*Failure of Ohanaeze & Igbo Intelligentsia
Mazi Onumonu-Uzoaru Oha-Ka.
I feel the pains of Ndi-Igbo, no different from the pain of all those Igbo who have wrapped themselves around the Politics of Appeasement including the Conspiracy of Silence about the Genocaust and continuing marginalization of Ndi Igbo, tossed accountability overboard, rubbished the rule of law by enthroning the abominable selective policy of sacred cows by wearing blinders when it suited them, and embraced the attitude of see no evil, hear no evil or speak no evil, as long as they were able to pick up the crumbs that fell off the table of their Hausa-Fulani/ Yoruba masters, as they continued to suppress, oppress, marginalize and murder your so-called brethren.
I would expected not to mention ndi -igbo's association with the great professor, Maazi Stanley Diamond, a true son of humanity who will shed tears at the support of one of his pupils for this ego self centered dictator who engineered one of the greatest disasters in human history by snatching defeat out of the mouth of total victory in a war that should have lasted less than six months with very little loss of lives to a complete defeat that lasted three years with the near extermination of his nation including the high prize that Ndi Igbo continue to pay since this defeat, if he were today alive to understand the complete and total incompetence that led to the defeat and betrayal of a mourning and brutalized nation.
Let me summarize a few of the key points that will be pertinent to this discuss:
1. Was Ojukwu warned that this was a war Igbo/Biafra could not afford to loose?
2. How did he prepare for this war of survival after witnessing the unmitigated and unwarranted massacre of over 500,000 of his brethren all over Nigeria engineered by the spiritual leaders of the North, the Emirs; political leaders, all Northern politicians of any stature; education leaders, professors; military leaders headed by Gowon, the Hitler of Nigeria; student leaderships, etc?
3. How did his administration go about building a groundswell from the world in support of a dehumanized nation?
4. What part did the elders, especially those recognized internationally play in this fight for survival?
5. Did he not know of the plan to exterminate the Igbo and their brethren by the North?
6. Why was Igbo West of the Niger not part of Biafra, and how could any nation go to war, especially a war that all understood was a war of survival, a war that Biafra could not afford to loose, with one hand tied behind its back?
7. While planning for the invasion up to Lagos to liberate the West, what was his plan for the protection of Igbo West if this strategy failed?
8. How did he prepare the army for a war that Igbo/Biafra could not afford to loose?
9. As the war dragged on, were there other alternatives to total defeat, at least to give Biafra the breathing space it needed?
10. What were his actions since he was fortunate to leave Biafra during the complete defeat and surrender of Biafra?
11. Did he not understand what was happening in Biafra?
12. Did he travel all over the world to keep what was happening in Ala Igbo in the eyes of the world?
13. Did he contact the Biafran worldwide movements that were already in place, movements that were responsible for the survival of Biafrans and that even helped finance the war to update them on what was going on and continue working with them to hold Nigeria responsible for its actions in Biafra and to seek the eventual realization of an independent Nation, Biafra?
14. How did he go about making sure that the Genocaust continued in the limelight around the world?
15. How about Ndi Igbo in Diaspora, how did he go about holding them together after this unprecedented defeat, a defeat that had cut the heart out of them to the point that many now questioned their relationship to God?
16. What did he do to bring hope to these his downcast brethren, people who had given all and whose dreams now lay in ruins?
17. What did he do about the thousands of Biafran children flown out of Biafra to other parts of Africa or even the world?
17. Why did he return to Nigeria if he believed in what he and his brethren had fought for and died for in their millions?
18. What conditions did the Nigerian victors set for his return to Nigeria?
19. How did these conditions affect the Igbo/Biafran nation?
20. Why did he not intervene to get Ndi Igbo do something about the total neglect of the Biafran amputees, those who gave their body parts that Igbo might survive?
21. Why did he and other so-called Igbo leaders sit on the hands for the past 40 plus years as the oppression, suppression, marginalization and Genocaust continue in full force?
22. As the Nigerian overlords placed their puppets over Ndi Igbo, people who stole the monies that should have paid teachers, government workers, provided needed basic facilities to the people, what did he and other Igbo leaders do?
My brothers and sisters, these are a few of the questions that must be raised and answered.
Soon Njoku and the other Army leadership were distressed at the lack of policy direction in the region. Either efforts were needed to negotiate the peace, or preparations for war had to begin. These officers met with Ojukwu, but their fears were not allayed by Ojukwu's arguments.
He demonstrated his ruthlessness and his modus operandi in the way he preempted the potential threat to his power by these military officers.
Nonetheless, he managed to slip out of the country, touring Africa to gain support for the ANC's guerrilla army, visiting Tanzania, Ethiopia and Algeria, a number of revolutionary leaders gave him advice on guerrilla warfare and tactics. He even visited Britain.
The authorities wanted to defuse the situation, and they offered Mandela his freedom on the condition that he unconditionally gave up violence. He refused.
I hope you have done your research and this time you will stand and defend your god Ojukwu. Let me repeat what I have already written a number of times, by the time we are done, generations to come will compare Ojukwu to Judas, whereas Judas was responsible for the betrayal of one man, Jesus, Ojukwu will be remembered for the betrayal of a whole Nation, the Igbo Nation and other nations that made up Biafra.
QUICK KILL IN SLOW MOTION: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SMR.htm
Nelson Mandella
http://www.mandela.tv/mandela_story2.html
Nelson Mandella
http://www.mandela.tv/mandela_story2.html
Monday, December 5, 2011
Reform, rupture or re-imagination: understanding the purpose of an occupation
Guy Aitchison
In 2011 occupations have become the tactic of choice for popular movements worldwide. But how exactly does the physical holding of space contribute to a movement's aims? This article draws from experience of the student occupations in the UK, to argue that the strategy and tactics of occupation can be understood according to three alternative, but complimentary, visions of political change.
Over the course of the academic year 2010-2011, students and their supporters at University College London carried out three occupations in protest at cuts to higher education and the government’s wider austerity measures. The first of these, which took place in the Jeremy Bentham Room (JBR) between November 24 and December 10, was one of the most prominent of over fifty school and university occupations taking place at that time, attracting significant media attention and serving as a focal point for the national campaign of resistance to the government’s legislation on tuition fees. In February, a second occupation took place in another conference room, the Old Refectory. This occupation lasted several days and fed into the occupation of an entire building in Bloomsbury owned by another London university, Royal Holloway, which served as a radical organising space – the Anti-Cuts Space –before being raided by bailiffs. A third occupation at UCL in support of a lecturers’ strike took place between March 22 and March 24in the university registry. This article is informed by my own experience taking part in these occupations as an activist and PhD student at UCL.[1]
It is striking how, during the winter of 2010, the act of occupation as a political tactic, enjoyed a huge resurgence amongst the student population of the UK at a time when the majority had only a vague idea of what an occupation is and what it was expected to achieve. The over-arching goal of stopping the government’s legislation on tuition fees going through parliament was, presumably, shared by all who took part in the first occupation, along with the idea that occupying one’s university was a worthwhile tactic in pursuit of that goal. Yet when it comes to the more specific question of what the purpose of an occupation is – that is, how exactly it will contribute to the realisation of one’s political aims - there was far less clarity. There is, of course, no single correct answer to the question of what the purpose of an occupation is but instead a number of alternative conceptions of how the occupied space should be configured, how the occupiers should set about achieving their political goals and what their relationship to authority - in the form of university management, elected representatives and the police - should be.
Proceeding through an analysis of the three occupations at UCL, and drawing on examples from other student occupations, this article will show how activists’ conceptions of the purpose of an occupation vary according to an evolving set of political commitments grounded in distinctive visions of transformational social change. Occasionally, these competing conceptions were a source of conflict amongst activists at UCL, as in other occupations, but by far the most significant fact to note is the way in which activists’ understanding of what an occupation is was radically expanded and transformed as part of a broader process of politicization and radicalization. This transformation, I argue, both reflected and reinforced a more general shift, amongst the occupiers, from a broadly centre-left, social democratic politics to a much more radical anti-capitalist politics. In conclusion, I suggest that no single conception of the role and purpose of an occupation should be viewed as universally valid. The experience of occupation will nearly always involve careful negotiation, amongst activists of different political views and backgrounds, of a number of different and occasionally conflicting conceptions of the utility of the collective action they have undertaken, each grounded in shifting and overlapping strategies for social change, none of which can command unanimity. Success - insofar as it can be judged - will often involve a messy combination of different elements from each of these conceptions.
Three Models of Transformational Social Change
The most common framework for thinking about strategies for transformational social change is the traditional opposition of “reform” and “revolution”, but a far more useful approach is that taken by Erik Olin Wright in Envisioning Real Utopias which sets out a sophisticated tripartite model based on “symbiotic”, “ruptural” and “interstitial” visions (2010). These three strategies “differ both in terms of their visions of the trajectory of systemic transformation and in their understanding of the nature of the strategies needed to move along that trajectory” (Wright, 303). They each correspond to different political traditions within egalitarian social movements; emphasise the role of different actors in emancipatory resistance and embody different strategic logics with respect to capitalism and the state.
The central distinction Wright makes is between ruptural strategies and trajectories of metamorphosis. Ruptural strategies involve direct confrontation and political struggle with the aim of creating new institutions of social empowerment through a sharp break with existing institutions and social structures. Activists working within the orthodox tradition of revolutionary Marxism, in parties such as the SWP and the Socialist Party, are the paradigmatic examples of such an approach. The prospect of a revolutionary rupture may seem romantic and far-fetched in normal circumstances, but it is important for our purposes that certain aspects of the strategy – such as the emphasis on sharp confrontation with dominant classes and the state – need not be restricted to “totalizing ruptures in entire social systems” (309).
There are, meanwhile, two alternative visions of change through metamorphosis. Interstitial metamorphosis – perhaps the least well-known of the three - seeks to build new forms of social empowerment in the niches and margins of capitalist society (323). The core idea, prominent within the anarchist tradition, is to create autonomous institutions, which embody the democratic and egalitarian goals activists aspire to. Central to this strategy is the insight that capitalism and the state are not “things” external to society that can be confronted and defeated but a set of social relationships, which negate alternative forms of human association through their own successful reproduction. A free society will not exist until non-coercive forms of human interaction out-compete and displace coercive forms: this cannot wait until a singular, all transformative moment of ruptural change but requires free experimentation and practical testing out of new methods of free association at every opportunity. Although they may not see what they’re doing in these terms, the work of many community activists, involved in projects such as community land trusts and consumer co-ops, is consistent with such a strategy.
Interstitial visions are commonly found in the work of “autonomist” thinkers linked to the alter-globalisation movement, such as John Holloway, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Holloway, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2001). The ideals and motivations behind such visions, however, go back at least as far as the Industrial Workers of the World, the syndicalist union established at the turn of the 20th century, which propagates a vision of socialism based upon principles of federalism, on free combination from below upward; and, indeed, to past experiments in new-world construction, such as the Italian autonomists, Paris Communards and English Diggers.
The third and final strategy emancipatory social movements may choose to pursue, according to Wright’s framework, is symbiotic metamorphosis. This involves extending and deepening institutional forms of popular social empowerment in a manner that is consistent with the interests of dominant classes and elites (305). Historically, the most important example is the “class compromise” embodied in the relatively stable post World War Two Keynsian settlement, which encompasses a welfare state and a system of collective bargaining between capital and labour. In modern capitalist countries it typically involves social democratic parties, such as the UK Labour party, with links to trade unions, working through the institutions of parliamentary democracy to create electoral coalitions across social classes that compete for political power.
In practice, of course, the visions of social movement activists are far less clear cut and there is a great deal of cross-over between them. The salient point to note is that nearly every strategy for social transformation will embody one, two or three of these methods and ideals to a greater or lesser extent.
Symbiotic Visions of Occupation
The first UCL occupation was, of course, part of a much wider eruption of student activism in response to huge cuts by the Conservative-Lib Dem government to higher education tied to a threefold increase in tuition fees, along with the abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance. The decision by UCL activists to take some form of direct action was taken at a lively meeting of around 150 students and education workers that followed the storming of the Conservative Party headquarters at Millbank. A small group of experienced activists was formed to make preparations and a rally was called in the UCL quad for November 24, the day of the first national “walk out” of university and school students called by the National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts, the Educational Activist Network and the London Student Assembly, protest groups on the radical wing of the student movement. Following the rally, a group of around 200 marched into the Jeremy Bentham Room, a large conference space near the main entrance to UCL used for receptions, corporate events and by student societies. An immediate meeting was called and a collective decision taken to occupy it as part of the campaign against tuition fees and cuts to higher education. Many of those present, including myself, had never participated in an occupation before with the various Climate Camp protests the only comparable experience. For the over-whelming majority, this was their first experience of any sustained political engagement, let alone direct action.
There was a paradoxical logic at work in this initial act of occupation. It reflected both a radical disenchantment with parliament and political parties and a residual hope that these could be influenced towards progressive ends by convincing a sufficient number of MPs to vote against the government’s measures. The higher education bill provided a focal point for opposition and defined the lifecycle of the occupations. At the same time, the occupation movement was seen by many as the vivid manifestation of an entire generation’s withdrawal from the political system. Activists at UCL initially navigated this tension by presenting the use of direct action tactics as a last resort following the failure of the ordinary political process. This made sense within the context of a popular discourse, played out repeatedly in the mainstream media, which emphasised the “betrayal” of Nick Clegg and the Lib Dems who had “sold out” students in abandoning their election pledge to abolish tuition fees in exchange for power. As the initial “statement” drawn up consensually by UCL occupiers, put it;
"We stand against fees and savage cuts to higher education and government attempts to force society to pay for a crisis it didn’t cause. Promises have been broken, the political process has failed and we have been left with no other option."
Implicit in this first statement is the idea that direct action tactics denote a state of exception, to be resorted to when political processes – which, we are to presume, ordinarily function in a satisfactory manner - have “failed”. The statement was accompanied by a list of “demands” addressed to UCL management. The occupation demanded that UCL
Issue a statement condemning all cuts to higher education and the rise in tuition fees.
