Secret
American diplomatic dispatches, spread over 21,000 pages, provide previously
unknown information about the Nigerian Civil War
Early
in the morning of 1 July 1967, Nigeria’s young head of state, Colonel Yakubu
Gowon, was feeling uneasy in his office at the Supreme Headquarters, Dodan
Barracks in Lagos. The unease was a result of his being ceaselessly pressured
to authorize a military invasion of the breakaway Republic of Biafra.
Thirty
officers had been recalled from courses abroad. Trains and truck convoys,
bearing fuel, supplies and men, were still leaving Kano and Kaduna for the
south of River Benue.
Colonel
Mohammed Shuwa of the First Area Command had moved his command headquarters
southwards and set it up in Makurdi. The 2nd Battalion was already
headquartered in Adikpo. Schools and private homes had been commandeered for
the use of Major Sule Apollo and his 4th Battalion in Oturkpo. They were
itching for action. The same day, Major B.M. Usman “a member of the intimate
northern group around Gowon” told the American defense attaché: “I do not know
what in hell he is waiting for; the boys are all ready to go. They are only
waiting on his word.”
Members
of the Supreme Military Council, who had been meeting twice daily, were waiting
for his word. The whole nation was waiting. Biafra, which was on high alert,
was also waiting.
On
27 June 1967, Cyprian Ekwensi, famous writer and Biafra’s Director of
Information Service, through the Voice of Biafra (formerly Enugu Radio), urged
Biafrans to be prepared for an invasion on June 29 since “Northerners have
often struck on 29th day of the month.” He was alluding to the day northern
officers, led by Major T.Y. Danjuma, seized Gowon’s predecessor, Major- General
Aguiyi-Ironsi, and killed him in a forest outside Ibadan.
Gowon,
then 31, had been running the affairs of 57million Nigerians for 10 months. It
had not been easy. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, his 58-year old trusted deputy and
adviser, was with Okoi Arikpo and Philip Asiodu, permanent secretaries of the
ministries of External Affairs and Trade and Industries respectively.
They
were preparing to put the noose on the neck of the Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell-BP,
which had frozen royalty payments due to the Federation Account on 1 June 1967
and had offered to pay the Biafran government £250,000.
Lieutenant
Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafran leader, had ordered all oil companies to start
paying all royalties to Enugu because they were operating in a new country or
risk heavy penalties.
Specifically,
he demanded a minimum of £2million from Shell-BP. The Federal Government had
imposed an economic blockade on Biafra. It entailed barring all merchant
vessels and sea tankers from sailing to and from Koko, Warri, Sapele, Escravos,
Bonny, Port Harcourt, Calabar ports, which Ojukwu had declared part and parcel
of Biafra.
Biafra
controlled the land on which the oil installations sat; the Nigerian government
controlled the coastal entrance and exit to those lands. Shell-BP was confused
as to whose order should be obeyed. Sir David Hunt, the British High
Commissioner to Nigeria, told his American counterpart after the meeting with
the Nigerian delegation: “Awolowo is very firmly in control of Ministry of
Finance and he is giving Stanley Gray, Shell’s General Manager and other
experts from London a very difficult time for the past three days.” They
persuaded Awolowo to accept a deal that would favour the Nigerian government
and, at the same time, would predispose oil workers and the £150million
investment to danger in the hands of Biafran military forces. Awolowo refused,
arguing that anything short of the status quo was recognition of Biafra and
concession to the rebels. As for security of investments and personnel, he
argued that once royalties were paid, the Nigerian government would have the
capacity to fund whatever action it would take on the rebels and Shell-BP’s
investments would be safe.
Gowon
paced to the large outdated map of the country by the door to his office. When
he asked Awolowo to come and join his government, Awolowo said he would accept
only if Gowon did something about the dominance of North over the rest of the
nation. A month before, Gowon had broken up the North into six states, but the
map by the door still showed the old Nigeria, with an imposing North at the
top. He ran his finger around the boundaries of Biafra and asked himself: “How
can I authorize an invasion of my own people?” He knew what it meant to be
resented. He was not the most senior officer in the army. He was not a Muslim
Hausa or Fulani from Kano, Kaduna or Sokoto. He was a Christian from one of the
small minorities that dot the North and yet, events had promoted him to the
position of the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief–to the chagrin of many
northern officers, politicians, and emirs.
