have completed 70%-80% of their obligations. The outstanding issues - including federalism, control of the judiciary, and a parliamentary vs presidential system - will be hard to resolve. The next months will be crucial in persuading politicians to set aside their differences (internal and cross-party) and implement the constitution.
The roles of India (Nepal’s traditional “big brother”) and to a lesser extent the United Nations Mission in Nepal (whose mandate has been extended until 15 September 2010) will be essential in facilitating an agreement. Another prolongation of the constitutional deadline would lead to nationwide violence and the strong possibility of a military coup. Nepalis and their democracy deserve better than that.
A Call on the Nigerian Senate to Save the Soul of the Nigerian nation
Nnanna Agomoh
The article below refers.
When the Children of God, the non-fanatical Christians and Muslims of Nigeria, call on the Federal Government to distance the affairs of State from Christianity and Islam, they are well aware that the leaders of the country, from Federal through the States to the Local governments are the god-sons of the Pope in Vatican Rome, the Archbishop of Canterbury in London, and the Islamic Sheik (or whatever) in Arabia.
The Children of God are well aware that religious adherents, who at the same time double as political-sons of the owners of Christianity and Islam, will be too cowardly to act against the financial interests of their
religious-cum-political god-fathers. The C of G appreciate that this religious attachment of Nigerian leaders is a constraint and apparently accounts for Nigeria's perpetual indebtedness to the World Bank and the Arab banks to please world Christian and Islamic leaders and, in turn, provide Nigerian leaders a cover for stashing their personal wealth abroad at the expense of starving Nigerian natives.
This last mentioned interest looks like the carrot these foreign religious owners dangle before Nigerian political leaders to keep them tied to foreign interests.
Be that as it may, the Children of God hold the Nigerian Senate responsible for not distancing Christianity and Islam from rubbing off bad culture on the Nigerian polity as evidenced by religious rioting, kidnapping, armed robbery and official corruption at all levels of government departments down to the mortuary unit.
With a population of 150 million, 89% of whom are reported to be Christians and Muslims, Nigeria is rated as a failed state!
This means that the culture of Nigerian Christianity and Islam, is antiquated and they can never inculcate the qualities of nationalism and patriotism that the nation needs to join the comity of civilized nations.
This poverty of philosophy in the two religions accounts for non-development, even poor performance in world sports, including soccer, boxing, high jump in which Nigeria excelled when we had remnants of practitioners of Nigeria's theo-centric culture.
For Nigeria, therefore, to join the comity of civilized nations, Islam and Christianity should be de-gazetted as official religions and Nigeria declared a secular State by a legislative act.
Christianity and Islam are trading institutions and stand indicted for their mutual hate, parochialism and bigotry. A legislative act is desirable to stop them from meddling and interfering with the business of government at all levels and rubbing off their culture of hate, etc on the polity. Nigerians worship God, not religion.
The nation must regain her Soul from colonial bondage.
The article below refers.
When the Children of God, the non-fanatical Christians and Muslims of Nigeria, call on the Federal Government to distance the affairs of State from Christianity and Islam, they are well aware that the leaders of the country, from Federal through the States to the Local governments are the god-sons of the Pope in Vatican Rome, the Archbishop of Canterbury in London, and the Islamic Sheik (or whatever) in Arabia.
The Children of God are well aware that religious adherents, who at the same time double as political-sons of the owners of Christianity and Islam, will be too cowardly to act against the financial interests of their
religious-cum-political god-fathers. The C of G appreciate that this religious attachment of Nigerian leaders is a constraint and apparently accounts for Nigeria's perpetual indebtedness to the World Bank and the Arab banks to please world Christian and Islamic leaders and, in turn, provide Nigerian leaders a cover for stashing their personal wealth abroad at the expense of starving Nigerian natives.
This last mentioned interest looks like the carrot these foreign religious owners dangle before Nigerian political leaders to keep them tied to foreign interests.
Be that as it may, the Children of God hold the Nigerian Senate responsible for not distancing Christianity and Islam from rubbing off bad culture on the Nigerian polity as evidenced by religious rioting, kidnapping, armed robbery and official corruption at all levels of government departments down to the mortuary unit.
With a population of 150 million, 89% of whom are reported to be Christians and Muslims, Nigeria is rated as a failed state!
This means that the culture of Nigerian Christianity and Islam, is antiquated and they can never inculcate the qualities of nationalism and patriotism that the nation needs to join the comity of civilized nations.
This poverty of philosophy in the two religions accounts for non-development, even poor performance in world sports, including soccer, boxing, high jump in which Nigeria excelled when we had remnants of practitioners of Nigeria's theo-centric culture.
For Nigeria, therefore, to join the comity of civilized nations, Islam and Christianity should be de-gazetted as official religions and Nigeria declared a secular State by a legislative act.
Christianity and Islam are trading institutions and stand indicted for their mutual hate, parochialism and bigotry. A legislative act is desirable to stop them from meddling and interfering with the business of government at all levels and rubbing off their culture of hate, etc on the polity. Nigerians worship God, not religion.
The nation must regain her Soul from colonial bondage.
Eritrea and Isaias Afewerki: a cold logic
Selam Kidane
The achievement of Isaias Afewerki’s regime in Asmara is to have used confrontation with its neighbours to entrench its survival. It is a political lesson that the international community still needs to learn, says Selam Kidane.
It is a rare form of success for a small country to engage in perennial disputes with often larger and more powerful neighbours yet to survive intact. Even more so for the leadership of this country to reinforce its own power in the process. This is a rough but workable description of the experience of Eritrea under President Isaias Afewerki since the country's independence from Ethiopia in 1991, and especially in the decade after 2001. This experience is also a unique case-study in African - and perhaps world - politics; a painful reality to those many Eritreans who have endured repression and exile under Afewerki’s rule; and a challenge to the international community to understand the kind of leader and state it is dealing with.
The issue of sanctions against Eritrea is one of many entry-points to understanding the character of the regime. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had adopted Resolution 1862 on 14 January 2009, criticising Eritrea over its role in a dispute with neighbouring Djibouti in June 2008 and subsequently. After Eritrea failed to comply with its provisions, the UNSC passed a second resolution on 23 December 2009 which imposed an arms embargo, and travel-restrictions and an asset-freeze on several of the country’s political and military leaders. The grounds for the decision were that Eritrea had failed to withdraw its forces from Djibouti, and had provided support to armed groups in Somalia.
The UNSC voted for Resolution 1907 by thirteen-to-one; Libya stood against and China abstained. The decision was itself the outcome of a long process in which Eritrean high officials had long denied the very existence of a problem in characteristic fashion, by responding to “accusations” by condemning the United States for “orchestrating” a “fabricated conflict” in order to “‘create turmoil” and thus “have an excuse to managing the ensuing crisis”. Now the Asmara government, its embassies across the world and its supporters in the Eritrean diaspora responded to the sanctions that followed in equally characteristic fashion: with denial, dismissal, and disdain.
Eritrea had spent all of 2009 in an effective standoff with the UNSC; during this time it made nine representations to the council - rejecting its charges, refusing requests for a fact-finding mission to examine the Djibouti conflict, and charging the council and the US of diverting attention from more important concerns (especially Eritrea’s unresolved border with arch-rival Ethiopia). This abrasive stance had the effect of pushing the council - and even the European Union and the African Union - towards a more critical stance in relation to Asmara (see Edward Denison, “The Horn of Africa: a bitter anniversary”, 12 April 2007).
In the end, Uganda that pushed the draft resolution, with support from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad, the regional economic alliance); China and Russia, which as permanent members of the Security Council chose not to block it; and Libya’s presidency of the council was no help to its Eritrean ally.