Implement a complete open books policy with regards to existing budget constraints.
Ensure no redundancies for teaching, research or support staff.
Reverse its outsourcing policy by bringing staff back in-house
Implement the full living wage package for all cleaning, catering and security staff with no cuts to hours and jobs.
Ensure no victimisation or repercussions for anyone participating in the occupation.
Allow free access in and out of the occupation.
As Genevieve Dawson points out, regarding the Oxford occupation, unlike a regular protest, an occupation compels a “debate” with the university authorities (in Hancox, 2010, 110). A great deal of care was taken in writing these demands in the first few hours in the JBR to ensure they provided a clear and realisable set of goals with which to negotiate. A working group was set up oversee negotiations with management, and representatives chosen at group meetings to negotiate with the Vice Provost and Head of Security on the occupation’s behalf.
Demands are, by their nature, always demands to some higher authority, usually involving an appeal to that authority to alter the existing state of affairs within the terms of the dominant system. As the occupation progressed and activists’ political horizons - along with their understanding of what it means to reclaim and reconfigure a space – changed, the importance attached to the demands diminished. The second occupation was undertaken primarily as a means to secure an organising space and reinvigorate activism on campus ahead of the TUC demonstration on March 26th. It included almost the entire first set of demands within it, but they were accompanied by more utopian demands, that management would almost certainly never agree to, such as the thoroughgoing democratisation of all university structures. The third occupation, in solidarity with striking lecturers, barely discussed political demands.
Ruptural Visions of Occupation
The care taken over the demands and the importance afforded to them in the first occupation is consistent with a symbiotic strategy for social change in which collective bargaining with the authorities, in the hope of realising an outcome agreeable to both parties, plays a central role. The shift away from a focus on demands reflects the shift from a primarily symbiotic conception of occupation towards one which encompasses ruptural and interstitial visions. As the occupation progressed it became clear that management were unlikely to meet any of the demands and were in any case not negotiating in good faith since they were prepared to go back on verbal agreements when it suited them. A response on the UCL occupation blog, to the first meeting with management, notes “We are highly disappointed that many of our demands were received with evasion and dismissal” by an unrepresentative and unaccountable elite that lacked the “legitimacy” to speak for the whole university on this issue (29/11/2010).
The anger and frustration increasingly felt towards management was part of a growing disenchantment with authority more generally amongst student activists, reflecting a broader process of radicalization amongst those involved in occupation. Cass Sunstein has shown how groups of people in “deliberative enclaves” (shared spaces, on or offline), with some degree of commonality and shared political commitments, will tend towards polarization (2009). As individuals reinforce one another’s opinions, identities harden and opposition to existing social practices becomes more extreme and deeply entrenched (“extremism”, he acknowledges, can be a good thing). Without doubt, this process of polarization took place within the occupations. It is also the case that participation in direct action is, for many people, an empowering and transformative experience. Participants discover their own agency when they confront, negate and ignore the power structures that dominate day-to-day life. At UCL, many activists report entering occupation with a broadly social democratic set of political commitments and leaving with a far more radical anti-capitalist politics. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the ruptural vision of occupation assumed greater significance.
One way in which the antagonistic stance associated with ruptural visions surfaced was in debates over “disruption”. In all three UCL occupations, and the Anti-Cuts Space, tensions arose over the issue of the disturbance caused to university staff and students. These tensions reflect political disagreements over the importance attributed to the occupation as a symbolic protest and as an antagonistic form of direct action designed to interrupt the functioning of the university. During the first occupation, there were a number of heated meetings, over whether student societies should be allowed to make use of the occupied space when they needed it for band rehearsals and so on. The third occupation succeeded in shutting down an entire wing of the university, made up of several offices where dozens of administrative staff worked, for four days. Several activists raised objections to this, on the basis that it would disrupt various welfare functions of the university. For others, this was precisely the point since the occupation was originally conceived as a way to amplify the effects of the strike called by UCU, the lecturers’ union: students, unable to withdraw their labour in solidarity with striking workers, were making use of the most effective tactic at their disposal.
This rationale, it should be noted, is consistent with symbiotic visions of change, which do not disavow the role of struggle. But it was noticeable that a far more confrontational and antagonistic tone accompanied this occupation following the logic of ruptural visions. The BBC’s somewhat patronising observations concerning the non-antagonistic atmosphere of the first occupation - “they're quoting Harry Potter rather than Che Guevera..” – almost certainly wouldn’t have been made of the third occupation (BBC News website, 30 November 2010).
On Thursday 24 March, the second day of the UCU strike, activists simultaneously occupied the registry and blockaded the room in which the university council were scheduled to hold a meeting agreeing the tripling of tuition fees, resulting in the police being called. In turn, Management responded to this escalation by threatening to pursue 13 named individuals for the legal costs for securing a possession order and injunction through the courts. The spectre of crippling financial costs for these 13 individuals, along with the potential end to their university careers, prompted an immediate campaign to “Defend the UCL 13”, along with a rally in the quad, and in the end management were pressured into far less draconian internal disciplinary measures.
Along with the rising importance of antagonism, it is possible to trace the growing significance of the ruptural conception from the beginning of the first occupation in the increasing emphasis placed on the use of the space as a site to plan and co-ordinate direct actions and protests, linking up with groups such asUK Uncut who target businesses alleged to have avoided tax with sit-ins and protests. The occupations also acted as a space to document and co-ordinate responses to police violence and use of “kettling” against demonstrators. A group of IT undergraduates and a freelance software engineer who had met in the first occupation went on to develop Sukey, an “anti-kettling” text service and smart phone application designed to help protesters out-manoeuvre police by providing up-to-date crowd-sourced information on police movements. The use of the occupations as a space to contest and challenge the state apparatus reflects the ruptural vision at work.
Interstital Visions of Occupation
Whilst the function of an occupation, understood according to a symbiotic or ruptural strategic logic, was apparent to most participants from the beginning (albeit not articulated in these terms), the third function only began to be recognised as a distinctive form of political activity in and of itself as the occupation progressed. Nevertheless, from day one, the occupants of the JBR began to act in a manner consistent with a vision of political change premised on working outside existing structures so as to re-configure social relationships along more just and egalitarian lines.
From its inception, the occupation aspired to non-coercive, anti-authoritarian forms of organisation. Internal practices inherited from the alter-globalisation movement, which had in turn adapted them from the Zapatistas and other social justice movements from the global south, were disseminated by student activists who had learnt them from, among other places, the Climate Camp protests. According to these practices, decisions are taken in a decentralized, non-hierarchical form of “consensus” democracy. Alongside consensus, the use of loose “working groups” dealing with particular areas of practical concern, such as media, kitchen, security, legal, tech and outreach, reinforced the principles of autonomy and decentralisation.
This understanding of UCL occupation as a “microtopia” was perhaps best expressed by a final year undergraduate, Sarah, on the UCL blog:
“the UCL Occupation was a unique experience for all involved. It’s not just a good story but also a lesson for society. School kids should have the power to speak to or turn down journalists. Everyone, no matter their opinions or status should have a say. Being productive and educated should be something you do voluntarily and enjoy. Politics and ambitious ideologies should be normal topics of conversation. You should be able to argue with, trust, listen to and love everyone you meet." (UCL occupation blog, (31/12/2010)
As with the other conceptions of the role and function of an occupation this one was not without controversy. Whilst some activists no doubt took a purely instrumental view that consensus was a good way to make decisions and foster community in a small group, others were opposed to it entirely. At one point, several activists involved in Marxist-Leninist parties, proposed a move to decision-making by vote – a move that was rejected by the group.
Needless to say, the ideal of a free and open space with a democratic egalitarian ethos was imperfectly realised in practice. Inequalities of gender, class, and education, reasserted themselves in the occupation as with the tendency of more assertive middle class male activists to dominate discussion at meetings. Nevertheless, the anti-authoritarian aspirations of the occupation became an important part of the group’s ideological self-understanding.
The second way in which the occupation can be said to have followed an interstitial strategic logic is in hosting open educational talks and workshops. Initially, these were, again, almost certainly conceived primarily, if not exclusively, in instrumental terms as a way of providing stimulation and learning and encouraging people into the occupation. Yet, as with the practice of consensus, they came to be seen along increasingly prefigurative lines, as a concrete realisation of the more democratic forms of education activists would like to see and a rejection of the “hedonistic and utilitarian” conception of the “neoliberal student” pushed by New Labour and the Coalition (Owen Hatherley in Hancox, 2011; 119). There were talks from lecturers, trade unionists, activists, journalists and students themselves, as well as gigs, poetry readings and dramatic performances. In what seemed like a natural progression, many of those involved in the first UCL occupation later became involved with the Really Free School, a nomadic institution based out of various squatted buildings in central London that self-consciously situated itself within an anarchist tradition of creating autonomous and non-hierarchical educational establishments as part of a wider emancipatory project.
Judging by other accounts, UCL occupation was far from unique in using the space in this way. Indeed, as Lee Satter and Jilly Boyce Kay write this was a “bone of contention as the occupation went on” at the UWE occupation with “process”-focused activists prioritising its use as an “education camp”, and others more interested in “protest”. (REF). On the UCL blog, Jo Casserly wrote, “it is a common mistake of some anarchists to see the occupation of a space, a squat or a social centre as an end in itself rather than a tactic in a far wider struggle.” (29/12/2010)
Here, we see an expression of the traditional Marxist critique of interstitial strategies, that they involve retreat from political struggle to spaces “allowed” by capitalism and the state. This critique is convincing when it comes to certain exclusively interstitial visions – criticised by many anarchists as “lifestylism” – such as the hippy communes of the 1960s. However, if we adopt the more holistic understanding of an occupation as simultaneously a pre-figurative enactment of a group’s political ideals, and as an organising space for protest, the dichotomy of “process” and “protest” does not hold. The “procedural” forms of democratic practice inside the occupation cannot be divorced from its “substantive” political goals outside, but must instead be understood as an additional and complimentary pathway to social change. Occupation as both protest and process involves a simultaneous delegitimation of the neoliberal capitalist order, which prescribes the commodification of education and its restriction to a wealthy elite, and the legitimation of another world governed by alternative logics.
Conclusion
It is common for activists involved in social movements to become fixated on one strategy for political change, disparaging others as ineffective or even counter-productive. In occupations, which, by their nature, bring together activists from diverse backgrounds each with their own particular ideas concerning how their actions will effect change, the co-existence of such strategies will often translate to tensions and conflicts over day-to-day issues. The re-imagination of an occupied space as an autonomous community will, at times, conflict with its use as a revolutionary organising space or as a tool with which to exert leverage in negotiating for reforms from management. Such tensions can be seen as healthy and productive and are in any case inevitable when activists reject a reductive, one-dimensional account of the purpose of occupation. Successful social movements are those that combine a number of alternative strategies for political change and that is why inclusivity and pluralism are so important. The same can be said of occupations.
[1] I am grateful for comments and feedback on this article from fellow UCL students and occupiers, Sam Halvorsen and Jessica Riches.
Bibliography
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri, Empire, (Harvard University Press, 2001).
Hancox, Dan (ed), Fight back! A Reader on the Winter of Protest, (openDemocracy, 2011) .
Holloway, John, Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today, (Pluto, 2005).
Sunstein, Cass, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide, (Oxford, OUP 200).
Wright, Erik Olin, Envisioning Real Utopias, (London, Verso, 2010).
This essay was originally published in The Journal for Social Movement Studies.
In 2011 occupations have become the tactic of choice for popular movements worldwide. But how exactly does the physical holding of space contribute to a movement's aims? This article draws from experience of the student occupations in the UK, to argue that the strategy and tactics of occupation can be understood according to three alternative, but complimentary, visions of political change.
Over the course of the academic year 2010-2011, students and their supporters at University College London carried out three occupations in protest at cuts to higher education and the government’s wider austerity measures. The first of these, which took place in the Jeremy Bentham Room (JBR) between November 24 and December 10, was one of the most prominent of over fifty school and university occupations taking place at that time, attracting significant media attention and serving as a focal point for the national campaign of resistance to the government’s legislation on tuition fees. In February, a second occupation took place in another conference room, the Old Refectory. This occupation lasted several days and fed into the occupation of an entire building in Bloomsbury owned by another London university, Royal Holloway, which served as a radical organising space – the Anti-Cuts Space –before being raided by bailiffs. A third occupation at UCL in support of a lecturers’ strike took place between March 22 and March 24in the university registry. This article is informed by my own experience taking part in these occupations as an activist and PhD student at UCL.[1]
It is striking how, during the winter of 2010, the act of occupation as a political tactic, enjoyed a huge resurgence amongst the student population of the UK at a time when the majority had only a vague idea of what an occupation is and what it was expected to achieve. The over-arching goal of stopping the government’s legislation on tuition fees going through parliament was, presumably, shared by all who took part in the first occupation, along with the idea that occupying one’s university was a worthwhile tactic in pursuit of that goal. Yet when it comes to the more specific question of what the purpose of an occupation is – that is, how exactly it will contribute to the realisation of one’s political aims - there was far less clarity. There is, of course, no single correct answer to the question of what the purpose of an occupation is but instead a number of alternative conceptions of how the occupied space should be configured, how the occupiers should set about achieving their political goals and what their relationship to authority - in the form of university management, elected representatives and the police - should be.
Proceeding through an analysis of the three occupations at UCL, and drawing on examples from other student occupations, this article will show how activists’ conceptions of the purpose of an occupation vary according to an evolving set of political commitments grounded in distinctive visions of transformational social change. Occasionally, these competing conceptions were a source of conflict amongst activists at UCL, as in other occupations, but by far the most significant fact to note is the way in which activists’ understanding of what an occupation is was radically expanded and transformed as part of a broader process of politicization and radicalization. This transformation, I argue, both reflected and reinforced a more general shift, amongst the occupiers, from a broadly centre-left, social democratic politics to a much more radical anti-capitalist politics. In conclusion, I suggest that no single conception of the role and purpose of an occupation should be viewed as universally valid. The experience of occupation will nearly always involve careful negotiation, amongst activists of different political views and backgrounds, of a number of different and occasionally conflicting conceptions of the utility of the collective action they have undertaken, each grounded in shifting and overlapping strategies for social change, none of which can command unanimity. Success - insofar as it can be judged - will often involve a messy combination of different elements from each of these conceptions.