He
knew the Igbo were resented in the North for succeeding where indigenes had
failed. His Igbo lover, Edith Ike, told him her life was threatened twice in
Lagos since she returned from the North in March.
According
to the secret US document of 1 July 1967, Edith’s parents, having lived in the
North for 30 years, where she too was born, had fled back to the East in
October 1966 because of that year’s massacre of the Igbo. Not 30,000 but around
7,000 were killed, according to the American documents. Donald Patterson of the
Political Section and Tom Smith of the Economic Section travelled from the US
Embassy in Lagos to the North after the pogrom. “The Sabon-Garis were ghost
towns, deserted, with the detritus of people, who had fled rapidly, left
behind. Most Northerners we talked to had no apologies for what had happened to
the Ibos, for the pogrom that had killed so many. There were exceptions, but in
general, there was no remorse and the feeling was one of good riddance.
“One
day, our Hausa gardener attacked and tried to beat up our Ibo cook. We fired
the gardener, but not long afterwards, the cook left for the East,” said
Patterson.
Earlier
that week, Gowon called the West German Ambassador in Lagos. The Germans were
eager to be in the good graces of the Gowon administration. A war loomed. And
in wars, buildings, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure are destroyed.
These would need rebuilding. The contract for the 2nd Mainland Bridge (later
called Eko Bridge) was signed two years earlier by the Ambassador, CEO of
Julius Berger Tiefbau AG and Shehu Shagari, Federal Commissioner for Works and
Survey. That was Julius Berger’s first contract in Nigeria. It was due for
completion in less than two years and they wanted more bilateral cooperation.
The ambassador assured Gowon over the phone that he had taken care of all the
details and guaranteed the safety of Edith, the nation’s “First Girlfriend”.
On
the evening of 30 June, just before her departure on a commercial airline,
Edith told the American Defense Attaché Standish Brooks, and his wife, Gail,
that she actually wanted to go to the UK or USA, but Jack, as she
affectionately called Gowon, insisted that she could be exposed to danger in
either of the two countries. Germany, he reasoned, would be safer.
To
Major B.M. Usman and other northern officers around Gowon, who had attributed
his slow response to the secession to the fact that his girlfriend was Igbo and
that her parents were resettled in the East, it was such a huge relief that at
the Supreme Military Council meeting of 3 July 1967, Gowon authorized the long
awaited military campaign.
Edith
had safely landed in West Germany. Gowon told the gathering: “Gentlemen, we are
going to crush the rebellion, but note that we are going after the rebels, not
the Ibos.” The military action, which was to become the Nigerian Civil War or
the Biafran War or Operation Unicord, as it was coded in military circles,
officially started on 6 July 1967 at 5 a.m.
The
North was minded to use the war as a tool to reassert its dominance of national
affairs. Mallam Kagu, Damboa, Regional Editor of the Morning Post, told the
American consul in Kaduna: “No one should kid himself that this is a fight
between the East and the rest of Nigeria. It is a fight between the North and
the Ibo.” He added that the rebels would be flushed out of Enugu within six
weeks. Lt. Colonel Hassan Katsina went further to say with the level of
enthusiasm among the soldiers; it would be a matter of “only hours before
Ojukwu and his men were rounded up”.
The
northern section of the Nigerian military was the best equipped in the country.
To ensure the region’s continued dominance, the British assigned most of the
army and air force resources to the North. It was only the Navy’s they could
not transfer. All the elite military schools were there. The headquarters of
the infantry and artillery corps were there. Kaduna alone was home to the
headquarters of the 1st Division of the Nigerian Army, Defense Industries
Corporation of Nigeria (Army Depot), Air Force Training School and, Nigerian
Defence Academy.
Maitama
Sule, Minister of Mines and Power in 1966, once told the story of how Muhammadu
Ribadu, his counterpart in Defence Ministry, went to the Nigerian Military
School, Zaria, and the British Commandant of the school told him many of the
students could not continue because they failed woefully. When Ribadu thumbed
through the list, Sule said, it was a Mohammed, an Ibrahim, a Yusuf or an
Abdullahi. “You don’t know what you are doing and because of this you cannot
continue to head the school,” an irate Ribadu was said to have told the commandant.