To many Eritrea observers, the events of December 2009 heralded the end of the era of “quiet diplomacy” that had long enshrouded the international community’s treatment of all matters Eritrean - and prevented a proper airing of the many human-rights violations perpetrated by the government of Isaias Afewerki. And perhaps the most notable aspect of this welcome change was that it marked a refocusing of the European Union’s policy.
A good listener
The European Union, and especially its former commissioner for development Louis Michel, had long sought to engage Eritrea with a view to enabling it to play a positive role in the region. In pursuit of this ambitious effort, Michel received President Isaias “warmly” in Brussels in May 2007; he called the occasion “an important event, an international signal for the EU and for Eritrea” that could open the way to a new partnership. In this approach, Louis Michel and the commission had to ignore mounting evidence of Eritrea’s appalling democratic and human-rights record (see “Isaias Afewerki and Eritrea: a nation’s tragedy”, 22 June 2009).
The EU pledged development-fund aid worth $180 million to Eritrea, none of which has made any tangible contribution to the stability of the Horn of Africa - far less to advancing the rights of Eritrean citizens. If anything, these deteriorated further during the period, while there was no perceptible change in Asmara’s unique brand of aggressive diplomacy.
The widening gap between the promise of May 2007 and any visible achievement grew. If one single incident helped to force a crack, it was the case of Dawit Isaac, a Swedish-Eritrean journalist held in prison - incommunicado, without any due process - since September 2001. The issue became more high-profile under Sweden’s presidency of the European Union in July-December 2009, when requests for Dawit Isaac’s release were snubbed. In October 2009, Britain followed the United States in calling for sanctions against Eritrea; and Louis Michel himself admitted at a hearing of the European parliament on 9 December that relations with the Eritrean president had become more rather than less difficult in recent years.
Michel’s unexpectedly frank speech even offered an insight into President Isaias's character - including his ability to filter the perspectives of others right out of the equation, reflected in his endless monologues about redundant or technical issues. It sounded as if Michel had all but given up on attempting to “engage” Eritrea, thus belatedly recognising a reality that Eritreans at home and in exile had lived with for many years.
Between home and abroad
The UN sanctions, then, were something of a turning-point; though to criticise Eritrea for its combative regional role is still far from registering the full range of its challenge to international accords and norms. These include the imprisonment of journalists, civil-society activists and political opponents; the suppression of independent media and religious groups; and as the forced and indefinite militarisation of young people. Several institutions had raised concerns about these issues, including Eritrean human-rights groups (such as the Eritrean Global Solidarity coalition), Reporters without Borders, and Human Rights Watch. The African Union and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) also appealed for release or due process in the case of eleven ministers and officials arrested in September 2001 after calling for reform.
There have also been some few steps at government level. In September 2005, the United States designated Eritrea a “country of particular concern” for its religious persecution, and imposed its own sanctions. In May 2010, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended further targeted sanctions against Eritrean individuals and institutions complicit in serious human-rights abuse. In January 2010, the European Union began to review the aid it had disbursed to Eritrea since 2007. EU officials even responded to enquiries on Dawit Isaac’s ongoing imprisonment by indicating that they recognised a connection between Eritrea’s serious domestic violations and its regional activity (see Ben Rawlence, "Eritrea: slender land, giant prison", 6 May 2009).
The rule of whim
Then, as the implementation of sanctions proceeded, and the first six-month reporting-cycle on Eritrea’s compliance approached in June 2010, there seemed a break in the ice. Asmara agreed a peace-deal with Djibouti, brokered by Qatar, which was broadly welcomed - and led to a flurry of reports that Eritrea was softening its foreign policy.
It looked like good news. But there is a catch. The Eritrean regime can, in the absence of any semblance of accountable governance or rule of law, enter into and renege on agreements at will - with no consultation, scrutiny or public follow-up whatsoever. In June 2008, when Eritrea decided to resolve its border issue with Djibouti via confrontation, no one in the country knew what was going on; the independent media had been silenced since 2001, the parliament hadn’t met since 2002, and if more than seven Eritreans wanted to gather they would need special permission from government. So when in June 2010 the government decided to resolve the same issue via third-party mediation, again no one had a clue as to how that came about; nor will they if Asmara has any other problems it wants to sort out by force.
This is the cold political logic at Eritrea’s core. Isaias Afewerki may have been pressed by UN sanctions into a rare concession, but this changes nothing at the heart of the matter: the impunity of his regime at home and abroad. The international community needs to understand that among the many ingredients of long-term peace and stability in the troubled Horn of Africa, citizens’ rights and legal order in Asmara are very high on the list.
The achievement of Isaias Afewerki’s regime in Asmara is to have used confrontation with its neighbours to entrench its survival. It is a political lesson that the international community still needs to learn, says Selam Kidane.
It is a rare form of success for a small country to engage in perennial disputes with often larger and more powerful neighbours yet to survive intact. Even more so for the leadership of this country to reinforce its own power in the process. This is a rough but workable description of the experience of Eritrea under President Isaias Afewerki since the country's independence from Ethiopia in 1991, and especially in the decade after 2001. This experience is also a unique case-study in African - and perhaps world - politics; a painful reality to those many Eritreans who have endured repression and exile under Afewerki’s rule; and a challenge to the international community to understand the kind of leader and state it is dealing with.
The issue of sanctions against Eritrea is one of many entry-points to understanding the character of the regime. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had adopted Resolution 1862 on 14 January 2009, criticising Eritrea over its role in a dispute with neighbouring Djibouti in June 2008 and subsequently. After Eritrea failed to comply with its provisions, the UNSC passed a second resolution on 23 December 2009 which imposed an arms embargo, and travel-restrictions and an asset-freeze on several of the country’s political and military leaders. The grounds for the decision were that Eritrea had failed to withdraw its forces from Djibouti, and had provided support to armed groups in Somalia.
The UNSC voted for Resolution 1907 by thirteen-to-one; Libya stood against and China abstained. The decision was itself the outcome of a long process in which Eritrean high officials had long denied the very existence of a problem in characteristic fashion, by responding to “accusations” by condemning the United States for “orchestrating” a “fabricated conflict” in order to “‘create turmoil” and thus “have an excuse to managing the ensuing crisis”. Now the Asmara government, its embassies across the world and its supporters in the Eritrean diaspora responded to the sanctions that followed in equally characteristic fashion: with denial, dismissal, and disdain.
Eritrea had spent all of 2009 in an effective standoff with the UNSC; during this time it made nine representations to the council - rejecting its charges, refusing requests for a fact-finding mission to examine the Djibouti conflict, and charging the council and the US of diverting attention from more important concerns (especially Eritrea’s unresolved border with arch-rival Ethiopia). This abrasive stance had the effect of pushing the council - and even the European Union and the African Union - towards a more critical stance in relation to Asmara (see Edward Denison, “The Horn of Africa: a bitter anniversary”, 12 April 2007).
In the end, Uganda that pushed the draft resolution, with support from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad, the regional economic alliance); China and Russia, which as permanent members of the Security Council chose not to block it; and Libya’s presidency of the council was no help to its Eritrean ally.
To many Eritrea observers, the events of December 2009 heralded the end of the era of “quiet diplomacy” that had long enshrouded the international community’s treatment of all matters Eritrean - and prevented a proper airing of the many human-rights violations perpetrated by the government of Isaias Afewerki. And perhaps the most notable aspect of this welcome change was that it marked a refocusing of the European Union’s policy.
A good listener
The European Union, and especially its former commissioner for development Louis Michel, had long sought to engage Eritrea with a view to enabling it to play a positive role in the region. In pursuit of this ambitious effort, Michel received President Isaias “warmly” in Brussels in May 2007; he called the occasion “an important event, an international signal for the EU and for Eritrea” that could open the way to a new partnership. In this approach, Louis Michel and the commission had to ignore mounting evidence of Eritrea’s appalling democratic and human-rights record (see “Isaias Afewerki and Eritrea: a nation’s tragedy”, 22 June 2009).