Three Models of Transformational Social Change
The most common framework for thinking about strategies for transformational social change is the traditional opposition of “reform” and “revolution”, but a far more useful approach is that taken by Erik Olin Wright in Envisioning Real Utopias which sets out a sophisticated tripartite model based on “symbiotic”, “ruptural” and “interstitial” visions (2010). These three strategies “differ both in terms of their visions of the trajectory of systemic transformation and in their understanding of the nature of the strategies needed to move along that trajectory” (Wright, 303). They each correspond to different political traditions within egalitarian social movements; emphasise the role of different actors in emancipatory resistance and embody different strategic logics with respect to capitalism and the state.
The central distinction Wright makes is between ruptural strategies and trajectories of metamorphosis. Ruptural strategies involve direct confrontation and political struggle with the aim of creating new institutions of social empowerment through a sharp break with existing institutions and social structures. Activists working within the orthodox tradition of revolutionary Marxism, in parties such as the SWP and the Socialist Party, are the paradigmatic examples of such an approach. The prospect of a revolutionary rupture may seem romantic and far-fetched in normal circumstances, but it is important for our purposes that certain aspects of the strategy – such as the emphasis on sharp confrontation with dominant classes and the state – need not be restricted to “totalizing ruptures in entire social systems” (309).
There are, meanwhile, two alternative visions of change through metamorphosis. Interstitial metamorphosis – perhaps the least well-known of the three - seeks to build new forms of social empowerment in the niches and margins of capitalist society (323). The core idea, prominent within the anarchist tradition, is to create autonomous institutions, which embody the democratic and egalitarian goals activists aspire to. Central to this strategy is the insight that capitalism and the state are not “things” external to society that can be confronted and defeated but a set of social relationships, which negate alternative forms of human association through their own successful reproduction. A free society will not exist until non-coercive forms of human interaction out-compete and displace coercive forms: this cannot wait until a singular, all transformative moment of ruptural change but requires free experimentation and practical testing out of new methods of free association at every opportunity. Although they may not see what they’re doing in these terms, the work of many community activists, involved in projects such as community land trusts and consumer co-ops, is consistent with such a strategy.
Interstitial visions are commonly found in the work of “autonomist” thinkers linked to the alter-globalisation movement, such as John Holloway, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Holloway, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2001). The ideals and motivations behind such visions, however, go back at least as far as the Industrial Workers of the World, the syndicalist union established at the turn of the 20th century, which propagates a vision of socialism based upon principles of federalism, on free combination from below upward; and, indeed, to past experiments in new-world construction, such as the Italian autonomists, Paris Communards and English Diggers.
The third and final strategy emancipatory social movements may choose to pursue, according to Wright’s framework, is symbiotic metamorphosis. This involves extending and deepening institutional forms of popular social empowerment in a manner that is consistent with the interests of dominant classes and elites (305). Historically, the most important example is the “class compromise” embodied in the relatively stable post World War Two Keynsian settlement, which encompasses a welfare state and a system of collective bargaining between capital and labour. In modern capitalist countries it typically involves social democratic parties, such as the UK Labour party, with links to trade unions, working through the institutions of parliamentary democracy to create electoral coalitions across social classes that compete for political power.
In practice, of course, the visions of social movement activists are far less clear cut and there is a great deal of cross-over between them. The salient point to note is that nearly every strategy for social transformation will embody one, two or three of these methods and ideals to a greater or lesser extent.
Symbiotic Visions of Occupation
The first UCL occupation was, of course, part of a much wider eruption of student activism in response to huge cuts by the Conservative-Lib Dem government to higher education tied to a threefold increase in tuition fees, along with the abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance. The decision by UCL activists to take some form of direct action was taken at a lively meeting of around 150 students and education workers that followed the storming of the Conservative Party headquarters at Millbank. A small group of experienced activists was formed to make preparations and a rally was called in the UCL quad for November 24, the day of the first national “walk out” of university and school students called by the National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts, the Educational Activist Network and the London Student Assembly, protest groups on the radical wing of the student movement. Following the rally, a group of around 200 marched into the Jeremy Bentham Room, a large conference space near the main entrance to UCL used for receptions, corporate events and by student societies. An immediate meeting was called and a collective decision taken to occupy it as part of the campaign against tuition fees and cuts to higher education. Many of those present, including myself, had never participated in an occupation before with the various Climate Camp protests the only comparable experience. For the over-whelming majority, this was their first experience of any sustained political engagement, let alone direct action.
There was a paradoxical logic at work in this initial act of occupation. It reflected both a radical disenchantment with parliament and political parties and a residual hope that these could be influenced towards progressive ends by convincing a sufficient number of MPs to vote against the government’s measures. The higher education bill provided a focal point for opposition and defined the lifecycle of the occupations. At the same time, the occupation movement was seen by many as the vivid manifestation of an entire generation’s withdrawal from the political system. Activists at UCL initially navigated this tension by presenting the use of direct action tactics as a last resort following the failure of the ordinary political process. This made sense within the context of a popular discourse, played out repeatedly in the mainstream media, which emphasised the “betrayal” of Nick Clegg and the Lib Dems who had “sold out” students in abandoning their election pledge to abolish tuition fees in exchange for power. As the initial “statement” drawn up consensually by UCL occupiers, put it;
"We stand against fees and savage cuts to higher education and government attempts to force society to pay for a crisis it didn’t cause. Promises have been broken, the political process has failed and we have been left with no other option."
Implicit in this first statement is the idea that direct action tactics denote a state of exception, to be resorted to when political processes – which, we are to presume, ordinarily function in a satisfactory manner - have “failed”. The statement was accompanied by a list of “demands” addressed to UCL management. The occupation demanded that UCL
Issue a statement condemning all cuts to higher education and the rise in tuition fees.
Implement a complete open books policy with regards to existing budget constraints.
Ensure no redundancies for teaching, research or support staff.
Reverse its outsourcing policy by bringing staff back in-house
Implement the full living wage package for all cleaning, catering and security staff with no cuts to hours and jobs.
Ensure no victimisation or repercussions for anyone participating in the occupation.
Allow free access in and out of the occupation.
As Genevieve Dawson points out, regarding the Oxford occupation, unlike a regular protest, an occupation compels a “debate” with the university authorities (in Hancox, 2010, 110). A great deal of care was taken in writing these demands in the first few hours in the JBR to ensure they provided a clear and realisable set of goals with which to negotiate. A working group was set up oversee negotiations with management, and representatives chosen at group meetings to negotiate with the Vice Provost and Head of Security on the occupation’s behalf.
Demands are, by their nature, always demands to some higher authority, usually involving an appeal to that authority to alter the existing state of affairs within the terms of the dominant system. As the occupation progressed and activists’ political horizons - along with their understanding of what it means to reclaim and reconfigure a space – changed, the importance attached to the demands diminished. The second occupation was undertaken primarily as a means to secure an organising space and reinvigorate activism on campus ahead of the TUC demonstration on March 26th. It included almost the entire first set of demands within it, but they were accompanied by more utopian demands, that management would almost certainly never agree to, such as the thoroughgoing democratisation of all university structures. The third occupation, in solidarity with striking lecturers, barely discussed political demands.
Ruptural Visions of Occupation
The care taken over the demands and the importance afforded to them in the first occupation is consistent with a symbiotic strategy for social change in which collective bargaining with the authorities, in the hope of realising an outcome agreeable to both parties, plays a central role. The shift away from a focus on demands reflects the shift from a primarily symbiotic conception of occupation towards one which encompasses ruptural and interstitial visions. As the occupation progressed it became clear that management were unlikely to meet any of the demands and were in any case not negotiating in good faith since they were prepared to go back on verbal agreements when it suited them. A response on the UCL occupation blog, to the first meeting with management, notes “We are highly disappointed that many of our demands were received with evasion and dismissal” by an unrepresentative and unaccountable elite that lacked the “legitimacy” to speak for the whole university on this issue (29/11/2010).
The anger and frustration increasingly felt towards management was part of a growing disenchantment with authority more generally amongst student activists, reflecting a broader process of radicalization amongst those involved in occupation. Cass Sunstein has shown how groups of people in “deliberative enclaves” (shared spaces, on or offline), with some degree of commonality and shared political commitments, will tend towards polarization (2009). As individuals reinforce one another’s opinions, identities harden and opposition to existing social practices becomes more extreme and deeply entrenched (“extremism”, he acknowledges, can be a good thing). Without doubt, this process of polarization took place within the occupations. It is also the case that participation in direct action is, for many people, an empowering and transformative experience. Participants discover their own agency when they confront, negate and ignore the power structures that dominate day-to-day life. At UCL, many activists report entering occupation with a broadly social democratic set of political commitments and leaving with a far more radical anti-capitalist politics. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the ruptural vision of occupation assumed greater significance.
One way in which the antagonistic stance associated with ruptural visions surfaced was in debates over “disruption”. In all three UCL occupations, and the Anti-Cuts Space, tensions arose over the issue of the disturbance caused to university staff and students. These tensions reflect political disagreements over the importance attributed to the occupation as a symbolic protest and as an antagonistic form of direct action designed to interrupt the functioning of the university. During the first occupation, there were a number of heated meetings, over whether student societies should be allowed to make use of the occupied space when they needed it for band rehearsals and so on. The third occupation succeeded in shutting down an entire wing of the university, made up of several offices where dozens of administrative staff worked, for four days. Several activists raised objections to this, on the basis that it would disrupt various welfare functions of the university. For others, this was precisely the point since the occupation was originally conceived as a way to amplify the effects of the strike called by UCU, the lecturers’ union: students, unable to withdraw their labour in solidarity with striking workers, were making use of the most effective tactic at their disposal.
This rationale, it should be noted, is consistent with symbiotic visions of change, which do not disavow the role of struggle. But it was noticeable that a far more confrontational and antagonistic tone accompanied this occupation following the logic of ruptural visions. The BBC’s somewhat patronising observations concerning the non-antagonistic atmosphere of the first occupation - “they're quoting Harry Potter rather than Che Guevera..” – almost certainly wouldn’t have been made of the third occupation (BBC News website, 30 November 2010).
On Thursday 24 March, the second day of the UCU strike, activists simultaneously occupied the registry and blockaded the room in which the university council were scheduled to hold a meeting agreeing the tripling of tuition fees, resulting in the police being called. In turn, Management responded to this escalation by threatening to pursue 13 named individuals for the legal costs for securing a possession order and injunction through the courts. The spectre of crippling financial costs for these 13 individuals, along with the potential end to their university careers, prompted an immediate campaign to “Defend the UCL 13”, along with a rally in the quad, and in the end management were pressured into far less draconian internal disciplinary measures.
Along with the rising importance of antagonism, it is possible to trace the growing significance of the ruptural conception from the beginning of the first occupation in the increasing emphasis placed on the use of the space as a site to plan and co-ordinate direct actions and protests, linking up with groups such asUK Uncut who target businesses alleged to have avoided tax with sit-ins and protests. The occupations also acted as a space to document and co-ordinate responses to police violence and use of “kettling” against demonstrators. A group of IT undergraduates and a freelance software engineer who had met in the first occupation went on to develop Sukey, an “anti-kettling” text service and smart phone application designed to help protesters out-manoeuvre police by providing up-to-date crowd-sourced information on police movements. The use of the occupations as a space to contest and challenge the state apparatus reflects the ruptural vision at work.
Interstital Visions of Occupation
Whilst the function of an occupation, understood according to a symbiotic or ruptural strategic logic, was apparent to most participants from the beginning (albeit not articulated in these terms), the third function only began to be recognised as a distinctive form of political activity in and of itself as the occupation progressed. Nevertheless, from day one, the occupants of the JBR began to act in a manner consistent with a vision of political change premised on working outside existing structures so as to re-configure social relationships along more just and egalitarian lines.
From its inception, the occupation aspired to non-coercive, anti-authoritarian forms of organisation. Internal practices inherited from the alter-globalisation movement, which had in turn adapted them from the Zapatistas and other social justice movements from the global south, were disseminated by student activists who had learnt them from, among other places, the Climate Camp protests. According to these practices, decisions are taken in a decentralized, non-hierarchical form of “consensus” democracy. Alongside consensus, the use of loose “working groups” dealing with particular areas of practical concern, such as media, kitchen, security, legal, tech and outreach, reinforced the principles of autonomy and decentralisation.
This understanding of UCL occupation as a “microtopia” was perhaps best expressed by a final year undergraduate, Sarah, on the UCL blog:
“the UCL Occupation was a unique experience for all involved. It’s not just a good story but also a lesson for society. School kids should have the power to speak to or turn down journalists. Everyone, no matter their opinions or status should have a say. Being productive and educated should be something you do voluntarily and enjoy. Politics and ambitious ideologies should be normal topics of conversation. You should be able to argue with, trust, listen to and love everyone you meet." (UCL occupation blog, (31/12/2010)
As with the other conceptions of the role and function of an occupation this one was not without controversy. Whilst some activists no doubt took a purely instrumental view that consensus was a good way to make decisions and foster community in a small group, others were opposed to it entirely. At one point, several activists involved in Marxist-Leninist parties, proposed a move to decision-making by vote – a move that was rejected by the group.
Needless to say, the ideal of a free and open space with a democratic egalitarian ethos was imperfectly realised in practice. Inequalities of gender, class, and education, reasserted themselves in the occupation as with the tendency of more assertive middle class male activists to dominate discussion at meetings. Nevertheless, the anti-authoritarian aspirations of the occupation became an important part of the group’s ideological self-understanding.