Shehu
Musa Yar’Adua was one of the students for whom the commandant was sacked. “You
can see what Yar’Adua later became in life. He became the vice president. This
is the power of forward planning,” Sule declared.
Unknown
to the forward planners, according to the US documents, Ojukwu had been
meticulously preparing for war as early as October 1966, after the second round
of massacre in the North. He had stopped the Eastern share of revenues that
were supposed to accrue to the Federation Account. By 30 April 1967, he had
recalled all Igbos serving in Nigeria embassies and foreign missions and those
that heeded his call were placed on the payroll of the government of Eastern
Region. The 77,000 square kilometres of the Republic of Biafra–a mere 8 per
cent of the size of Nigeria–was already divided into 20 provinces, with leaders
selected for each. They had their own judiciary, legislative councils,
ministries and ambassadors. Alouette helicopters and a B26 bomber were procured
from the French Air Force through a Luxemburg trading company. Hank Warton, the
German-American arms dealer, had been flying in Czech and Israeli arms via
Spain and Portugal since October 1966. The military hardware, they could not
get, they seized. A DC3 and a Fokker F27 were seized from the Nigerian Air
Force in April. NNS Ibadan, a Nigerian Navy Seaward Defence Boat (SDB) that
docked in Calabar Port, was quickly made Biafran.
Major
Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was supposed to be in Enugu in prison for his role in
1966 coup, joined in training recruits in Abakaliki. Foreign mercenaries were
training indoctrinated old people, young men and teenagers recruited as NCOs
[Non-commissioned Officers] in jungle warfare, bomb making, mortar and other
artillery firing. Ojukwu, through speeches, town hall meetings, market square
performances and radio broadcasts, succeeded in convincing his people that
their destiny was death or a separate state. All his performances in Ghana that
culminated in the Aburi Accord of January 1967, or discussions with the
Awolowo-led National Conciliation Committee five months later, turned out to be
ruse.
The
underground war preparations, the secret arms stockpiles openly manifested
themselves as Ojukwu’s stubborn refusal to accept offers or concessions during
these peace meetings.
But
the Biafrans knew that their vulnerable line was along Ogoja, Ikom, Calabar,
Port Harcourt, and Yenogoa. Support from the six million people making up the
Eastern minorities was very much unsure. The minorities viewed their leaders in
Biafra high command as traitors. And without the minorities, Biafra would be
landlocked and most likely, unviable as a state. More so, their vast oil and
gas resources were the reason they contemplated secession in the first place.
The Biafra high command believed that if there was going to be any troop
incursion from there, they are going to be transported through ship. They
already had a B26 bomber to deal fire to Nigeria’s only transport ship, NNS
Lokoja, anytime it approached the Biafran coastline.
The
Biafrans also knew that Gowon wanted to respect the neutrality of Midwest and
not invade through Niger Bridge, which would have driven the people of the
Midwest into waiting Biafran hands. But if Gowon changed his mind and there was
a general mobilization of the two battalions of the federal troops there, they
had trustworthy men there that would alert Enugu. And if that failed, according
to the US documents, the Niger Bridge had been mined using “explosives with
metal covering across the roadbed at second pier out from the eastern side”.
The
Biafrans also knew that the Yoruba, who were sworn enemies of the Northern
hegemony, would never join the North militarily or politically against the
Biafrans. When Gowon vouched to “crush the rebellion,” progressive Yoruba
intellectuals deplored the language. Professor Hezekiah Oluwasanmi, Vice
Chancellor of University of Ife, described the use of the word as unfortunate.
Justice Kayode Eso of the Western Court of Appeal said: “Crushing the East was not
the way to make Nigeria one.”
Mr.
Strong, the American consul in Ibadan, whom they had been speaking to,
confidentially wrote: “As intellectuals and modernizers, they see the conflict
in terms of continuing determination of conservative North to dominate the more
advanced South and they expressed fear that once North subdues East, it will
seek to assert outright dominance over the West. The centre of trouble might
then swing back to the West, where it all started.”