The EU pledged development-fund aid worth $180 million to Eritrea, none of which has made any tangible contribution to the stability of the Horn of Africa - far less to advancing the rights of Eritrean citizens. If anything, these deteriorated further during the period, while there was no perceptible change in Asmara’s unique brand of aggressive diplomacy.
The widening gap between the promise of May 2007 and any visible achievement grew. If one single incident helped to force a crack, it was the case of Dawit Isaac, a Swedish-Eritrean journalist held in prison - incommunicado, without any due process - since September 2001. The issue became more high-profile under Sweden’s presidency of the European Union in July-December 2009, when requests for Dawit Isaac’s release were snubbed. In October 2009, Britain followed the United States in calling for sanctions against Eritrea; and Louis Michel himself admitted at a hearing of the European parliament on 9 December that relations with the Eritrean president had become more rather than less difficult in recent years.
Michel’s unexpectedly frank speech even offered an insight into President Isaias's character - including his ability to filter the perspectives of others right out of the equation, reflected in his endless monologues about redundant or technical issues. It sounded as if Michel had all but given up on attempting to “engage” Eritrea, thus belatedly recognising a reality that Eritreans at home and in exile had lived with for many years.
Between home and abroad
The UN sanctions, then, were something of a turning-point; though to criticise Eritrea for its combative regional role is still far from registering the full range of its challenge to international accords and norms. These include the imprisonment of journalists, civil-society activists and political opponents; the suppression of independent media and religious groups; and as the forced and indefinite militarisation of young people. Several institutions had raised concerns about these issues, including Eritrean human-rights groups (such as the Eritrean Global Solidarity coalition), Reporters without Borders, and Human Rights Watch. The African Union and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) also appealed for release or due process in the case of eleven ministers and officials arrested in September 2001 after calling for reform.
There have also been some few steps at government level. In September 2005, the United States designated Eritrea a “country of particular concern” for its religious persecution, and imposed its own sanctions. In May 2010, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended further targeted sanctions against Eritrean individuals and institutions complicit in serious human-rights abuse. In January 2010, the European Union began to review the aid it had disbursed to Eritrea since 2007. EU officials even responded to enquiries on Dawit Isaac’s ongoing imprisonment by indicating that they recognised a connection between Eritrea’s serious domestic violations and its regional activity (see Ben Rawlence, "Eritrea: slender land, giant prison", 6 May 2009).
The rule of whim
Then, as the implementation of sanctions proceeded, and the first six-month reporting-cycle on Eritrea’s compliance approached in June 2010, there seemed a break in the ice. Asmara agreed a peace-deal with Djibouti, brokered by Qatar, which was broadly welcomed - and led to a flurry of reports that Eritrea was softening its foreign policy.
It looked like good news. But there is a catch. The Eritrean regime can, in the absence of any semblance of accountable governance or rule of law, enter into and renege on agreements at will - with no consultation, scrutiny or public follow-up whatsoever. In June 2008, when Eritrea decided to resolve its border issue with Djibouti via confrontation, no one in the country knew what was going on; the independent media had been silenced since 2001, the parliament hadn’t met since 2002, and if more than seven Eritreans wanted to gather they would need special permission from government. So when in June 2010 the government decided to resolve the same issue via third-party mediation, again no one had a clue as to how that came about; nor will they if Asmara has any other problems it wants to sort out by force.
This is the cold political logic at Eritrea’s core. Isaias Afewerki may have been pressed by UN sanctions into a rare concession, but this changes nothing at the heart of the matter: the impunity of his regime at home and abroad. The international community needs to understand that among the many ingredients of long-term peace and stability in the troubled Horn of Africa, citizens’ rights and legal order in Asmara are very high on the list.
NIGERIA AND THE IMPARATIVE OF GOOD GOVERNACE
Mazi Okey Kanu
When the National Executive Committee of PDP bestowed on Dr Okwesilieze Nwodo the National Chairmanship of the party on June 17, 2010, it was an obvious acknowledgement of the imperativeness of good governance and the urgency of free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria.
Dr Nwodo was executive governor of Enugu State and also the first General Secretary of PDP among other positions held. In his acceptance speech as the National Chairman of PDP he lamented on failed promises PDP made to the Nigerian people through the party's manifesto. He recounted the ugly situations in PDP and I quote: our party today has been handed over to godfathers at different levels who with reckless abandon, impose candidates with questionable character and no leadership qualities whatsoever, and clear the way for them to run for elections under our party flag.
In the same acceptance speech, Dr Nwodo was bold to make promises to the nation and I quote: we must return the choice of our candidates to the people and not to individual godfathers and godmothers. The days of imposition of candidates by PDP, hoping to hoist such leaders on the people of Nigeria through rigged elections are over and over forever. Then he spoke about the social contract the party has with the people of Nigeria through the party's manifesto. He stated that because imposition of candidates, most elected officials do not honor the social contract with the electorate.
At that point he made more promises to the people of Nigeria and I quote: all candidates from the councilors to the president must campaign based on this document and if they win, must strive to actualize their campaign promises at all levels of government. Happily, our dear president, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has taken the bold and praiseworthy step of assuring Nigerians and the international community of his administration's commitment to free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria in 2011. This is a worthy legacy the PDP must assist the president to give to our nation.
It is true that the political and economic conditions in Nigeria are not anything to write home about, but I will not give up on Nigeria and neither should you. One of the greatest problems facing Nigeria politically is disenfranchisement of the electorate through imposition of candidates. The offspring of this problem is election rigging. Dr Nwodo preached the doctrine of all inclusiveness in his acceptance speech and the president Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan promised the nation free, fair and credible election come 2011. Since it is said that, out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh, let us pay attention to the PDP federal administration, demand that they deliver to us all the promises made to the people of Nigeria.
If Dr Nwodo returns the choice of the candidates to the people as promised, the elected officials will owe allegiance to the electorate and thereby treat and represent us better. And if the president delivers free, fair and credible elections in 2011 as promised, it will have multiplier effects that will surely improve the economy of the nation. Let us hold them accountable to the electorate.
Good reasoning will make some to ask, why PDP when there are 50 different political parties in Nigeria. Two reasons, firstly, PDP is the ruling political party and controls 28 states of the 36 states in Nigeria, which approximates 80%of our population under their control. Secondly, there are no ideological differences between PDP and the rest of the political parties; whatever happens in PDP, happens in all other parties.
I promise to make available at a later date the entire acceptance speech of Dr Nwodo as the new national chairman of PDP for everybody to know what the new leadership of PDP is promising the nation.
My argument is that time has come for us to ask what we can do for Nigeria not for what Nigeria can do for us. Let us keep the Nation over and above ethnicity, religion or even political parties. Let us emphasize Nigeria; it is the common denominator that holds all together.
When the National Executive Committee of PDP bestowed on Dr Okwesilieze Nwodo the National Chairmanship of the party on June 17, 2010, it was an obvious acknowledgement of the imperativeness of good governance and the urgency of free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria.
Dr Nwodo was executive governor of Enugu State and also the first General Secretary of PDP among other positions held. In his acceptance speech as the National Chairman of PDP he lamented on failed promises PDP made to the Nigerian people through the party's manifesto. He recounted the ugly situations in PDP and I quote: our party today has been handed over to godfathers at different levels who with reckless abandon, impose candidates with questionable character and no leadership qualities whatsoever, and clear the way for them to run for elections under our party flag.