The second way in which the occupation can be said to have followed an interstitial strategic logic is in hosting open educational talks and workshops. Initially, these were, again, almost certainly conceived primarily, if not exclusively, in instrumental terms as a way of providing stimulation and learning and encouraging people into the occupation. Yet, as with the practice of consensus, they came to be seen along increasingly prefigurative lines, as a concrete realisation of the more democratic forms of education activists would like to see and a rejection of the “hedonistic and utilitarian” conception of the “neoliberal student” pushed by New Labour and the Coalition (Owen Hatherley in Hancox, 2011; 119). There were talks from lecturers, trade unionists, activists, journalists and students themselves, as well as gigs, poetry readings and dramatic performances. In what seemed like a natural progression, many of those involved in the first UCL occupation later became involved with the Really Free School, a nomadic institution based out of various squatted buildings in central London that self-consciously situated itself within an anarchist tradition of creating autonomous and non-hierarchical educational establishments as part of a wider emancipatory project.
Judging by other accounts, UCL occupation was far from unique in using the space in this way. Indeed, as Lee Satter and Jilly Boyce Kay write this was a “bone of contention as the occupation went on” at the UWE occupation with “process”-focused activists prioritising its use as an “education camp”, and others more interested in “protest”. (REF). On the UCL blog, Jo Casserly wrote, “it is a common mistake of some anarchists to see the occupation of a space, a squat or a social centre as an end in itself rather than a tactic in a far wider struggle.” (29/12/2010)
Here, we see an expression of the traditional Marxist critique of interstitial strategies, that they involve retreat from political struggle to spaces “allowed” by capitalism and the state. This critique is convincing when it comes to certain exclusively interstitial visions – criticised by many anarchists as “lifestylism” – such as the hippy communes of the 1960s. However, if we adopt the more holistic understanding of an occupation as simultaneously a pre-figurative enactment of a group’s political ideals, and as an organising space for protest, the dichotomy of “process” and “protest” does not hold. The “procedural” forms of democratic practice inside the occupation cannot be divorced from its “substantive” political goals outside, but must instead be understood as an additional and complimentary pathway to social change. Occupation as both protest and process involves a simultaneous delegitimation of the neoliberal capitalist order, which prescribes the commodification of education and its restriction to a wealthy elite, and the legitimation of another world governed by alternative logics.
Conclusion
It is common for activists involved in social movements to become fixated on one strategy for political change, disparaging others as ineffective or even counter-productive. In occupations, which, by their nature, bring together activists from diverse backgrounds each with their own particular ideas concerning how their actions will effect change, the co-existence of such strategies will often translate to tensions and conflicts over day-to-day issues. The re-imagination of an occupied space as an autonomous community will, at times, conflict with its use as a revolutionary organising space or as a tool with which to exert leverage in negotiating for reforms from management. Such tensions can be seen as healthy and productive and are in any case inevitable when activists reject a reductive, one-dimensional account of the purpose of occupation. Successful social movements are those that combine a number of alternative strategies for political change and that is why inclusivity and pluralism are so important. The same can be said of occupations.
[1] I am grateful for comments and feedback on this article from fellow UCL students and occupiers, Sam Halvorsen and Jessica Riches.
Bibliography
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri, Empire, (Harvard University Press, 2001).
Hancox, Dan (ed), Fight back! A Reader on the Winter of Protest, (openDemocracy, 2011) .
Holloway, John, Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today, (Pluto, 2005).
Sunstein, Cass, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide, (Oxford, OUP 200).
Wright, Erik Olin, Envisioning Real Utopias, (London, Verso, 2010).
This essay was originally published in The Journal for Social Movement Studies.
Forced marriage in the UK: hidden from view
Sajda Mughal
Plans by the government to criminalise forced marriage in the UK will put women and girls at even greater risk of violence. Forced marriages can only be tackled from within and by the community, with sufficient resources to support this work, says Sajda Mughal
About the author
Sajda Mughal is a community and women’s rights activist. She leads the JAN Trust which educates, engages and empowers grass roots disadvantaged women and girls in the UK
“Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (2)
Forced marriage is a serious issue in the UK. The Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) received 1063 reports of possible forced marriages in the first six months of 2009 – an increase of 25% on the same period in 2008. The majority involved families of Pakistani background, with the rest originating from other parts of South Asia, Middle East, Europe & Africa. Nearly 40% of the cases dealt with by the FMU concerned people under the age of 18 and women and girls were the victims in 85% of the cases. And the numbers keep rising: in 2010 there were 1,735 potential forced marriages involving British citizens.
Recognising the need to address the issue of forced marriage, in 2007 the UK government passed the Forced Marriage Civil Protection Act “to make provision for protecting individuals from being forced to enter into marriage without their free and full consent and for protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage without such consent; and for connected purposes.” The FMU was established as a joint-initiative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office.
However, the current government treats forced marriages primarily as an immigration issue, which underestimates the true extent of the issue. This approach does not tackle the fact that forced marriages are happening in the UK but remain a hidden problem. According to a report published by the Home Office Communications Directorate “with a small number of exceptions, none of the relevant service providers keep detailed figures on the number of cases of forced marriage they deal with”, which directly undermines genuine attempts to establish methods of successful intervention.
There are various challenges in combating forced marriages. Misconceptions about forced and arranged marriages prevail in the UK, and it is crucial to stress that an arranged marriage is one where both parties consent to the union, whilst a forced marriage is one where one or both parties are under physical or psychological pressure to enter the marriage. Various religious misconceptions about forced marriage need to be challenged, because contrary to popular belief, no religion endorses this practice. In Islam there are Hadith’s (practices) that condemn forced marriages and highlight that the consent, in particular a woman’s consent, must be sought.
Forced marriage is still a taboo subject in Asian and Muslim communities, one which few are willing to discuss outside their cultural environment, and one that must be challenged in order to deal with the many cases of forced marriage that stay hidden. In our experience the FMU figures do not reveal the extent of the problem. In the last three years, JAN Trust has consulted with nearly 1,000 Muslim and Pakistani women and 85% of them said that a forced marriage had occurred in their family (or they knew of individuals who had been in a forced marriage) and that the individuals involved were unhappy. Over 90% felt that a project was needed which specifically targeted the Asian and Pakistani communities. As one woman told us," forced marriages are not discussed in the Pakistani community. It is sad because they lead to bigger problems and ruin people’s lives. Something must be done…our community needs educating”.
The way forward has to be a participatory grassroots approach, because the current top-down government intervention is often perceived as a threat to the cultural heritage of minority groups. “It is the community who needs to tackle this issue. If the Government does it, it feels as though fingers are being pointed at us”. In our experience it is crucial to empower the mothers by educating them about forced marriage, because they are best placed to stop it from occurring. As one mother said,“If JAN Trust didn’t show me that forcing my daughter to marry someone was wrong then I dread to think what would have happened. I could have lost her for good, and no mother wants that.” Furthermore, combating forced marriages will also prevent other types of violent and serious crime, because research has shown that forced marriage is linked to domestic and sexual violence, as well as to people trafficking and prostitution.
We have worked for more than twenty years supporting black, Asian, minority ethnic, immigrant and refugee women to overcome the barriers to inclusion that they face in the UK. We have found that 97% of those seeking help and advice about forced marriages were Asians, and over 90% of them were from the Pakistani community in London and Slough. In response to these findings the Mujboor (Urdu for forced/desperation) project was first rolled out in April 2011 in order to eradicate the misconceptions of forced marriages and raise awareness of the issue in the Asian and Muslim communities. Taking an entirely new approach to this taboo issue, Mujboor works by running workshops and collaborating with faith leaders to reinforce the message that these inhumane acts are condemned in religion. As quoted from the Qur'an “O you who have believed, it is not lawful for you to inherit women by compulsion...” (4:19). Furthermore, a Hadith states that “Once a virgin girl came to the Prophet (PBUH) and said that her father had married her to a man against her wishes. The Prophet gave her the right to repudiate the marriage” (Abu Dawud). To enforce this message we invite respected Imams to our workshops on forced marriage where they educate the community on the issue from a religious perspective, and answer questions from the audience.
Many of our staff are women from similar ethnic minority backgrounds and can relate to the experiences of the women who come to us for help. Establishing trust with ethnic minority communities, and in particular with the Pakistani community, has been key. There has been some success in raising awareness of this taboo issue, eradicating misconceptions, and directing women to mainstream agencies such as the FCO Forced Marriage Unit. The Mujboor project will now be expanded across London, running workshops and providing a confidential first contact point for victims. This community based approach has raised the credibility of the project, as opposed to governmental approaches which fall short because their top-down approach often alienates communities and fails to take some cultural sensitivities into consideration.
However, despite the above, we have unfortunately faced a few barriers, especially from male members of the Pakistani community, when raising the taboo subject of inhumane forced marriages. Barriers include the denial of the issue even existing, and opposition to any involvement in the campaign. These attitudes manifest themselves in misinformed statements such as “I have never come across anyone who is in a forced marriage” or “Forced marriages do not happen in the Pakistani community”. We did not let this faze us, and eventually we overcame these barriers by discussing the issue with them, the nature and number of cases that we and the FCO forced marriage unit have dealt with, as well as making them aware of statistics which provide evidence that the Pakistani community has the highest rate of forced marriages in the UK.
We are committed to continue challenging these damaging attitudes by educating the community about the reality and the extent of forced marriages. What is apparent from our own experience and expertise, is that forced marriages can only be tackled from within, and by, the community. The government needs to invest resources into supporting this awareness raising and prevention work. In early 2011, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee published a report on forced marriages, in which it urged the government to criminalise the act of forced marriage. “We believe that it would send out a very clear and positive message to communities within the UK and internationally if it becomes a criminal act to force—or to participate in forcing—an individual to enter into marriage against their will. ... We urge the Government to take an early opportunity to legislate on this matter.” Following this, David Cameron has recently announced that he wants to see forced marriages made a criminal offence in its own right.
We are deeply concerned about these developments, because we fear that this will put victims at even greater risk of physical and emotional violence and honour crimes if they decide to seek help. As forced marriages continue to be a very sensitive taboo issue in Asian and Muslim communities, coming forward and speaking out about this injustice is perceived as ‘washing one’s dirty linen in public’, bringing shame to the family and community. If speaking out will result in criminal prosecution, this threat to perceived ‘Izzath’ - ‘family honour’ - will be greatly increased, and victims will be under even greater pressure from their family and community to remain silent, as well as at a severe risk of retaliation acts if they do seek help. Additionally, in our experience, some victims do want future reconciliation with family members, and in particular their parents. In this situation, criminalisation may discourage victims from speaking out about the abuse they are suffering.
The British government provides insufficient funding for programmes dealing with forced marriages that are able to support victims appropriately, and it is these programmes that will be on the frontline of addressing the increasing danger to victims that can be expected as a result of any legislation criminalising forced marriages.
We, like many others, want to see a society where people, in particular women, have the confidence and right to say NO.
Plans by the government to criminalise forced marriage in the UK will put women and girls at even greater risk of violence. Forced marriages can only be tackled from within and by the community, with sufficient resources to support this work, says Sajda Mughal
About the author
Sajda Mughal is a community and women’s rights activist. She leads the JAN Trust which educates, engages and empowers grass roots disadvantaged women and girls in the UK
“Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (2)
Forced marriage is a serious issue in the UK. The Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) received 1063 reports of possible forced marriages in the first six months of 2009 – an increase of 25% on the same period in 2008. The majority involved families of Pakistani background, with the rest originating from other parts of South Asia, Middle East, Europe & Africa. Nearly 40% of the cases dealt with by the FMU concerned people under the age of 18 and women and girls were the victims in 85% of the cases. And the numbers keep rising: in 2010 there were 1,735 potential forced marriages involving British citizens.
Recognising the need to address the issue of forced marriage, in 2007 the UK government passed the Forced Marriage Civil Protection Act “to make provision for protecting individuals from being forced to enter into marriage without their free and full consent and for protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage without such consent; and for connected purposes.” The FMU was established as a joint-initiative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office.
However, the current government treats forced marriages primarily as an immigration issue, which underestimates the true extent of the issue. This approach does not tackle the fact that forced marriages are happening in the UK but remain a hidden problem. According to a report published by the Home Office Communications Directorate “with a small number of exceptions, none of the relevant service providers keep detailed figures on the number of cases of forced marriage they deal with”, which directly undermines genuine attempts to establish methods of successful intervention.
There are various challenges in combating forced marriages. Misconceptions about forced and arranged marriages prevail in the UK, and it is crucial to stress that an arranged marriage is one where both parties consent to the union, whilst a forced marriage is one where one or both parties are under physical or psychological pressure to enter the marriage. Various religious misconceptions about forced marriage need to be challenged, because contrary to popular belief, no religion endorses this practice. In Islam there are Hadith’s (practices) that condemn forced marriages and highlight that the consent, in particular a woman’s consent, must be sought.
Forced marriage is still a taboo subject in Asian and Muslim communities, one which few are willing to discuss outside their cultural environment, and one that must be challenged in order to deal with the many cases of forced marriage that stay hidden. In our experience the FMU figures do not reveal the extent of the problem. In the last three years, JAN Trust has consulted with nearly 1,000 Muslim and Pakistani women and 85% of them said that a forced marriage had occurred in their family (or they knew of individuals who had been in a forced marriage) and that the individuals involved were unhappy. Over 90% felt that a project was needed which specifically targeted the Asian and Pakistani communities. As one woman told us," forced marriages are not discussed in the Pakistani community. It is sad because they lead to bigger problems and ruin people’s lives. Something must be done…our community needs educating”.
The way forward has to be a participatory grassroots approach, because the current top-down government intervention is often perceived as a threat to the cultural heritage of minority groups. “It is the community who needs to tackle this issue. If the Government does it, it feels as though fingers are being pointed at us”. In our experience it is crucial to empower the mothers by educating them about forced marriage, because they are best placed to stop it from occurring. As one mother said,“If JAN Trust didn’t show me that forcing my daughter to marry someone was wrong then I dread to think what would have happened. I could have lost her for good, and no mother wants that.” Furthermore, combating forced marriages will also prevent other types of violent and serious crime, because research has shown that forced marriage is linked to domestic and sexual violence, as well as to people trafficking and prostitution.