The
Biafrans understood, therefore, that their strongest defence perimeter would be
along Nsukka, Obudu, Gakem and Nyonya in Ogoja province, where they share
border with the North. That was where they concentrated. On 8 July after three
days of fighting, only four Biafran troops were dead and nine wounded in Obudu,
while up to 100 Nigerian troops were dead, according to the Irish Embassy
official, Eamon O’tuathail, who visited the Catholic Mission Hospital in Obudu.
He said: “Forty five (45) of the dead had already been buried and the villagers
were seen carrying the heads of the remaining around town.” In June before
fighting started, Ojukwu charged on Biafra Radio: “Each Biafran soldier should
bring back ten or twenty Hausa heads.”
At
Nyanya, Nigerian troops attempted to seize the bridge linking Obudu and Ogoja,
but were beaten back by the Biafran troops on 7 July at 1400hrs. According to
the New York Times’ Lloyd Garrison’s dispatch of 8 July: “The Biafran Air
Force–a lone B-26 fighter bomber–flew sorties from Enugu today, bombing and
strafing enemy columns. Asked what damage it had inflicted, its European pilot
replied: “Frankly, I don’t know. But we made a lot of smoke. Hundreds of Enugu
pedestrians waved and cheered each time the plane returned from a mission and
swooped low over the city buzzing Ogui Avenue.”
Tunde
Akingbade of the Daily Times, who was returning from the frontlines, said the
first Nigerian battalion in Ogoja area was “almost completely wiped out by a
combination of mines and electrical devices (Ogbunigwe)”.
In
the first few weeks of the war, the Biafrans were clearly on top. “Enugu is
very calm,” the confidential cable of 13 July 1967 noted. “Ojukwu is dining
with Field Commanders in State House tonight.”
On
the federal side, confusion reigned. They had grossly underestimated Biafran
capabilities. “Gowon and his immediate military advisers believe they can carry
out a successful operation putting their trust in the superiority of the Hausa
soldier,” the British High Commissioner, Sir David Hunt, told his American
counterpart on 31 May 1967. He said further: “A northern incursion would be
hastily mounted, ill-conceived and more in the nature of a foray.”
Even
the Nigerian infantry, which advanced as far as Obolo on Oturkpo-Nsukka Road,
was easily repelled. It ran out of ammunition. At the Supreme Headquarters in
Lagos, they were accusing Shuwa, the commander, of not sending enough
information about what was going on. Shuwa counter-accused that he was not
getting enough and timely orders. Requests for ammunition and hardware procurement
were chaotically coming to the Federal Armament Board from different units, not
collectively from the central command.
Major
S.A. Alao, acting commander of Nigerian Air Force (after George Kurubo defected
to Biafran High Command) together with the German adviser, Lieutenant Colonel
Karl Shipp, had travelled to many European cities to buy jets. They were
unsuccessful. Gowon had written to the American president for arms. The State
Department declined military assistance to either side. Gowon replied that he
was not requesting for assistance, but a right to buy arms from the American
market. That too was rejected.
The
CIA had predicted a victory for Ojukwu, but American diplomatic and consular
corps in Nigeria predicted victory for the Federal side and concluded that a
united Nigeria served American interests better than the one without the
Eastern Region. Two conflicting conclusions from an important department and a
useful agency. The American government chose to be neutral. Dean Rusk,
America’s Secretary of State said: “America is not in a position to take action
as Nigeria is an area under British influence.”
The
British on the other hand were foot-dragging. At the insistence of Awolowo,
“the acting prime minister” as he was called in diplomatic circles, Gowon
approached the Soviet Union.
According
to a secret cable (dated 24/08/67) sent by Dr. Martin Hillenbrand, American
Ambassador in East Germany, to his counterpart in Lagos, MCK Ajuluchukwu,
Ojukwu’s special envoy, met Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandr Romanov, in
Moscow in June 1967. Romanov said that for USSR to recognize Biafra and supply
it arms, the latter had to nationalize the oil industry. Ojukwu refused, saying
that he had no money to reimburse the oil companies and that Biafrans did not
have the expertise to run the oil installations.
A
month later, Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for Information and
Labour, went to Moscow, signed a cultural agreement with Moscow and promised to
nationalize the oil industry, including its allied industries once they got
arms to recapture them from the Biafrans. Within days, 15 MiGs arrived in
sections in Ikeja and Kano airports, awaiting assemblage. There was no
nationalization.