In the same acceptance speech, Dr Nwodo was bold to make promises to the nation and I quote: we must return the choice of our candidates to the people and not to individual godfathers and godmothers. The days of imposition of candidates by PDP, hoping to hoist such leaders on the people of Nigeria through rigged elections are over and over forever. Then he spoke about the social contract the party has with the people of Nigeria through the party's manifesto. He stated that because imposition of candidates, most elected officials do not honor the social contract with the electorate.
At that point he made more promises to the people of Nigeria and I quote: all candidates from the councilors to the president must campaign based on this document and if they win, must strive to actualize their campaign promises at all levels of government. Happily, our dear president, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has taken the bold and praiseworthy step of assuring Nigerians and the international community of his administration's commitment to free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria in 2011. This is a worthy legacy the PDP must assist the president to give to our nation.
It is true that the political and economic conditions in Nigeria are not anything to write home about, but I will not give up on Nigeria and neither should you. One of the greatest problems facing Nigeria politically is disenfranchisement of the electorate through imposition of candidates. The offspring of this problem is election rigging. Dr Nwodo preached the doctrine of all inclusiveness in his acceptance speech and the president Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan promised the nation free, fair and credible election come 2011. Since it is said that, out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh, let us pay attention to the PDP federal administration, demand that they deliver to us all the promises made to the people of Nigeria.
If Dr Nwodo returns the choice of the candidates to the people as promised, the elected officials will owe allegiance to the electorate and thereby treat and represent us better. And if the president delivers free, fair and credible elections in 2011 as promised, it will have multiplier effects that will surely improve the economy of the nation. Let us hold them accountable to the electorate.
Good reasoning will make some to ask, why PDP when there are 50 different political parties in Nigeria. Two reasons, firstly, PDP is the ruling political party and controls 28 states of the 36 states in Nigeria, which approximates 80%of our population under their control. Secondly, there are no ideological differences between PDP and the rest of the political parties; whatever happens in PDP, happens in all other parties.
I promise to make available at a later date the entire acceptance speech of Dr Nwodo as the new national chairman of PDP for everybody to know what the new leadership of PDP is promising the nation.
My argument is that time has come for us to ask what we can do for Nigeria not for what Nigeria can do for us. Let us keep the Nation over and above ethnicity, religion or even political parties. Let us emphasize Nigeria; it is the common denominator that holds all together.
Kashmir: cri de coeur
Seema Kazi
Labelling Kashmiri anger "separatist" or "anti-national" does a disservice to the victims of violence while serving to cover up and excuse state repression, argues Seema Kazi.
8 January: Inayat Khan (16 years) shot dead by CRPF, Srinagar.
22 January: Manzoor Ahmed Sofi (23 years), shot dead by the CRPF, Parahaspora (Pattan).
31 January: Wamiq Farooq (13 years) shot dead by JK police, Srinagar.
31 January: Zahid Farooq (16 years) shot dead by Border Security Force, Srinagar.
13 April: Zubair Ahmad Bhat (17 years) drowned to death by CRPF, Sopore.
11 June: Tufail Ahmad Mattoo (17 years) attacked and killed by JK police, Srinagar.
19 June: Rafique Ahmad Bangroo (24 years) beaten to death by CRPF, Srinagar.
20 June: Javed Ahmed Malla (22 years) shot dead by CRPF, Srinagar.
27 June: Shakeel Ahmad Ganai (17 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
27 June: Firdous Ahmad Kakroo (16 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
27 June: Bilal Ahmed Wani (21 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
28 June: Tauqir Ahmed Rather (9 years) killed by CRPF, Sopore.
28 June: Tajamul Bashir (17 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
29 June: Ishtiaq Ahmed Khanday (15 years) shot dead by police, Anantnag.
29 June: Imtiaz Ahmed Itoo (17 years) shot dead by police, Anantnag.
29 June: Shujat ul Islam (16 years) shot dead by police, Anantnag.
India’s war in Kashmir has, of late, acquired a particularly deadly edge. During the past six months, a disproportionately large number of teenagers and young men have been shot dead on the streets by the police or CRPF. It is far from clear as to whether all those who died were actually throwing stones. Be that as it may, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and his administration have deemed stone-throwing a criminal offence punishable with death or a lifetime in prison. Having ‘legalised’ the repression of dissent, Abdullah, Home Minister Chidambaram, and Home Secretary GK Pillai hold the separatists and ‘anti-national’ forces responsible for the present crisis in Kashmir.
There cannot be a greater folly than to attribute the deep and overflowing reservoir of collective anger and outrage against a twenty-year-old occupation to the Machiavellian powers of a fragmented and fairly discredited separatist conglomerate. In no state, least of all in one that claims to be democratic, can the act of stone-throwing or public protest legitimise a shoot-to-kill policy. As democratic channels for dissent in Kashmir remain blocked, and the institutions meant for the protection of civilians (military and paramilitary) or the enforcement of the rule of law (police) deprive citizens of the right to life, stones, slogans and mass protest are all what the Kashmiris have to oppose and resist a shameful and scandalous state of affairs.
To represent Kashmiri public outrage as a ‘separatist’, ‘anti-national’ conspiracy is an exercise in self-delusion and deceit; it also betrays a profound disrespect for Kashmiri public opinion. Separatist leaders may or may not support stone-pelting but to suggest that all the boys and young men shot dead were part of a grand separatist ploy is, at best, a patently tendentious claim. However unpleasant stone-throwing may be for soldiers or the keepers of law and order, it is, quite simply Kashmiri resistance against a relentless counter-offensive characterised by violence, dispossession and death.
Ever since the eruption of mass rebellion in Kashmir in 1989-90, New Delhi has lacked the moral courage to publicly acknowledge, much less redress Kashmiri grievance. The domestic political consensus on Kashmir has consequently centred on the denial of local Kashmiri grievance and a concerted focus on Kashmir’s external (Pakistan) dimension commonly referred to as ‘cross-border terrorism’. Global, especially Western fears regarding Islamist terror, Pakistan’s own dubious and destructive role in Kashmir, together with the tragedy of 26/11 allowed India to escape local democratic accountability within Kashmir. It has been relatively easy to claim that if at all there is a Kashmir problem, Pakistan and its terror machine are to blame. India’s self-created domestic crisis in Kashmir (that Pakistan subsequently exploited) has been consistently understated or overlooked.
As a result of this political and intellectual dishonesty, the opinion and subjective experience of Kashmiri Muslims is ignored. India could mobilise over 500,000 soldiers to safeguard Kashmir’s territorial frontiers yet betray a cruel and callous disregard for the security, rights or dignity of the people within it. For two long decades, the use of coercive, frequently lethal force, resort to arbitrary detention, custodial death, fake encounters, rape and sexual abuse, extrajudicial killing, torture, and bouts of undeclared curfew has been the standard state response to accumulating Kashmiri grievance. The 2008 assembly elections are India’s answer to awkward questions regarding democracy in Kashmir.
But like any other oppressed people in the world, the Kashmiri Muslims have not been cowed down by force; nor have they ceased protesting India’s democratic deficit in Kashmir. Indeed, it is precisely during these moments that India’s feeble and tenuous claims to democracy and normalcy in Kashmir are forcefully exposed. The stones cast by a young, radicalised generation of Kashmiri boys today symbolise the unequal battle between truth and power in Kashmir. The truth is that the youth who throw stones and the masses of people who march with them raising ‘anti-national’ slogans wish to be rid of Indian hegemony in their contested homeland. They want the security forces withdrawn; those languishing in jails released; the extraordinary powers vested in the military curbed; public accountability for the disappeared; prosecution for those responsible for crimes against citizens; a chance to determine their own political future; a life of freedom and dignity. In short, the truth is that the Kashmiri Muslims vehemently reject their existing relationship with the Indian state.