We have worked for more than twenty years supporting black, Asian, minority ethnic, immigrant and refugee women to overcome the barriers to inclusion that they face in the UK. We have found that 97% of those seeking help and advice about forced marriages were Asians, and over 90% of them were from the Pakistani community in London and Slough. In response to these findings the Mujboor (Urdu for forced/desperation) project was first rolled out in April 2011 in order to eradicate the misconceptions of forced marriages and raise awareness of the issue in the Asian and Muslim communities. Taking an entirely new approach to this taboo issue, Mujboor works by running workshops and collaborating with faith leaders to reinforce the message that these inhumane acts are condemned in religion. As quoted from the Qur'an “O you who have believed, it is not lawful for you to inherit women by compulsion...” (4:19). Furthermore, a Hadith states that “Once a virgin girl came to the Prophet (PBUH) and said that her father had married her to a man against her wishes. The Prophet gave her the right to repudiate the marriage” (Abu Dawud). To enforce this message we invite respected Imams to our workshops on forced marriage where they educate the community on the issue from a religious perspective, and answer questions from the audience.
Many of our staff are women from similar ethnic minority backgrounds and can relate to the experiences of the women who come to us for help. Establishing trust with ethnic minority communities, and in particular with the Pakistani community, has been key. There has been some success in raising awareness of this taboo issue, eradicating misconceptions, and directing women to mainstream agencies such as the FCO Forced Marriage Unit. The Mujboor project will now be expanded across London, running workshops and providing a confidential first contact point for victims. This community based approach has raised the credibility of the project, as opposed to governmental approaches which fall short because their top-down approach often alienates communities and fails to take some cultural sensitivities into consideration.
However, despite the above, we have unfortunately faced a few barriers, especially from male members of the Pakistani community, when raising the taboo subject of inhumane forced marriages. Barriers include the denial of the issue even existing, and opposition to any involvement in the campaign. These attitudes manifest themselves in misinformed statements such as “I have never come across anyone who is in a forced marriage” or “Forced marriages do not happen in the Pakistani community”. We did not let this faze us, and eventually we overcame these barriers by discussing the issue with them, the nature and number of cases that we and the FCO forced marriage unit have dealt with, as well as making them aware of statistics which provide evidence that the Pakistani community has the highest rate of forced marriages in the UK.
We are committed to continue challenging these damaging attitudes by educating the community about the reality and the extent of forced marriages. What is apparent from our own experience and expertise, is that forced marriages can only be tackled from within, and by, the community. The government needs to invest resources into supporting this awareness raising and prevention work. In early 2011, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee published a report on forced marriages, in which it urged the government to criminalise the act of forced marriage. “We believe that it would send out a very clear and positive message to communities within the UK and internationally if it becomes a criminal act to force—or to participate in forcing—an individual to enter into marriage against their will. ... We urge the Government to take an early opportunity to legislate on this matter.” Following this, David Cameron has recently announced that he wants to see forced marriages made a criminal offence in its own right.
We are deeply concerned about these developments, because we fear that this will put victims at even greater risk of physical and emotional violence and honour crimes if they decide to seek help. As forced marriages continue to be a very sensitive taboo issue in Asian and Muslim communities, coming forward and speaking out about this injustice is perceived as ‘washing one’s dirty linen in public’, bringing shame to the family and community. If speaking out will result in criminal prosecution, this threat to perceived ‘Izzath’ - ‘family honour’ - will be greatly increased, and victims will be under even greater pressure from their family and community to remain silent, as well as at a severe risk of retaliation acts if they do seek help. Additionally, in our experience, some victims do want future reconciliation with family members, and in particular their parents. In this situation, criminalisation may discourage victims from speaking out about the abuse they are suffering.
The British government provides insufficient funding for programmes dealing with forced marriages that are able to support victims appropriately, and it is these programmes that will be on the frontline of addressing the increasing danger to victims that can be expected as a result of any legislation criminalising forced marriages.
We, like many others, want to see a society where people, in particular women, have the confidence and right to say NO.
ANAMBARA: MY TAKE ON PETER OBI +OJUKWU BURIAL + MISSION SCHOOLS
"Emenike Nwankwo, PhD"
REPORT: "In the area of healthcare, we used to give them (missions) support and suggestions. Later, we abandoned them and the institutions collapsed. For example, Iyienu Hospital produced the first and best mid-wife in Nigeria. By the time we came into power, that school was closed down and then you wonder why such a good school was closed down. This was a school which trained our professional nurses, which should be a premier iconic institution; yet it was closed down. Iyienu trained most of our medical doctors. That was where, they did their House jobs. As I speak to you, the place is no more functional. Before we built state and national Hospitals, these hospitals served our own people. So, we are now going back. As at last week, we paid non-academic staff N3 billion and we are giving all these back to the Churches that ran these institutions. Today, we have commenced subvention to the federal schools, we are spending N6 billion in that regard. We gave over N1 billion to different schools of nursing, including Iyienu, as well as Lourdes, Ihiala. Is the Church still what it used to be, to manage moral upbringing? Yes, of course, at least, they are far better than we are (laughs) but we challenge them."
People,
A leader is one who leads. If you are aleader, you stay on top of issues and work hard to influence directions of thinking that affect the people you lead. The above comment by Peter Obi is why I say many of them who lead only when in governmen are more looters than leaders. A leader first begins with showing interest and concern for his people and the institutions that affect them.,Read the above and you see where to place Peter Obi in the scheme of things - one who did not care while not in power. He did not know why a school was closed that he knew was a successful school in his community. Democracy is not just about winning election, but about being part of the political process of knowing what happens and why. Why such places get closes is that people who could raise concerns like Peter Obi look elsewhere when not in power because it did not affect them - after all he was already rich and should not be bothered with institutions that cater to the interests of the poor. What business does he have fighting to keep such schools open when not in goverment and is too rich to be hospitalized in Nigeria?
Government to his likes not in office is just an avenue to get richer, so when you are not in government, you do not concern with government thinking. It is sad that one who became a governor of a state, did not know why the state became educationally baren and why hospitals or medical facilities like the one that train nurses closed. Had he campaign like is done in most other democracies, he would have done his homework. Had he understood what democracy was about which is service to people, he would have known why the facilities was closed as he would have wondered why at the announcement that it was to be closed not just after he took office.. This is why Igboland continue to be in dilapidation, people take power for their own best interest who did not have prior concern for community and the people they plan to govern - they just want power to control federal allocation and steal as much as they could.
On the issue of Ojukwu burial, no amount of burial is befitting enough unless they issues that Ojukwu cared about were addressed and related problems remedied. Any money spent on his burial that did not help address dilapidation in Igboland is a waste. People who want to honor Ojukwu should be asked to do so in civilized manner - give to the poor or contribute towards the construction and establishment of a befitting medical facility that can serve all Igbo and humanity. Wasting money of beer, cows, and expensive grave site does not honer ojukwu. Wasting money to be at the burial does not honor Ojukwu. People should be asked to stay were they are as there will be no room for the crowd, rather they should contribute their transport fare to the funeral to an Ojukwu memorial funds towards building the same kinds of hospitals they took him to in London at home in Igboland. That is how to give him a befitting exit. Buffoonish is parties and celebrations of waste would not add value to humanity like Ojukwu would have asked for.
Even when government does not run those hospitals like PEter Obi explained,. government helped set the rules and climate that made it possible for them to be funded and supported by people. Hospitals like schools are in most cases public good facilities that are monitored and operated under government legislation. When rich people die in England or other civilized countries they do not waste money in useless befitting unending burials. They will their assets to public good institutions that help keep them functional and progressive. When rich people die in Nigeria, they waste money in burial that they now call celebration of life. We love or show love to our people only after they died. The world is watching Peter Obi to see what leadership will come out of Ojukwu's death and whether all Igboland will get from it is a befitting burial that means nothing one week later, or whether he will invest in substantial efforts to immortalize him with a befitting medical facility for all Igbo in his home town. We are watching!!
HEN
"Competition is a by-product of productive work, not its goal. A creative man is motivated by the desire to achieve, not by the desire to beat others". - Ayn Rand
"When the comes come to become, you will know the physicality of man" ... Political Jugernaut, Kingsley O. Mbadiwe (K.O.)
ONLY A FOOL IS AT HIS BEST........... Collin Powel (USA)
REPORT: "In the area of healthcare, we used to give them (missions) support and suggestions. Later, we abandoned them and the institutions collapsed. For example, Iyienu Hospital produced the first and best mid-wife in Nigeria. By the time we came into power, that school was closed down and then you wonder why such a good school was closed down. This was a school which trained our professional nurses, which should be a premier iconic institution; yet it was closed down. Iyienu trained most of our medical doctors. That was where, they did their House jobs. As I speak to you, the place is no more functional. Before we built state and national Hospitals, these hospitals served our own people. So, we are now going back. As at last week, we paid non-academic staff N3 billion and we are giving all these back to the Churches that ran these institutions. Today, we have commenced subvention to the federal schools, we are spending N6 billion in that regard. We gave over N1 billion to different schools of nursing, including Iyienu, as well as Lourdes, Ihiala. Is the Church still what it used to be, to manage moral upbringing? Yes, of course, at least, they are far better than we are (laughs) but we challenge them."
People,
A leader is one who leads. If you are aleader, you stay on top of issues and work hard to influence directions of thinking that affect the people you lead. The above comment by Peter Obi is why I say many of them who lead only when in governmen are more looters than leaders. A leader first begins with showing interest and concern for his people and the institutions that affect them.,Read the above and you see where to place Peter Obi in the scheme of things - one who did not care while not in power. He did not know why a school was closed that he knew was a successful school in his community. Democracy is not just about winning election, but about being part of the political process of knowing what happens and why. Why such places get closes is that people who could raise concerns like Peter Obi look elsewhere when not in power because it did not affect them - after all he was already rich and should not be bothered with institutions that cater to the interests of the poor. What business does he have fighting to keep such schools open when not in goverment and is too rich to be hospitalized in Nigeria?
Government to his likes not in office is just an avenue to get richer, so when you are not in government, you do not concern with government thinking. It is sad that one who became a governor of a state, did not know why the state became educationally baren and why hospitals or medical facilities like the one that train nurses closed. Had he campaign like is done in most other democracies, he would have done his homework. Had he understood what democracy was about which is service to people, he would have known why the facilities was closed as he would have wondered why at the announcement that it was to be closed not just after he took office.. This is why Igboland continue to be in dilapidation, people take power for their own best interest who did not have prior concern for community and the people they plan to govern - they just want power to control federal allocation and steal as much as they could.
On the issue of Ojukwu burial, no amount of burial is befitting enough unless they issues that Ojukwu cared about were addressed and related problems remedied. Any money spent on his burial that did not help address dilapidation in Igboland is a waste. People who want to honor Ojukwu should be asked to do so in civilized manner - give to the poor or contribute towards the construction and establishment of a befitting medical facility that can serve all Igbo and humanity. Wasting money of beer, cows, and expensive grave site does not honer ojukwu. Wasting money to be at the burial does not honor Ojukwu. People should be asked to stay were they are as there will be no room for the crowd, rather they should contribute their transport fare to the funeral to an Ojukwu memorial funds towards building the same kinds of hospitals they took him to in London at home in Igboland. That is how to give him a befitting exit. Buffoonish is parties and celebrations of waste would not add value to humanity like Ojukwu would have asked for.
Even when government does not run those hospitals like PEter Obi explained,. government helped set the rules and climate that made it possible for them to be funded and supported by people. Hospitals like schools are in most cases public good facilities that are monitored and operated under government legislation. When rich people die in England or other civilized countries they do not waste money in useless befitting unending burials. They will their assets to public good institutions that help keep them functional and progressive. When rich people die in Nigeria, they waste money in burial that they now call celebration of life. We love or show love to our people only after they died. The world is watching Peter Obi to see what leadership will come out of Ojukwu's death and whether all Igboland will get from it is a befitting burial that means nothing one week later, or whether he will invest in substantial efforts to immortalize him with a befitting medical facility for all Igbo in his home town. We are watching!!
HEN
"Competition is a by-product of productive work, not its goal. A creative man is motivated by the desire to achieve, not by the desire to beat others". - Ayn Rand
"When the comes come to become, you will know the physicality of man" ... Political Jugernaut, Kingsley O. Mbadiwe (K.O.)
ONLY A FOOL IS AT HIS BEST........... Collin Powel (USA)
THE MAKING OF ABURI ACCORD
Official record of the minutes of the meeting of Nigeria's military leaders held at Aburi, Ghana on January 4 & 5, 1967.
DURO ADESEKO
Those present were:
• Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon
• Colonel Robert Adebayo
• Lt.-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu
• Lt.-Col. David Ejoor
• Lt.-Col. Hassan Katsina
• Commodore J.E.A. Wey
• Major Mobolaji Johnson
• Alhaji Kam Selem
• Mr. T. Omo-Bare
Secretaries:
• Mr. S.I.A. Akenzua, Permanent Under-Secretary, Federal Cabinet Office
• Mr. P.T. Odumosu, Secretary to the Military Government, West
• Mr. N.U. Akpan, Secretary to the Military Government, East
• Mr. D.P. Lawani, Under Secretary, Military Governor’s Office, Mid-West
• Alhaji Ali Akilu, Secretary to the Military Government, North
Opening
The Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt.-General J.A. Ankrah, declaring the meeting open, welcomed the visitors to Ghana and expressed delight that Ghana had been agreed upon by the Nigerian Military leaders as the venue for this crucial meeting. He considered the whole matter to be the domestic affair of Nigeria, and as such, he refrained from dwelling on any specific points.
The General, however, expressed the belief that the Nigerian problems were not such that cannot be easily resolved through patience, understanding and mutual respect. Throughout history, he said, there has been no failure of military statesmen and the eyes of the whole world were on the Nigerian Army. He advised that soldiers are purely statesmen and not politicians and the Nigerian military leaders owe it as a responsibility to the 56 million people of Nigeria to successfully carry through their task of nation building. Concluding, the General urged the Nigerian leaders to bury their differences, forget the past and discuss their matter frankly but patiently.
Lt.-Col. Gowon invited the Nigerian leaders to say a joint thank you to their host, and all said thank you in unison in response to Lt.-General Ankrah’s address.
At this point the General vacated the conference table.