What is India – the de-facto ‘power’ in Kashmir – doing about this truth? Precious little. Bereft of imagination or morality, the Indian state focuses on the symptom of the malaise: by maligning and thereby de-legitimising Kashmiri public opinion as ‘anti-national, it seeks to legitimise its own authoritarian counter-offensive (curfew, arbitrary detention, a ban on sms and mobile services, restrictions on journalists and the media, restrictions on public mobility, a ban on public gatherings, etc.) that passes for governance and democracy in Kashmir. The possession of superior force and enforced curfew, it is hoped, shall eventually quieten things down. That shall indeed happen, as has happened for the past twenty years: curfew restrictions shall be relaxed, schools shall re-open, people shall go to work, tourists shall throng Dal Lake, and there will be traffic on the roads.
Yet, as ‘power’ well knows, the latent, festering truth of injustice and anger underpinning Kashmir’s deceptive veneer of ‘normality’ can erupt any time with terrifying intensity - with blood on the streets and swarms of stone-throwing and slogan-shouting crowds. As tragic and grievous as the loss of Kashmir’s young men is India’s refusal to concede the truth. Cornered and defensive, lacking the courage and conscience expected of a mature and self-confident democracy, India has no option other than digging in and playing for time. Sadly, neither time nor history is on India’s side. No people have ever surrendered to the untruth of the abuse of power. No state has ever erased a people’s history, memory or quest for justice.
Labelling Kashmiri anger "separatist" or "anti-national" does a disservice to the victims of violence while serving to cover up and excuse state repression, argues Seema Kazi.
8 January: Inayat Khan (16 years) shot dead by CRPF, Srinagar.
22 January: Manzoor Ahmed Sofi (23 years), shot dead by the CRPF, Parahaspora (Pattan).
31 January: Wamiq Farooq (13 years) shot dead by JK police, Srinagar.
31 January: Zahid Farooq (16 years) shot dead by Border Security Force, Srinagar.
13 April: Zubair Ahmad Bhat (17 years) drowned to death by CRPF, Sopore.
11 June: Tufail Ahmad Mattoo (17 years) attacked and killed by JK police, Srinagar.
19 June: Rafique Ahmad Bangroo (24 years) beaten to death by CRPF, Srinagar.
20 June: Javed Ahmed Malla (22 years) shot dead by CRPF, Srinagar.
27 June: Shakeel Ahmad Ganai (17 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
27 June: Firdous Ahmad Kakroo (16 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
27 June: Bilal Ahmed Wani (21 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
28 June: Tauqir Ahmed Rather (9 years) killed by CRPF, Sopore.
28 June: Tajamul Bashir (17 years) shot dead by CRPF, Sopore.
29 June: Ishtiaq Ahmed Khanday (15 years) shot dead by police, Anantnag.
29 June: Imtiaz Ahmed Itoo (17 years) shot dead by police, Anantnag.
29 June: Shujat ul Islam (16 years) shot dead by police, Anantnag.
India’s war in Kashmir has, of late, acquired a particularly deadly edge. During the past six months, a disproportionately large number of teenagers and young men have been shot dead on the streets by the police or CRPF. It is far from clear as to whether all those who died were actually throwing stones. Be that as it may, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and his administration have deemed stone-throwing a criminal offence punishable with death or a lifetime in prison. Having ‘legalised’ the repression of dissent, Abdullah, Home Minister Chidambaram, and Home Secretary GK Pillai hold the separatists and ‘anti-national’ forces responsible for the present crisis in Kashmir.
There cannot be a greater folly than to attribute the deep and overflowing reservoir of collective anger and outrage against a twenty-year-old occupation to the Machiavellian powers of a fragmented and fairly discredited separatist conglomerate. In no state, least of all in one that claims to be democratic, can the act of stone-throwing or public protest legitimise a shoot-to-kill policy. As democratic channels for dissent in Kashmir remain blocked, and the institutions meant for the protection of civilians (military and paramilitary) or the enforcement of the rule of law (police) deprive citizens of the right to life, stones, slogans and mass protest are all what the Kashmiris have to oppose and resist a shameful and scandalous state of affairs.
To represent Kashmiri public outrage as a ‘separatist’, ‘anti-national’ conspiracy is an exercise in self-delusion and deceit; it also betrays a profound disrespect for Kashmiri public opinion. Separatist leaders may or may not support stone-pelting but to suggest that all the boys and young men shot dead were part of a grand separatist ploy is, at best, a patently tendentious claim. However unpleasant stone-throwing may be for soldiers or the keepers of law and order, it is, quite simply Kashmiri resistance against a relentless counter-offensive characterised by violence, dispossession and death.
Ever since the eruption of mass rebellion in Kashmir in 1989-90, New Delhi has lacked the moral courage to publicly acknowledge, much less redress Kashmiri grievance. The domestic political consensus on Kashmir has consequently centred on the denial of local Kashmiri grievance and a concerted focus on Kashmir’s external (Pakistan) dimension commonly referred to as ‘cross-border terrorism’. Global, especially Western fears regarding Islamist terror, Pakistan’s own dubious and destructive role in Kashmir, together with the tragedy of 26/11 allowed India to escape local democratic accountability within Kashmir. It has been relatively easy to claim that if at all there is a Kashmir problem, Pakistan and its terror machine are to blame. India’s self-created domestic crisis in Kashmir (that Pakistan subsequently exploited) has been consistently understated or overlooked.
As a result of this political and intellectual dishonesty, the opinion and subjective experience of Kashmiri Muslims is ignored. India could mobilise over 500,000 soldiers to safeguard Kashmir’s territorial frontiers yet betray a cruel and callous disregard for the security, rights or dignity of the people within it. For two long decades, the use of coercive, frequently lethal force, resort to arbitrary detention, custodial death, fake encounters, rape and sexual abuse, extrajudicial killing, torture, and bouts of undeclared curfew has been the standard state response to accumulating Kashmiri grievance. The 2008 assembly elections are India’s answer to awkward questions regarding democracy in Kashmir.
But like any other oppressed people in the world, the Kashmiri Muslims have not been cowed down by force; nor have they ceased protesting India’s democratic deficit in Kashmir. Indeed, it is precisely during these moments that India’s feeble and tenuous claims to democracy and normalcy in Kashmir are forcefully exposed. The stones cast by a young, radicalised generation of Kashmiri boys today symbolise the unequal battle between truth and power in Kashmir. The truth is that the youth who throw stones and the masses of people who march with them raising ‘anti-national’ slogans wish to be rid of Indian hegemony in their contested homeland. They want the security forces withdrawn; those languishing in jails released; the extraordinary powers vested in the military curbed; public accountability for the disappeared; prosecution for those responsible for crimes against citizens; a chance to determine their own political future; a life of freedom and dignity. In short, the truth is that the Kashmiri Muslims vehemently reject their existing relationship with the Indian state.
What is India – the de-facto ‘power’ in Kashmir – doing about this truth? Precious little. Bereft of imagination or morality, the Indian state focuses on the symptom of the malaise: by maligning and thereby de-legitimising Kashmiri public opinion as ‘anti-national, it seeks to legitimise its own authoritarian counter-offensive (curfew, arbitrary detention, a ban on sms and mobile services, restrictions on journalists and the media, restrictions on public mobility, a ban on public gatherings, etc.) that passes for governance and democracy in Kashmir. The possession of superior force and enforced curfew, it is hoped, shall eventually quieten things down. That shall indeed happen, as has happened for the past twenty years: curfew restrictions shall be relaxed, schools shall re-open, people shall go to work, tourists shall throng Dal Lake, and there will be traffic on the roads.
Yet, as ‘power’ well knows, the latent, festering truth of injustice and anger underpinning Kashmir’s deceptive veneer of ‘normality’ can erupt any time with terrifying intensity - with blood on the streets and swarms of stone-throwing and slogan-shouting crowds. As tragic and grievous as the loss of Kashmir’s young men is India’s refusal to concede the truth. Cornered and defensive, lacking the courage and conscience expected of a mature and self-confident democracy, India has no option other than digging in and playing for time. Sadly, neither time nor history is on India’s side. No people have ever surrendered to the untruth of the abuse of power. No state has ever erased a people’s history, memory or quest for justice.
2011: "South won't produce president in 50 years if Jonathan runs" Sam Aluko
DURO ADESEKO
Professor Sam Aluko has called on President Goodluck Jonathan not to contest the 2011 election. According to him, it would be unfair to deny the North the right to produce the next president because of the unfortunate death of the late President Umar Musa Yarâ' Adua. He argued that if the late president were to be around, he would have contested and won the 2011 presidential election.
He warned that the North is more populated than the South and if Jonathan contests and wins the 2011 election, the North would make ensure it gets back power in coming elections and hold on to it for the next 50 years.
Although he is not a member of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Aluko is in support of the zoning arrangement of the party. He argued that zoning would ensure that the presidency goes round the country.
Our peculiar circumstance favours zoning. Without zoning, the largest town in a local council would continue to produce the chairman while the largest tribes would continue to produce governors and the president, he said.
Aluko also said that the energy situation in the country can be improved upon if states are given the responsibility of generating power. He suggested that Jonathan should meet with governors and discuss how to improve energy generation.
President Goodluck Jonathan is in charge of energy ministry. Do you see this as the solution to the electricity problem?
I don't think he is holding on to the ministry as minister of power. I think he wants to ensure that whoever is minister for power reports to him from time to time. The duties of the president are so multifarious and so exhausting that he cannot afford to hold on to a federal ministry. I don't think he is holding on to the ministry of power. I think he has an adviser on power and a minister of state for power.
What can he do to achieve his ambition of stabilising energy generation in the country?
I think he has only one year and even within this one year, he can meet the aspiration they could not meet in three years. But I think that if he can guarantee supply of gas to the various power stations and he can ensure the supervision of those power stations, he will do well. The problem is not that the stations are not there but most of the things that are supposed to be bought to make the power stations work were brought in as second-hand equipment. I was chairman of Economic and Intelligence Committee for three years and I was able to know that most of these problems we have, arose from the fact that obsolete equipment, instead of new ones, are being used. Take the power station in Ikorodu, which was supposed to be supplied with gas, for example. They went there and pumped something else into it and the thing exploded. Three out of four exploded. They did that because they felt that the element was cheaper than gas. So, it is the same thing with the refineries. Instead of using modern equipment and allow the NNPC to use it to regenerate and refurbish what is called the turn-around maintenance for the refineries, they will award the contract to a politician who will re-award it to another politician and then go and use obsolete equipment or just polish the equipment and say that the things have been done.
The same thing applies to our pipelines. The pipelines were supposed to have been changed three times over since they were laid in the 1950s. But they are still there. The pipes were vandalised because they are old. Sometimes, the force of the fuel is higher than what they were carrying in the 1950s. That is part of the problem. If they can ensure that faithful, loyal and honest people are in charge and are maintaining them, using the relevant equipment and they are not putting the money in their pockets, the power system will work. We have enough stations today to even supply Nigeria more than the 6,000 power megawatts that they have promised. But the power stations are not being maintained loyally and honestly. That is the problem.
Again, the whole idea of concentrating the management of the energy sector in the hands of the Federal Government alone is wrong. There are many countries in the world that are not as large as Ondo State or Ekiti State or even Bayelsa and they are generating their own energy and maintaining an uninterrupted power. It is a shame. We have 36 states, Federal Capital Territory and the Federal Government. We ought to have 38 units of energy generation in Nigeria.
In Europe and America, local governments generate their own energy. So, the whole idea is that we are not doing what we should do. We are not practising division of labour. We concentrate too much power with the Federal Government. Federal Government is concentrating power in the private sector. Private sector has its own responsibilities. They cannot even maintain energy for their own. They are looking up to the Federal Government to generate energy for their industries and we are saying they are the ones who will generate energy for the country. You could see the vicious circle of foolishness that we are engaged in.
I think, really, the Federal Government should have a meeting with the states and concede it to them. The states have money. Ondo State has more money than many small countries in the world. I did a study for one of the state governments. There are 59 countries in the world, which are members of the United Nations that are smaller than Ekiti State or Ondo State and they are not as rich, in human resources and material resources. They have ambassadors; they have airlines and they have shipping lines, railways, and airports. It means something is wrong with us. It is because we stopped planning in the 80s that we are where we are now.
You suggest Jonathan should meet with state governments to discuss it. Why?
He should ask them what government could do to improve the energy stations in their states. If Ondo State takes control of its energy supply in its own state and other states can take control in their states, the problem would be minimised. That is what the council of states’ meeting should be about and not to be sharing money from excess crude account. They should be working in concert with the Federal Government to solve our energy problem, unemployment and road problems. Why should the Federal Government maintain roads in Ondo State? There is a government in Ondo State. They can contract that to the Ondo State government and not a contractor in Sokoto, who doesn’t know Ondo State. That is what is done in America. The Federal Government in the US stipulates the quality of the roads that should be in the country. That is why there are competitions to see that their roads are good. That is why there are no potholes on their roads. Here we give the contract to a contractor, who is a lawyer. He will sub-contract to a third party and there is nobody to supervise. How can the president or minister in Abuja supervise a road in Ore? These are things we need to put right.
What do you say about the circumstance that brought Jonathan to power?
It is an unfortunate circumstance that our president died. Anybody can die. It is a natural thing that all of us will die. That is an unfortunate circumstance. But it is also fortunate for Jonathan that he, being the vice president, automatically became the president. So, we should rejoice with him in the same way Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar became head of State when Abacha died. Those are circumstances that occur in countries from time to time. It is a natural thing that he is there because he was the vice president.
Some people are asking him to contest the 2011 election despite the zoning formula of the PDP. Do you think he should contest?
I support the zoning formula, even though I am not a member of the PDP. In this country, most of us, particularly, in the South are shot-sighted. When we have a temporary advantage, we believe that it will be permanent. We don’t look into the future. When I was chairman of Ado Ekiti Local Government Area, there were only four local government areas in Ekiti. That was in 1954-55. I had my own local government police. At the time, there was local government police. There was state police and there was federal police. If any thief came to Ado, the local people knew. They spoke the local language. The state police spoke the local language and nobody could defeat them.
We started campaigning in the Action Group (AG) that federal police should be responsible for states and local governments. They wanted the police federalised because northerners were using the Andoka, the native authority police, to harass our supporters in the North. I said that since we have our own local government police here, they will not be able to harass our people. They said no, arguing that if we centralised the local government police, we would win the federal election, produce the president and use the police to do a lot of things in the North. I asked them what if we didn’t win. And they were confident we would. That is how we campaigned to federalise police. Today, we are shouting in the South that we want state police and we want local government police. But we were the ones who started the campaign, in those days, for a federal police thinking that we would rule Nigeria and use the police against the northern emirs.
We started the campaign for presidential system of government. We used to debate it in the Action Group (AG). We had somebody who would be both head of state and head of government. I said it could lead to tyranny. They said no, that we would win the presidency. I know we are not like America. Look at Britain. Very few countries in the world have this kind of presidential system. Even some countries that have presidential system have heads of state and heads of government. The head of government is a parliamentarian. Now, we are saddled with presidential system. Who are the people now arguing for parliamentary system? Southerners. This is because we now see that what we thought we would be able to hold on to, we couldn’t.