Importation of arms and resolution renouncing the use of force
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu spoke next. He said that the agenda was acceptable to him subject to the comments he had made on some of the items. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu said that no useful purpose would be served by using the meeting as a cover for arms build-up and accused the Federal Military Government of having engaged in large scale arms deals by sending Major Apolo to negotiate for arms abroad. He alleged that the Federal Military Government recently paid £1 million for some arms bought from Italy and now stored up in Kaduna.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu was reminded by the Military Governor, North and other members that the East was indulging in an arms build-up and that the plane carrying arms, which recently crashed on the Cameroons border, was destined for Enugu. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu denied both allegations. Concluding his remarks on arms build-up, Lt.-Col. Ojukwu proposed that if the meeting was to make any progress, all the members must, at the outset, adopt a resolution to renounce the use of force in the settlement of Nigerian dispute.
Lt.-Col. Gowon explained that as a former Chief of Staff, Army, he was aware of the deficiency in the country’s arms and ammunition, which needed replacement. Since the Defence Industries Corporation could not produce these, the only choice was to order from overseas and order was accordingly placed to the tune of £3/4 million. He said to the best of his knowledge, the actual amount that had been paid out was only £80, 000. As to why these arms were sent up to the North, Lt.-Col. Gowon referred to lack of storage facilities in Lagos and reminded his military colleagues of the number of times arms and ammunition had been dumped in the sea. This was why, he said, it became necessary to use the better storage facilities in Kaduna. The arms and ammunition had not been distributed because they arrived only two weeks previously and have not yet been taken on charge.
After exhaustive discussion to which all members contributed and during which Lt.-Col. Ejoor pointed out that it would be necessary to determine what arms and ammunitions had arrived and what each unit of the Army had before any further distribution would take place, the Supreme Military Council unanimously adopted a declaration proposed by Lt.-Col. Ojukwu, that all members:
• renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis;
• reaffirm their faith in discussions and negotiation as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis; and
• agree to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, and to share out such arms equitably to the various commands;
• agree that there should be no more importation of arms and ammunition until normalcy was restored.
The full text of the declaration was signed by all members:
The Supreme Military Council, having acknowledged the fact that the series of disturbances since January 15, 1966, have caused disunity in the Army resulting in lack of discipline and loss of public confidence, turned their attention to the question of how best the Army should be re-organised in order to restore that discipline and confidence. There was a lengthy discussion of the subject and when the arguments became involved members retired into secret session. On their return, they announced that agreement had been reached by them on the re-organisation, administration and control of the Army on the following lines:
• Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.
• Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
• Creation of area commands corresponding to existing regions and under the charge of area commanders.
• Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council. • During the period of the military government, military governors will have control over area commands for internal security.
• Creation of a Lagos Garrison, including Ikeja Barracks.
In connection with the re-organisation of the army, the Council discussed the distribution of military personnel with particular reference to the present recruitment drive. The view was held that general recruitment throughout the country in the present situation would cause great imbalance in the distribution of soldiers. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, the Council agreed to set up a military committee, on which each region will be represented, to prepare statistics, which will show:
• Present strength of Nigerian Army;
• Deficiency in each sector of each unit;
• The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;
• Additional requirements for the country and each Area Command. The committee is to meet and report to Council within two weeks from the date of receipt of instructions.
The Council agreed that pending completion of the exercise in paragraph 7 further recruitment of soldiers should cease.
In respect of item 3 (b) of the Agenda, implementation of the agreement reached on August 9, 1966, it was agreed, after a lengthy discussion, that it was necessary for the agreement reached on August 9 by the delegates of the Regional Governments to be fully implemented. In particular, it was accepted in principle that army personnel of Northern origin should return to the North from the West. It was, therefore, felt that a crash programme of recruitment and training, the details of which would be further examined after the Committee to look into the strength and distribution of army personnel had reported, would be necessary to constitute indigenous army personnel in the West to a majority there quickly.
Non-recognition by the East of Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander
10. The question of the non-recognition by the East of Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government was also exhaustively discussed. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu based his objection on the fact, inter alia, that no one can properly assume the position of Supreme Commander until the whereabouts of the former Supreme Commander, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, was known. He, therefore, asked that the country be informed of the whereabouts of the Major-General and added that in his view, it was impossible, in the present circumstances, for any one person to assume any effective central command of the Nigerian Army. Lt.-Col. Ejoor enunciated four principles to guide the meeting in formulating an answer to the question of who should be Supreme Commander.
There were the:
a. Problem of effective leadership;
b. Crisis of confidence in the Army;
c. Disruption in the present chain of command;
d. Inability of any soldier to serve effectively in any unit anywhere in the country.
Lt.-Col. Gowon replied that he was quite prepared to make an announcement on the matter and regretted that a formal announcement had been delayed for so long but the delay was originally intended to allow time for tempers to cool down. He reminded his colleagues that they already had the information in confidence. After further discussion and following the insistence by Lt.-Col Ojukwu that Lt.-Col Gowon should inform members of what happened to the former Supreme Commander, members retired into secret session and subsequently returned to continue with the meeting after having reached an agreement among themselves.
11. At this point the meeting adjourned until Thursday, January 5, 1967.
The Power of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the regional governments.
12. When the meeting resumed on the January 5, it proceeded to consider the form of government best suited to Nigeria, in view of what the country has experienced in the past year (1966). Members agreed that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to military governors for their comment and concurrence. Specifically, the Council agreed that appointments to senior ranks in the Police, Diplomatic and Consular Services as well as appointments to super-scale posts in the Federal Civil Service and the equivalent posts in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council. The regional members felt that all the decrees or provisions of decrees passed since January 15, 1966, and which detracted from the previous powers and positions of regional governments should be repealed if mutual confidence is to be restored. After this issue had been discussed at some length, the Council took the following decisions:
The Council decided that:
i. on the reorganization of the army:
a. Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.
b. Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
c. Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.
d. Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.
e. During the period of the Military Government, military governors will have control over area commands for internal security.
f. Creation of a Lagos Garrison, including Ikeja Barracks.
ii. on appointment to certain posts: The following appointments must be approved by Supreme Military Council:
a. Diplomatic and Consular posts.
b. Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.
c. Super-scale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts.
iii. on the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decision affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible, such a matter must be referred to military governors for
comment and concurrence.
iv. that all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on January 14 and list out all the decrees and provisions of decrees concerned, so that they may be repealed not later than January 21 if possible;
v. that for at least the next six months, there should be purely a military government, having nothing to do whatever with politicians.
Soldiers involved in disturbances on January 15, 1966 and thereafter
13. Members expressed views about the future of those who have been detained in connection with all the disturbances since January 15, 1966, and agreed that the fate of soldiers in detention should be determined not later than end of January 1967.
Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference
14. The Council next considered the question of the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee and the acceptance of that Committee’s recommendations of September 1966. After some exchange of views, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume sitting as soon as practicable to begin from where they left off, and that the question of accepting the unanimous recommendations of September 1966 be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.
The problems of displaced persons
15. The Council considered exhaustively the problems of displaced persons, with particular reference to their rehabilitation, employment and property. The view was expressed and generally accepted that the Federal Government ought to take the lead in establishing a National Body, which will be responsible for raising and making appeal for funds. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu made the point, which was accepted by Lt.-Col. Katsina, that in the present situation, the intermingling of easterners and northerners was not feasible. After each military governor had discussed these problems as they affected his area, the Council agreed:
a. On rehabilitation, that Finance Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each region should send three representatives to the meeting.
b. On employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until March 31, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the military governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons. Lt.-Col. Ejoor disclosed that the employment situation in his region was so acute that he had no alternative but to ask none Mid-Westerners working the private sector in his region to quit and make room for Mid-Westerners repatriated from elsewhere.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu stated that he fully appreciated the problem faced by both the Military Governor, West, and the Military Governor, Mid-West, in this matter and that if in the last resort, either of them had to send the easterners concerned back to the East, he would understand, much as the action would further complicate the resettlement problem in the East. He assured the Council that his order that non-easterners should leave the Eastern Region would be kept under constant review with a view to its being lifted as soon as practicable.
16. On the question of future meeting of the Supreme Military Council, members agreed that future meetings will be held in Nigeria at a venue to be mutually agreed.
17. On the question of government information media, the Council agreed that all government information media should be restrained from making inflammatory statements and causing embarrassment to various governments in the federation.
18. There were other matters not on the agenda, which were also considered among which were the form of government for Nigeria (reported in paragraph 12 above) and the disruption of the country’s economy by the lack of movement of rail and road transport which the regional governors agreed to look into.
19. The meeting began and ended in a most cordial atmosphere and members unanimously issued a second and final Communiqué.
20. In his closing remarks, the Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council expressed his pleasure at the successful outcome of the meeting and commended the decisions taken to the Nigerian leaders for their implementation. Lt.-Col. Gowon on behalf of this colleagues thanked the Ghanaian leader for the excellent part he had played in helping to resolve the issues. The successful outcome of the meeting was then toasted with champagne and the Nigerians took leave of the Ghanaians.
21. The proceedings of the meeting were reported verbatim for each regional government and the Federal Government by their respective official reporters and tape-recorded versions were distributed to each government.
The Sun News
DURO ADESEKO
Those present were:
• Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon
• Colonel Robert Adebayo
• Lt.-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu
• Lt.-Col. David Ejoor
• Lt.-Col. Hassan Katsina
• Commodore J.E.A. Wey
• Major Mobolaji Johnson
• Alhaji Kam Selem
• Mr. T. Omo-Bare
Secretaries:
• Mr. S.I.A. Akenzua, Permanent Under-Secretary, Federal Cabinet Office
• Mr. P.T. Odumosu, Secretary to the Military Government, West
• Mr. N.U. Akpan, Secretary to the Military Government, East
• Mr. D.P. Lawani, Under Secretary, Military Governor’s Office, Mid-West
• Alhaji Ali Akilu, Secretary to the Military Government, North
Opening
The Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt.-General J.A. Ankrah, declaring the meeting open, welcomed the visitors to Ghana and expressed delight that Ghana had been agreed upon by the Nigerian Military leaders as the venue for this crucial meeting. He considered the whole matter to be the domestic affair of Nigeria, and as such, he refrained from dwelling on any specific points.
The General, however, expressed the belief that the Nigerian problems were not such that cannot be easily resolved through patience, understanding and mutual respect. Throughout history, he said, there has been no failure of military statesmen and the eyes of the whole world were on the Nigerian Army. He advised that soldiers are purely statesmen and not politicians and the Nigerian military leaders owe it as a responsibility to the 56 million people of Nigeria to successfully carry through their task of nation building. Concluding, the General urged the Nigerian leaders to bury their differences, forget the past and discuss their matter frankly but patiently.
Lt.-Col. Gowon invited the Nigerian leaders to say a joint thank you to their host, and all said thank you in unison in response to Lt.-General Ankrah’s address.
At this point the General vacated the conference table.
Importation of arms and resolution renouncing the use of force
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu spoke next. He said that the agenda was acceptable to him subject to the comments he had made on some of the items. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu said that no useful purpose would be served by using the meeting as a cover for arms build-up and accused the Federal Military Government of having engaged in large scale arms deals by sending Major Apolo to negotiate for arms abroad. He alleged that the Federal Military Government recently paid £1 million for some arms bought from Italy and now stored up in Kaduna.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu was reminded by the Military Governor, North and other members that the East was indulging in an arms build-up and that the plane carrying arms, which recently crashed on the Cameroons border, was destined for Enugu. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu denied both allegations. Concluding his remarks on arms build-up, Lt.-Col. Ojukwu proposed that if the meeting was to make any progress, all the members must, at the outset, adopt a resolution to renounce the use of force in the settlement of Nigerian dispute.
Lt.-Col. Gowon explained that as a former Chief of Staff, Army, he was aware of the deficiency in the country’s arms and ammunition, which needed replacement. Since the Defence Industries Corporation could not produce these, the only choice was to order from overseas and order was accordingly placed to the tune of £3/4 million. He said to the best of his knowledge, the actual amount that had been paid out was only £80, 000. As to why these arms were sent up to the North, Lt.-Col. Gowon referred to lack of storage facilities in Lagos and reminded his military colleagues of the number of times arms and ammunition had been dumped in the sea. This was why, he said, it became necessary to use the better storage facilities in Kaduna. The arms and ammunition had not been distributed because they arrived only two weeks previously and have not yet been taken on charge.
After exhaustive discussion to which all members contributed and during which Lt.-Col. Ejoor pointed out that it would be necessary to determine what arms and ammunitions had arrived and what each unit of the Army had before any further distribution would take place, the Supreme Military Council unanimously adopted a declaration proposed by Lt.-Col. Ojukwu, that all members:
• renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis;
• reaffirm their faith in discussions and negotiation as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis; and
• agree to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, and to share out such arms equitably to the various commands;
• agree that there should be no more importation of arms and ammunition until normalcy was restored.
The full text of the declaration was signed by all members:
The Supreme Military Council, having acknowledged the fact that the series of disturbances since January 15, 1966, have caused disunity in the Army resulting in lack of discipline and loss of public confidence, turned their attention to the question of how best the Army should be re-organised in order to restore that discipline and confidence. There was a lengthy discussion of the subject and when the arguments became involved members retired into secret session. On their return, they announced that agreement had been reached by them on the re-organisation, administration and control of the Army on the following lines:
• Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.
• Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
• Creation of area commands corresponding to existing regions and under the charge of area commanders.
• Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council. • During the period of the military government, military governors will have control over area commands for internal security.
• Creation of a Lagos Garrison, including Ikeja Barracks.
In connection with the re-organisation of the army, the Council discussed the distribution of military personnel with particular reference to the present recruitment drive. The view was held that general recruitment throughout the country in the present situation would cause great imbalance in the distribution of soldiers. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, the Council agreed to set up a military committee, on which each region will be represented, to prepare statistics, which will show:
• Present strength of Nigerian Army;
• Deficiency in each sector of each unit;
• The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;
• Additional requirements for the country and each Area Command. The committee is to meet and report to Council within two weeks from the date of receipt of instructions.
The Council agreed that pending completion of the exercise in paragraph 7 further recruitment of soldiers should cease.
In respect of item 3 (b) of the Agenda, implementation of the agreement reached on August 9, 1966, it was agreed, after a lengthy discussion, that it was necessary for the agreement reached on August 9 by the delegates of the Regional Governments to be fully implemented. In particular, it was accepted in principle that army personnel of Northern origin should return to the North from the West. It was, therefore, felt that a crash programme of recruitment and training, the details of which would be further examined after the Committee to look into the strength and distribution of army personnel had reported, would be necessary to constitute indigenous army personnel in the West to a majority there quickly.
Non-recognition by the East of Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander
10. The question of the non-recognition by the East of Lt.-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government was also exhaustively discussed. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu based his objection on the fact, inter alia, that no one can properly assume the position of Supreme Commander until the whereabouts of the former Supreme Commander, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, was known. He, therefore, asked that the country be informed of the whereabouts of the Major-General and added that in his view, it was impossible, in the present circumstances, for any one person to assume any effective central command of the Nigerian Army. Lt.-Col. Ejoor enunciated four principles to guide the meeting in formulating an answer to the question of who should be Supreme Commander.
There were the:
a. Problem of effective leadership;
b. Crisis of confidence in the Army;
c. Disruption in the present chain of command;
d. Inability of any soldier to serve effectively in any unit anywhere in the country.
Lt.-Col. Gowon replied that he was quite prepared to make an announcement on the matter and regretted that a formal announcement had been delayed for so long but the delay was originally intended to allow time for tempers to cool down. He reminded his colleagues that they already had the information in confidence. After further discussion and following the insistence by Lt.-Col Ojukwu that Lt.-Col Gowon should inform members of what happened to the former Supreme Commander, members retired into secret session and subsequently returned to continue with the meeting after having reached an agreement among themselves.
11. At this point the meeting adjourned until Thursday, January 5, 1967.
The Power of the Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the regional governments.
12. When the meeting resumed on the January 5, it proceeded to consider the form of government best suited to Nigeria, in view of what the country has experienced in the past year (1966). Members agreed that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to military governors for their comment and concurrence. Specifically, the Council agreed that appointments to senior ranks in the Police, Diplomatic and Consular Services as well as appointments to super-scale posts in the Federal Civil Service and the equivalent posts in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council. The regional members felt that all the decrees or provisions of decrees passed since January 15, 1966, and which detracted from the previous powers and positions of regional governments should be repealed if mutual confidence is to be restored. After this issue had been discussed at some length, the Council took the following decisions:
The Council decided that:
i. on the reorganization of the army:
a. Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.
b. Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
c. Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.
d. Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.
e. During the period of the Military Government, military governors will have control over area commands for internal security.
f. Creation of a Lagos Garrison, including Ikeja Barracks.
ii. on appointment to certain posts: The following appointments must be approved by Supreme Military Council:
a. Diplomatic and Consular posts.
b. Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.
c. Super-scale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts.
iii. on the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decision affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible, such a matter must be referred to military governors for
comment and concurrence.
iv. that all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on January 14 and list out all the decrees and provisions of decrees concerned, so that they may be repealed not later than January 21 if possible;
v. that for at least the next six months, there should be purely a military government, having nothing to do whatever with politicians.
Soldiers involved in disturbances on January 15, 1966 and thereafter
13. Members expressed views about the future of those who have been detained in connection with all the disturbances since January 15, 1966, and agreed that the fate of soldiers in detention should be determined not later than end of January 1967.
Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference
14. The Council next considered the question of the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee and the acceptance of that Committee’s recommendations of September 1966. After some exchange of views, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume sitting as soon as practicable to begin from where they left off, and that the question of accepting the unanimous recommendations of September 1966 be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.
The problems of displaced persons
15. The Council considered exhaustively the problems of displaced persons, with particular reference to their rehabilitation, employment and property. The view was expressed and generally accepted that the Federal Government ought to take the lead in establishing a National Body, which will be responsible for raising and making appeal for funds. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu made the point, which was accepted by Lt.-Col. Katsina, that in the present situation, the intermingling of easterners and northerners was not feasible. After each military governor had discussed these problems as they affected his area, the Council agreed:
a. On rehabilitation, that Finance Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each region should send three representatives to the meeting.
b. On employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until March 31, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the military governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons. Lt.-Col. Ejoor disclosed that the employment situation in his region was so acute that he had no alternative but to ask none Mid-Westerners working the private sector in his region to quit and make room for Mid-Westerners repatriated from elsewhere.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu stated that he fully appreciated the problem faced by both the Military Governor, West, and the Military Governor, Mid-West, in this matter and that if in the last resort, either of them had to send the easterners concerned back to the East, he would understand, much as the action would further complicate the resettlement problem in the East. He assured the Council that his order that non-easterners should leave the Eastern Region would be kept under constant review with a view to its being lifted as soon as practicable.
16. On the question of future meeting of the Supreme Military Council, members agreed that future meetings will be held in Nigeria at a venue to be mutually agreed.
17. On the question of government information media, the Council agreed that all government information media should be restrained from making inflammatory statements and causing embarrassment to various governments in the federation.
18. There were other matters not on the agenda, which were also considered among which were the form of government for Nigeria (reported in paragraph 12 above) and the disruption of the country’s economy by the lack of movement of rail and road transport which the regional governors agreed to look into.
19. The meeting began and ended in a most cordial atmosphere and members unanimously issued a second and final Communiqué.
20. In his closing remarks, the Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council expressed his pleasure at the successful outcome of the meeting and commended the decisions taken to the Nigerian leaders for their implementation. Lt.-Col. Gowon on behalf of this colleagues thanked the Ghanaian leader for the excellent part he had played in helping to resolve the issues. The successful outcome of the meeting was then toasted with champagne and the Nigerians took leave of the Ghanaians.
21. The proceedings of the meeting were reported verbatim for each regional government and the Federal Government by their respective official reporters and tape-recorded versions were distributed to each government.
The Sun News
Religion, gender and migration: beyond 'obedience vs agency’
Chloé Lewis
It is time that debates surrounding religion and migration in the UK move beyond the almost monolithic focus on Islam, recognising the multiple and fluid ways in which religion shapes, and is in turned shaped by, experiences of migration, says Chloé Lewis
‘Religion’, ‘gender’, and ‘migration’: three terms which taken together tend to evoke assumptions of fundamentalism, oppression, and an overall threat to ‘British identity’. A mere glance over ‘mainstream’ media reports in the UK and those of our continental counterparts confirm such presuppositions, succinctly symbolised by ‘the veiled Muslim woman’. Religious affiliations, especially in relation to ‘migrant’ communities, have in recent years been accorded increasing importance politically, socially, and culturally within the UK and the west more broadly. In this regard, it is important to recognise the influence of the current political and geopolitical context, which has led to particular attention being paid to Islam within host societies. Against this backdrop, the multiple and fluid ways in which religion shapes and is in turned shaped by experiences of migration are too often overlooked.
It is time that debates surrounding religion and migration move beyond the almost monolithic focus on Islam, recognising the diversity across as well as within faith-based communities as opposed to a singular understanding of a particular religious community. A symposium on ‘Gender, Migration & Religion’ recently convened by Middlesex University provided a cross-comparative analysis of the experiences of diverse faith-based migrant communities – Jewish, Muslim, Jainist, Hindu and Christian – in an array of contexts. This was a rare opportunity to consider these three themes together, providing a powerful reminder of the multi-faceted nature of religious faiths on a community and individual level, while highlighting the complex and contradictory ways in which religion and religiosity intersect and interact with a wide array of identity markers. A key theme that emerged from the conference was that religion is a possible source of agency, and even ‘empowerment’ – a notion which sits somewhat uncomfortably with most secular western feminist discourses – but also represents a possible source of exclusion for both female and male migrants in the UK.
Islam in the UK has been dubbed by politicians and the media as a ‘mark of separation’, with the burqa, arranged marriages, and so-called honour-killings at the forefront of such perceptions. It wouldn’t be outlandish to state that public debates surrounding ‘Muslim women’ view and portray this group as homogenous ‘passive victims’ of a particularly austere and male-centred manifestation of patriarchy, in ways, which simply put, ‘western’ women are not. Unsurprisingly, a recent YouGov poll found that 69% of those surveyed ‘believe that Islam encourages the repression of women’. Moreover, the failure to engage the voices of Muslim women in such debates has, paradoxically, reinforced their perceived repression. However, research by the Social Policy Research Centre at Middlesex University in partnership with the London Borough of Barnet into the ‘concerns, experiences and aspirations’ of women, more specifically mothers, who identify as ‘Muslim’ in different ways and to differing degrees, stressed the need to recognise the diversity of experiences within Muslim communities, which are influenced by a number of factors, including ethnic and/or national background, socio-economic standing, and length of time since arrival in the UK. As one of the research participants said: ‘Look, Somalis and Afghanis, the needs are so similar. We have all come here so recently, we are refugees. The Asians came here before us, they are well-established. They have businesses, while our people are still on benefits… the Muslims are not only one community, there is a lot of diversity.’
Nevertheless, this study was able to discern some commonalities in relation to the role(s) played by Islam for these women. For instance, Islam was found to provide useful resource in developing parenting strategies in a UK context. Religion was seen to provide a source of moral authority in attempts to mitigate against fears that “children may be led astray by negative influences” such as gangs, street crime, drugs, and for girls, teenage pregnancy. These concerns were perceived by some to be a common reality for all mothers “whether or not you are Muslim”. Interestingly, the notion of ‘normalcy’ was echoed by a number of the participants, and was, in a subsequent article, interpreted by one of the authors of the report to represent a mechanism by which Muslim women attempt to resist the collective stigmatisation of Islam. The second key role of Islam in parenting was in the provision of religious knowledge and values of “real Islam” to their children, as distinct from the stereotypes promoted in some ‘traditional’ Islamic as well as ‘British’ discourses. This included the confinement of Muslim women to the ‘home’, which according to a number of the participants reflects a misinterpretation of the Quran and a denial of Islamic history in which “women were always active as teachers, scholars, and business women”.
The emphasis ascribed to female employment by the women in the study may, in part, be attributable to changing financial needs of migrant women and families following their move to Britain. As noted in the study in relation to Iranian women: “women who did not work in Iran, were forced by economic circumstances to take up paid employment after they moved to Britain”. For women who had recently arrived in the country, language – rather than religious or cultural – barriers were seen by many to be a greater obstacle to engaging with the local and wider community. The insights into these women’s perspectives fundamentally challenge stereotypes of ‘Muslim women’, who are often depicted as a monolithic and invariably subordinated group by virtue of their religion.
Similarly, research on Nigerian Pentecostalism in the UK highlights the complexities surrounding expectations of 'female submission' among its followers in London. In 2009 a report by the ippr stated that the rise of Pentecostalism in the UK was ‘perhaps the most significant change in the UK demographic of faith’, citing migration from Africa as a substantial contributing factor. The same year, this particular branch of Pentecostalism had approximately 150 parishes in London alone, demonstrating the reach within Nigerian communities living in Britain. A study presented at the symposium uncovered Nigerian women’s conscious ability to acquire agency within this religious framework. According to the author, Katrin Maier, it is through acts of ‘submission’ in the home, such as taking care of the children and doing the housework, thereby conforming to ‘Biblical requirements’, that these Nigerian women can simultaneously adopt leadership roles within, for instance, the church. This was exemplified by the experiences of a female pastor, who was seen to be both obedient (to her husband) and powerful (in the church) at the same time. This research further confirmed a need to go beyond the conventional binary often promoted in (secular) western feminism of ‘obedience versus agency’.
In contrast, research presented on burgeoning “Neo-Hinduism” practiced by some Hindu Tamil women, demonstrated a much clearer ‘break’ from Sri Lankan Hindu ‘tradition’ within elements of the diaspora. Ann David gave us a rare glimpse/insight into the changing nature of religious practices in a converted house “on the corner of a suburban road behind the main high street in East Ham”. In this “unusual” site of Hindu worship, “female devotees no longer remain simply participants, but are becoming transformed into religious specialists and leaders of ritual”. This strongly contradicts “traditional and current practice in mainstream Hindu temples” in India, Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, where male priests offer the “only access to divine power for the women”. Though David cautions that women’s place in Hindu traditions is complex and “clearly cannot be viewed through a lens of Western feminist standpoints that search for women’s equality and rights”, she nevertheless spoke of the “sense of freedom and empowerment in their women’s involvement in ritual practices” as a “dominating theme” in conversations and interviews during her field research. These changes may represent “gender empowerment, but also the particular changing priorities of Hindus in diasporic contexts”. Religion in this context of migration is seen to play an “emancipatory function” for women.
This fits comfortably within the broader understandings of ‘gender and (forced) migration’, which often stress the inversions or reconstitutions of gender roles and relations resulting from migratory experience(s). David proposes that ‘living on the boundaries in a diasporic milieu brings unsought and unforeseen changes which can provoke a need for continuity as well as the desire for innovation’. This suggests that the experiences of this community of Tamil Hindu women – as with most migrant communities – can in many ways be thought of as Janus-faced, at once looking ‘back’ to and maintaining a transnational link with Sri Lanka while looking ‘forward’ to life in the current location. While the development of this “new religious movement” is not representative of all Tamil Hindu women living in the UK, its presence in East Ham contributes to ongoing processes of Tamil transnational ‘place-making’ in the area. This serves to construct and promote a (perceived) collective Tamil identity within the British host population, which in turn draws many Tamil migrants and asylum seekers towards this London Borough.