I said the same thing to Moshood Abiola when he wanted to contest the presidential election. I told him that I believed in division of labour. I told him that God had given him a fortress. He came from nowhere and became one of the richest people in Africa. I told him to be contented with that. He said no, insisting that he wanted power. He said I would be the head of his economic team. I said I could not be because I didn’t think it was right. Did he become president?
We are talking about the same thing now. We started democracy, and we have 57 parties. We are now arguing that it should be a two-party system. But we were the ones who argued that the freest and fairest election was that of MKO Abiola. It is the same thing we are now saying now, because Jonathan is a southerner. People are saying he should contest in 2011. They are saying that zoning by the PDP is wrong. You forget that the North is in the majority. If you don’t do zoning, we may never be president of Nigeria in the next 50 years in the South.
In a free and fair election, where we count one man, one vote, northerners will always have majority. So, whoever they put up there, as the presidential candidate, would become the president of Nigeria. The South would be short-changed. But when we rotate, we know that at a point in time, it would be our own turn.
Are you endorsing zoning?
I support the zoning system of the PDP, even though I am not a member of the PDP. It is a very civilised system. It is an equitable system. It is because of our peculiar circumstances and the structure of our population and homogeneity or lack of it. If we don’t do that, we find that the town that is in large majority, in a local government area, will continue to produce the chairman forever. The largest area would continue to produce the governor forever. But when we rotate, we say look, you have done it two or three times, let somebody else do it.
I think we need that and that is why I don’t think Jonathan should run. If Yar’Adua had not died, he would have had a second term. The North would have retained the presidency for eight years. We should not say because of the misfortune the North suffered, let us deny them the presidency for the next four years. It is not fair. As a Christian, I don’t think it is right. What is not fair cannot be right.
Are you therefore telling Jonathan not to run?
Yes. His time would come. After all, he did not aspire to be president and he is there now. Even if he is not president forever, he has made a name that he was once president. Look at Shonekan. He was there for only about three or four months. Look at Gen. Abubakar, he was there for only about eight to nine months. He is now honoured around the world. When we were in government, many military officers tried to prevail on Gen. Abubakar to have another year, but he said no. He is a honourable person today. So, I don’t think Jonathan should run.
Response to Paul Okojie on : Prof Aluko: "Jonathan must not run
Mr Okojie paul ,you said and i quote "When would you and others who think like you, move beyond hate and let reason prevail? " ,,,,,,,,,
I think you got some point and question here .So let me try and provide some answers here ,,,
We should stop when the seed of hatered which the same prof Sam Aluko planted in his evil son ,who also is a professor of aruru ani ,i mean roughfessor Bolaji Aluko.
You know that Aluko Bolaji is the most hating professor on this face of the sun ?
Imagine somebody who took from where his father stopped ,do not forget that his father was a big instrument in the genocidal move of Awo the snake ,which between the two "evil" they exterminated over 3 million infants and over 2 million women from 1967 -1970 .
Do not forget that they did that just to see if they can annihiliate an entire race ,to enable them take over the business and life of the igbo people.
Now do not forget that Awo who was the principal facilitator of the STARVATION as instrument of GENOCIDE ,did not leave behind a son to carry on his incompleted plot to eliminate umuigbo from the face of earth ,but this Sam Aluko have 2 son,s but do you know that god cursed him so much that ,one of his son is so useless that he is still living in his fathers house both in Nigeria and USA,and his father still takes care of his daily needs and that of his children as well .
Sam Aluko the father of Bolaji Aluko is a professor and we know that he cannot use words without weighting them very well.
So when a professor said that somebody is a fool ,he must have used every known formula to check out the person ,so for Prof Sam Aluko to call his own a FOOL ,it simply means ,Bolaji is a hard core fool.
Now where are we ? yes i was telling you when we will stop revisiting the atrocious deed of the Alukos.We can only stop when the Aluko apologised to ndi igbo for what they did to us during the pogrom.
We may stop when Bolaji Aluko stop hating and writing gross lies against ndi igbo.
Personally i will stop when Bolaji Aluko stop victimizing Igbo students in his class.
Now paul okojie ,are we communicating or should i go a further down to explain more ?
Professor Sam Aluko has called on President Goodluck Jonathan not to contest the 2011 election. According to him, it would be unfair to deny the North the right to produce the next president because of the unfortunate death of the late President Umar Musa Yarâ' Adua. He argued that if the late president were to be around, he would have contested and won the 2011 presidential election.
He warned that the North is more populated than the South and if Jonathan contests and wins the 2011 election, the North would make ensure it gets back power in coming elections and hold on to it for the next 50 years.
Although he is not a member of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Aluko is in support of the zoning arrangement of the party. He argued that zoning would ensure that the presidency goes round the country.
Our peculiar circumstance favours zoning. Without zoning, the largest town in a local council would continue to produce the chairman while the largest tribes would continue to produce governors and the president, he said.
Aluko also said that the energy situation in the country can be improved upon if states are given the responsibility of generating power. He suggested that Jonathan should meet with governors and discuss how to improve energy generation.
President Goodluck Jonathan is in charge of energy ministry. Do you see this as the solution to the electricity problem?
I don't think he is holding on to the ministry as minister of power. I think he wants to ensure that whoever is minister for power reports to him from time to time. The duties of the president are so multifarious and so exhausting that he cannot afford to hold on to a federal ministry. I don't think he is holding on to the ministry of power. I think he has an adviser on power and a minister of state for power.
What can he do to achieve his ambition of stabilising energy generation in the country?
I think he has only one year and even within this one year, he can meet the aspiration they could not meet in three years. But I think that if he can guarantee supply of gas to the various power stations and he can ensure the supervision of those power stations, he will do well. The problem is not that the stations are not there but most of the things that are supposed to be bought to make the power stations work were brought in as second-hand equipment. I was chairman of Economic and Intelligence Committee for three years and I was able to know that most of these problems we have, arose from the fact that obsolete equipment, instead of new ones, are being used. Take the power station in Ikorodu, which was supposed to be supplied with gas, for example. They went there and pumped something else into it and the thing exploded. Three out of four exploded. They did that because they felt that the element was cheaper than gas. So, it is the same thing with the refineries. Instead of using modern equipment and allow the NNPC to use it to regenerate and refurbish what is called the turn-around maintenance for the refineries, they will award the contract to a politician who will re-award it to another politician and then go and use obsolete equipment or just polish the equipment and say that the things have been done.
The same thing applies to our pipelines. The pipelines were supposed to have been changed three times over since they were laid in the 1950s. But they are still there. The pipes were vandalised because they are old. Sometimes, the force of the fuel is higher than what they were carrying in the 1950s. That is part of the problem. If they can ensure that faithful, loyal and honest people are in charge and are maintaining them, using the relevant equipment and they are not putting the money in their pockets, the power system will work. We have enough stations today to even supply Nigeria more than the 6,000 power megawatts that they have promised. But the power stations are not being maintained loyally and honestly. That is the problem.
Again, the whole idea of concentrating the management of the energy sector in the hands of the Federal Government alone is wrong. There are many countries in the world that are not as large as Ondo State or Ekiti State or even Bayelsa and they are generating their own energy and maintaining an uninterrupted power. It is a shame. We have 36 states, Federal Capital Territory and the Federal Government. We ought to have 38 units of energy generation in Nigeria.
In Europe and America, local governments generate their own energy. So, the whole idea is that we are not doing what we should do. We are not practising division of labour. We concentrate too much power with the Federal Government. Federal Government is concentrating power in the private sector. Private sector has its own responsibilities. They cannot even maintain energy for their own. They are looking up to the Federal Government to generate energy for their industries and we are saying they are the ones who will generate energy for the country. You could see the vicious circle of foolishness that we are engaged in.