Although religion can, and does, play ‘positive’ roles within migrant communities in UK, it is also important to recognise the exclusionary dimensions of faith-based community formation(s), often imperceptible to host communities and with detrimental implications for individuals on the margins. This, according to Nick Gill, is aptly exemplified by the Polish Catholic communities in England and Wales. The Polish Catholic Mission (PCM) has been a key pillar of the Polish diaspora since the post-war period, intent on ‘upholding the Polish language, and Polish Catholic values and traditions’ by providing youth groups, charity events, Saturday schools and cultural events aside from its religious functions. The PCM is, as a result, seen by the host community to be a central meeting point for Poles, and the quickest way to systematically communicate with the community, especially, it is assumed, ‘if they’ve just come over from Poland’. Thus, local public service providers, such as the Police, employment agencies, or administrative city agencies, target churches for information distribution on health and safety, local schools, and job opportunities. What this fails to realise, however, is the changing composition/face of the PCM in recent years to the extent that the church is no longer representative of the Polish community in the UK. There has been a marked decrease in levels of church attendance, particularly among the younger post-2004 migrant Poles who have found alternative meeting places, including cafés, restaurants and even libraries. The evident consequence of what Gill calls the “inertia of host organisations in adapting to changing migrant conditions” is that non-church going Poles “often miss out on the information and opportunities” provided through the church. This takes us back to the need to recognise the diversity within religious communities. It also adds further support to the idea that the role of religion is fluid, particularly within migrant communities who are constantly changing and (re)adapting in relation to both their country/community of origin, as well as their ‘new’ or current location.
Overall, the presentations given at this symposium made me question a number of my own assumptions concerning women and religion. I say ‘women’ here because the ‘gender’ dimension of the symposium focused almost exclusively on female experiences of religiosity. This reflects a common tendency in both academic and non-academic settings of equating ‘gender’ with ‘women’, which serves to reinforce the idea that men and boys are somehow gender-neutral beings. It would also have been interesting to engage with issues surrounding sexuality, which are often closely linked to ‘gender’. However, the symposium did impart – at least for me – a clear awareness that assumptions made as a (‘western’ feminist) observer can be misleading. Indeed, the point that resonated almost unanimously through the works presented was a need to go beyond simplified binaries of ‘obedience versus agency’ and ‘submission versus freedom’. Though I am wary of advocating for an absolute doctrine of cultural relativism, perhaps we should be more open to a sense of religio-cultural relativity and to the diverse ways in migrant individuals and communities relate to and engage with religion in UK contexts and elsewhere.
It is time that debates surrounding religion and migration in the UK move beyond the almost monolithic focus on Islam, recognising the multiple and fluid ways in which religion shapes, and is in turned shaped by, experiences of migration, says Chloé Lewis
‘Religion’, ‘gender’, and ‘migration’: three terms which taken together tend to evoke assumptions of fundamentalism, oppression, and an overall threat to ‘British identity’. A mere glance over ‘mainstream’ media reports in the UK and those of our continental counterparts confirm such presuppositions, succinctly symbolised by ‘the veiled Muslim woman’. Religious affiliations, especially in relation to ‘migrant’ communities, have in recent years been accorded increasing importance politically, socially, and culturally within the UK and the west more broadly. In this regard, it is important to recognise the influence of the current political and geopolitical context, which has led to particular attention being paid to Islam within host societies. Against this backdrop, the multiple and fluid ways in which religion shapes and is in turned shaped by experiences of migration are too often overlooked.
It is time that debates surrounding religion and migration move beyond the almost monolithic focus on Islam, recognising the diversity across as well as within faith-based communities as opposed to a singular understanding of a particular religious community. A symposium on ‘Gender, Migration & Religion’ recently convened by Middlesex University provided a cross-comparative analysis of the experiences of diverse faith-based migrant communities – Jewish, Muslim, Jainist, Hindu and Christian – in an array of contexts. This was a rare opportunity to consider these three themes together, providing a powerful reminder of the multi-faceted nature of religious faiths on a community and individual level, while highlighting the complex and contradictory ways in which religion and religiosity intersect and interact with a wide array of identity markers. A key theme that emerged from the conference was that religion is a possible source of agency, and even ‘empowerment’ – a notion which sits somewhat uncomfortably with most secular western feminist discourses – but also represents a possible source of exclusion for both female and male migrants in the UK.
Islam in the UK has been dubbed by politicians and the media as a ‘mark of separation’, with the burqa, arranged marriages, and so-called honour-killings at the forefront of such perceptions. It wouldn’t be outlandish to state that public debates surrounding ‘Muslim women’ view and portray this group as homogenous ‘passive victims’ of a particularly austere and male-centred manifestation of patriarchy, in ways, which simply put, ‘western’ women are not. Unsurprisingly, a recent YouGov poll found that 69% of those surveyed ‘believe that Islam encourages the repression of women’. Moreover, the failure to engage the voices of Muslim women in such debates has, paradoxically, reinforced their perceived repression. However, research by the Social Policy Research Centre at Middlesex University in partnership with the London Borough of Barnet into the ‘concerns, experiences and aspirations’ of women, more specifically mothers, who identify as ‘Muslim’ in different ways and to differing degrees, stressed the need to recognise the diversity of experiences within Muslim communities, which are influenced by a number of factors, including ethnic and/or national background, socio-economic standing, and length of time since arrival in the UK. As one of the research participants said: ‘Look, Somalis and Afghanis, the needs are so similar. We have all come here so recently, we are refugees. The Asians came here before us, they are well-established. They have businesses, while our people are still on benefits… the Muslims are not only one community, there is a lot of diversity.’
Nevertheless, this study was able to discern some commonalities in relation to the role(s) played by Islam for these women. For instance, Islam was found to provide useful resource in developing parenting strategies in a UK context. Religion was seen to provide a source of moral authority in attempts to mitigate against fears that “children may be led astray by negative influences” such as gangs, street crime, drugs, and for girls, teenage pregnancy. These concerns were perceived by some to be a common reality for all mothers “whether or not you are Muslim”. Interestingly, the notion of ‘normalcy’ was echoed by a number of the participants, and was, in a subsequent article, interpreted by one of the authors of the report to represent a mechanism by which Muslim women attempt to resist the collective stigmatisation of Islam. The second key role of Islam in parenting was in the provision of religious knowledge and values of “real Islam” to their children, as distinct from the stereotypes promoted in some ‘traditional’ Islamic as well as ‘British’ discourses. This included the confinement of Muslim women to the ‘home’, which according to a number of the participants reflects a misinterpretation of the Quran and a denial of Islamic history in which “women were always active as teachers, scholars, and business women”.
The emphasis ascribed to female employment by the women in the study may, in part, be attributable to changing financial needs of migrant women and families following their move to Britain. As noted in the study in relation to Iranian women: “women who did not work in Iran, were forced by economic circumstances to take up paid employment after they moved to Britain”. For women who had recently arrived in the country, language – rather than religious or cultural – barriers were seen by many to be a greater obstacle to engaging with the local and wider community. The insights into these women’s perspectives fundamentally challenge stereotypes of ‘Muslim women’, who are often depicted as a monolithic and invariably subordinated group by virtue of their religion.
Similarly, research on Nigerian Pentecostalism in the UK highlights the complexities surrounding expectations of 'female submission' among its followers in London. In 2009 a report by the ippr stated that the rise of Pentecostalism in the UK was ‘perhaps the most significant change in the UK demographic of faith’, citing migration from Africa as a substantial contributing factor. The same year, this particular branch of Pentecostalism had approximately 150 parishes in London alone, demonstrating the reach within Nigerian communities living in Britain. A study presented at the symposium uncovered Nigerian women’s conscious ability to acquire agency within this religious framework. According to the author, Katrin Maier, it is through acts of ‘submission’ in the home, such as taking care of the children and doing the housework, thereby conforming to ‘Biblical requirements’, that these Nigerian women can simultaneously adopt leadership roles within, for instance, the church. This was exemplified by the experiences of a female pastor, who was seen to be both obedient (to her husband) and powerful (in the church) at the same time. This research further confirmed a need to go beyond the conventional binary often promoted in (secular) western feminism of ‘obedience versus agency’.
In contrast, research presented on burgeoning “Neo-Hinduism” practiced by some Hindu Tamil women, demonstrated a much clearer ‘break’ from Sri Lankan Hindu ‘tradition’ within elements of the diaspora. Ann David gave us a rare glimpse/insight into the changing nature of religious practices in a converted house “on the corner of a suburban road behind the main high street in East Ham”. In this “unusual” site of Hindu worship, “female devotees no longer remain simply participants, but are becoming transformed into religious specialists and leaders of ritual”. This strongly contradicts “traditional and current practice in mainstream Hindu temples” in India, Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, where male priests offer the “only access to divine power for the women”. Though David cautions that women’s place in Hindu traditions is complex and “clearly cannot be viewed through a lens of Western feminist standpoints that search for women’s equality and rights”, she nevertheless spoke of the “sense of freedom and empowerment in their women’s involvement in ritual practices” as a “dominating theme” in conversations and interviews during her field research. These changes may represent “gender empowerment, but also the particular changing priorities of Hindus in diasporic contexts”. Religion in this context of migration is seen to play an “emancipatory function” for women.
This fits comfortably within the broader understandings of ‘gender and (forced) migration’, which often stress the inversions or reconstitutions of gender roles and relations resulting from migratory experience(s). David proposes that ‘living on the boundaries in a diasporic milieu brings unsought and unforeseen changes which can provoke a need for continuity as well as the desire for innovation’. This suggests that the experiences of this community of Tamil Hindu women – as with most migrant communities – can in many ways be thought of as Janus-faced, at once looking ‘back’ to and maintaining a transnational link with Sri Lanka while looking ‘forward’ to life in the current location. While the development of this “new religious movement” is not representative of all Tamil Hindu women living in the UK, its presence in East Ham contributes to ongoing processes of Tamil transnational ‘place-making’ in the area. This serves to construct and promote a (perceived) collective Tamil identity within the British host population, which in turn draws many Tamil migrants and asylum seekers towards this London Borough.
Although religion can, and does, play ‘positive’ roles within migrant communities in UK, it is also important to recognise the exclusionary dimensions of faith-based community formation(s), often imperceptible to host communities and with detrimental implications for individuals on the margins. This, according to Nick Gill, is aptly exemplified by the Polish Catholic communities in England and Wales. The Polish Catholic Mission (PCM) has been a key pillar of the Polish diaspora since the post-war period, intent on ‘upholding the Polish language, and Polish Catholic values and traditions’ by providing youth groups, charity events, Saturday schools and cultural events aside from its religious functions. The PCM is, as a result, seen by the host community to be a central meeting point for Poles, and the quickest way to systematically communicate with the community, especially, it is assumed, ‘if they’ve just come over from Poland’. Thus, local public service providers, such as the Police, employment agencies, or administrative city agencies, target churches for information distribution on health and safety, local schools, and job opportunities. What this fails to realise, however, is the changing composition/face of the PCM in recent years to the extent that the church is no longer representative of the Polish community in the UK. There has been a marked decrease in levels of church attendance, particularly among the younger post-2004 migrant Poles who have found alternative meeting places, including cafés, restaurants and even libraries. The evident consequence of what Gill calls the “inertia of host organisations in adapting to changing migrant conditions” is that non-church going Poles “often miss out on the information and opportunities” provided through the church. This takes us back to the need to recognise the diversity within religious communities. It also adds further support to the idea that the role of religion is fluid, particularly within migrant communities who are constantly changing and (re)adapting in relation to both their country/community of origin, as well as their ‘new’ or current location.
Overall, the presentations given at this symposium made me question a number of my own assumptions concerning women and religion. I say ‘women’ here because the ‘gender’ dimension of the symposium focused almost exclusively on female experiences of religiosity. This reflects a common tendency in both academic and non-academic settings of equating ‘gender’ with ‘women’, which serves to reinforce the idea that men and boys are somehow gender-neutral beings. It would also have been interesting to engage with issues surrounding sexuality, which are often closely linked to ‘gender’. However, the symposium did impart – at least for me – a clear awareness that assumptions made as a (‘western’ feminist) observer can be misleading. Indeed, the point that resonated almost unanimously through the works presented was a need to go beyond simplified binaries of ‘obedience versus agency’ and ‘submission versus freedom’. Though I am wary of advocating for an absolute doctrine of cultural relativism, perhaps we should be more open to a sense of religio-cultural relativity and to the diverse ways in migrant individuals and communities relate to and engage with religion in UK contexts and elsewhere.
Saturday, December 3, 2011
N.I.M.C Boss paid last respect to Mama Labor
Church members, friends, family members and relatives at the church service.
Umuada also came to pay their last respect.
Mama Labour's first son and daughter near the casket paying their last respect.
The prestigious egwu aguba came too to pay last respect to one of their own, mama labour was a well respected member of the group.
The Ikpoho ogbe, ndi-Ogbeogo,i.e women married to Ogbeogo men, performing too, Mama labor was one of them. They too came to pay respect to one of their own because they know her worth and sound sense of judgement at issues, especially her fearless disposition.
Okwulagwe Ezeafadia performing the Ikwulu-Ozu rites, the last rite of honor for their sweet sister, the youth group performs this rite for their own, these youth are the last to see the departed one.
Barr. Chris Onyemenam, his wife-Akudika Ogene, flanked by friends led the walk to the Onyemenam country home at Ezeafadia Kings Street, for the internment of Mama Labor
Mama Labor on her way back to her father's house at Ezeafadia Kings Street, Ajaji Quarters, Asaba.
Thanks Friends For Your visit at this time of grieving, Barr. Chris Onyemenam shares with his friends.
Mama Labor steps into the Obiaso ancestral home.
Finally, Mama Labor arrives at his father's compound
Grave Side Prayers and blessing of the grave, the presiding ministers are flanked both sides by family members.
Ikechukwu, Mama labor's first son performing the dust to dust ritual for his sweet mother.
Barr. Chris Onyemenam with words on marble performed his dust to dust rites too.
After the internment, Barr. Chris led other family members to meet Diokpa Ezeafadia, akpakpalani ogbe, Ogbueshi George Onyemenam to brief the Diokpa how the event was conducted.
Barr. Chris receiving some vital words of advice, wise counsels and patriarchal blessings form the Diokpa Ogbe, akpakpalani Ezeafadi, Ogbueshi George Onyemenam.
Barr. Chris Onyemenam pose for Asaba Post News-Wire with his ever charming and beautiful Akudika Ogene, dalunu so, unu akwa ka nwanne anyi bu Sister Ngozi, Ani Ahaba ga edu unu shi ne.
Thanks for giving us at Asaba Post this opportunity to mourn with you and rights to publish same.
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