I think, really, the Federal Government should have a meeting with the states and concede it to them. The states have money. Ondo State has more money than many small countries in the world. I did a study for one of the state governments. There are 59 countries in the world, which are members of the United Nations that are smaller than Ekiti State or Ondo State and they are not as rich, in human resources and material resources. They have ambassadors; they have airlines and they have shipping lines, railways, and airports. It means something is wrong with us. It is because we stopped planning in the 80s that we are where we are now.
You suggest Jonathan should meet with state governments to discuss it. Why?
He should ask them what government could do to improve the energy stations in their states. If Ondo State takes control of its energy supply in its own state and other states can take control in their states, the problem would be minimised. That is what the council of states’ meeting should be about and not to be sharing money from excess crude account. They should be working in concert with the Federal Government to solve our energy problem, unemployment and road problems. Why should the Federal Government maintain roads in Ondo State? There is a government in Ondo State. They can contract that to the Ondo State government and not a contractor in Sokoto, who doesn’t know Ondo State. That is what is done in America. The Federal Government in the US stipulates the quality of the roads that should be in the country. That is why there are competitions to see that their roads are good. That is why there are no potholes on their roads. Here we give the contract to a contractor, who is a lawyer. He will sub-contract to a third party and there is nobody to supervise. How can the president or minister in Abuja supervise a road in Ore? These are things we need to put right.
What do you say about the circumstance that brought Jonathan to power?
It is an unfortunate circumstance that our president died. Anybody can die. It is a natural thing that all of us will die. That is an unfortunate circumstance. But it is also fortunate for Jonathan that he, being the vice president, automatically became the president. So, we should rejoice with him in the same way Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar became head of State when Abacha died. Those are circumstances that occur in countries from time to time. It is a natural thing that he is there because he was the vice president.
Some people are asking him to contest the 2011 election despite the zoning formula of the PDP. Do you think he should contest?
I support the zoning formula, even though I am not a member of the PDP. In this country, most of us, particularly, in the South are shot-sighted. When we have a temporary advantage, we believe that it will be permanent. We don’t look into the future. When I was chairman of Ado Ekiti Local Government Area, there were only four local government areas in Ekiti. That was in 1954-55. I had my own local government police. At the time, there was local government police. There was state police and there was federal police. If any thief came to Ado, the local people knew. They spoke the local language. The state police spoke the local language and nobody could defeat them.
We started campaigning in the Action Group (AG) that federal police should be responsible for states and local governments. They wanted the police federalised because northerners were using the Andoka, the native authority police, to harass our supporters in the North. I said that since we have our own local government police here, they will not be able to harass our people. They said no, arguing that if we centralised the local government police, we would win the federal election, produce the president and use the police to do a lot of things in the North. I asked them what if we didn’t win. And they were confident we would. That is how we campaigned to federalise police. Today, we are shouting in the South that we want state police and we want local government police. But we were the ones who started the campaign, in those days, for a federal police thinking that we would rule Nigeria and use the police against the northern emirs.
We started the campaign for presidential system of government. We used to debate it in the Action Group (AG). We had somebody who would be both head of state and head of government. I said it could lead to tyranny. They said no, that we would win the presidency. I know we are not like America. Look at Britain. Very few countries in the world have this kind of presidential system. Even some countries that have presidential system have heads of state and heads of government. The head of government is a parliamentarian. Now, we are saddled with presidential system. Who are the people now arguing for parliamentary system? Southerners. This is because we now see that what we thought we would be able to hold on to, we couldn’t.
I said the same thing to Moshood Abiola when he wanted to contest the presidential election. I told him that I believed in division of labour. I told him that God had given him a fortress. He came from nowhere and became one of the richest people in Africa. I told him to be contented with that. He said no, insisting that he wanted power. He said I would be the head of his economic team. I said I could not be because I didn’t think it was right. Did he become president?
We are talking about the same thing now. We started democracy, and we have 57 parties. We are now arguing that it should be a two-party system. But we were the ones who argued that the freest and fairest election was that of MKO Abiola. It is the same thing we are now saying now, because Jonathan is a southerner. People are saying he should contest in 2011. They are saying that zoning by the PDP is wrong. You forget that the North is in the majority. If you don’t do zoning, we may never be president of Nigeria in the next 50 years in the South.
In a free and fair election, where we count one man, one vote, northerners will always have majority. So, whoever they put up there, as the presidential candidate, would become the president of Nigeria. The South would be short-changed. But when we rotate, we know that at a point in time, it would be our own turn.
Are you endorsing zoning?
I support the zoning system of the PDP, even though I am not a member of the PDP. It is a very civilised system. It is an equitable system. It is because of our peculiar circumstances and the structure of our population and homogeneity or lack of it. If we don’t do that, we find that the town that is in large majority, in a local government area, will continue to produce the chairman forever. The largest area would continue to produce the governor forever. But when we rotate, we say look, you have done it two or three times, let somebody else do it.
I think we need that and that is why I don’t think Jonathan should run. If Yar’Adua had not died, he would have had a second term. The North would have retained the presidency for eight years. We should not say because of the misfortune the North suffered, let us deny them the presidency for the next four years. It is not fair. As a Christian, I don’t think it is right. What is not fair cannot be right.
Are you therefore telling Jonathan not to run?
Yes. His time would come. After all, he did not aspire to be president and he is there now. Even if he is not president forever, he has made a name that he was once president. Look at Shonekan. He was there for only about three or four months. Look at Gen. Abubakar, he was there for only about eight to nine months. He is now honoured around the world. When we were in government, many military officers tried to prevail on Gen. Abubakar to have another year, but he said no. He is a honourable person today. So, I don’t think Jonathan should run.
Response to Paul Okojie on : Prof Aluko: "Jonathan must not run
Mr Okojie paul ,you said and i quote "When would you and others who think like you, move beyond hate and let reason prevail? " ,,,,,,,,,
I think you got some point and question here .So let me try and provide some answers here ,,,
We should stop when the seed of hatered which the same prof Sam Aluko planted in his evil son ,who also is a professor of aruru ani ,i mean roughfessor Bolaji Aluko.
You know that Aluko Bolaji is the most hating professor on this face of the sun ?
Imagine somebody who took from where his father stopped ,do not forget that his father was a big instrument in the genocidal move of Awo the snake ,which between the two "evil" they exterminated over 3 million infants and over 2 million women from 1967 -1970 .
Do not forget that they did that just to see if they can annihiliate an entire race ,to enable them take over the business and life of the igbo people.
Now do not forget that Awo who was the principal facilitator of the STARVATION as instrument of GENOCIDE ,did not leave behind a son to carry on his incompleted plot to eliminate umuigbo from the face of earth ,but this Sam Aluko have 2 son,s but do you know that god cursed him so much that ,one of his son is so useless that he is still living in his fathers house both in Nigeria and USA,and his father still takes care of his daily needs and that of his children as well .
Sam Aluko the father of Bolaji Aluko is a professor and we know that he cannot use words without weighting them very well.
So when a professor said that somebody is a fool ,he must have used every known formula to check out the person ,so for Prof Sam Aluko to call his own a FOOL ,it simply means ,Bolaji is a hard core fool.
Now where are we ? yes i was telling you when we will stop revisiting the atrocious deed of the Alukos.We can only stop when the Aluko apologised to ndi igbo for what they did to us during the pogrom.
We may stop when Bolaji Aluko stop hating and writing gross lies against ndi igbo.
Personally i will stop when Bolaji Aluko stop victimizing Igbo students in his class.
Now paul okojie ,are we communicating or should i go a further down to explain more ?
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