Meanwhile,
buoyed by the confidence from early success, the Biafrans went on the
offensive. Their B26 (one of the six originally intended for use against the
Nigerian Navy) was fitted with multiple canon and 50mm calibre machine gun
mounts. It conducted bombing raids on Makurdi airfield, Kano and Kaduna.
Luckily for Nigeria, the two transport DC3s had gone to Lagos to get more
reserve mortar and 106-artillery ammo. In Kano, there were no fatalities, only
a slight damage to the wing of a commercial plane.
Kaduna,
however, was not that lucky. On 10 August 1967, the B26 dropped bombs on Kaduna
airbase, damaging many buildings and the main hangar. The German consulate in
Kaduna confirmed that a German citizen, a Dornier technician tasked with
maintaining Nigerian military planes, was killed and two others injured.
A
week later, the senior traffic control officer, A.O. Amaku, was arrested for
sabotage. He was accused of failing to shut off the airport’s homing device,
thus giving the Biafran plane navigational assistance. His British assistant,
Mr. Palfrey, was similarly suspected. He resigned and immediately returned to
the UK. However, Major Obada, the airbase commanding officer and an Urhobo from
the Midwest, strongly defended the accused.
The
daring bomb raid provoked many more Northern civilians to run to the nearest
army base and enlist to fight.
According
to a report by US Ambassador Elbert Matthews, cabled to Washington on 3 July
1967, unidentified men tried to bomb the police headquarters in Lagos on the
night of 2 July. They attempted to drive an automobile into the compound, but
the guards did not open the gate. They packed the car across the street near a
small house opposite a petrol station. Leaving the car, the men fled and within
seconds, an explosion took place. The house was demolished and all its
occupants killed, but the petrol station was unaffected. Eleven people,
including some of the guards at the police headquarters, were injured.
Two
hours later, a second explosion, from explosives in a car parked by a petrol
station, rocked Yaba. This time, the station caught fire. The ambassador
remarked: “It is possible this is a start of campaign of terrorism…public
reactions could further jeopardize safety of Ibos in Lagos.” And sure it did.
A
Lagos resident, who visited the police headquarters after the attack, told the
Australian ambassador “Ibos must be killed.”
There
was panic all over Lagos. Anti-Igbo riots broke out. Northern soldiers at the
2nd Battalion Barracks in Ikeja used the opportunity to launch a mini-version
of the previous year’s torture and massacre of the Igbo in the North. On 7 July
1967, Lagos State governor, Lieutenant Colonel Mobolaji Johnson, condemned the
bombing in a radio broadcast. “A good number of Igbos in Lagos is innocent and
loyal to the federal government. It is only fair that they be allowed to go
about their business unmolested so long as they abide by the law and are not
agents and evildoers,” Johnson said.
He
called for Lagosians to join civil defence units and for Easterners to come and
register with the police.
Meanwhile,
the corpses of troops and soldiers wounded in Yahe, Wakande, Obudu and Gakem
that arrived Kaduna by train on 11 July 1967 sparked enormous interest in
enlistment and volunteering. Recruitment centres were established in Ibadan,
Enugu, Lagos and Kano. But it was at the Kano centre, headquarters of the 4th
Battalion of the Nigerian Regiment that generated the biggest number of
recruits. According to the US confidential cable of 17 July 1967, 20,000 of
these were veterans, who had been recruited to fight on the British side in
Burma. The Burma veterans marched angrily to the recruitment offices to replace
those that had been killed or injured. Around 7,000 were accepted. Of these,
5,000 were immediately sent to the frontline. They said they needed no
training; only guns.
As
they advanced, towards the outskirts of Ikem, 4km southeast of Nsukka, when
mortal fires from the Biafran artillery landed close by, inexperienced recruits
ducked for cover behind their transport columns out of fear and incompetence in
bush warfare. Not these Burma veterans. Damboa, the Regional Editor of the
Morning Post, was embedded with some of these veterans under the command of
Major Shande, formerly of the 5th Battalion, Kano, which Ojukwu commanded in
1963.
One
day, at about 2a.m, Biafran forces began firing from the jungle in the hope of
drawing a return fire if the enemy was ahead. “But the veterans were too smart
and began to creep towards the source of firing. After some time, the Biafran
troops began to advance thinking that there were no federal troops ahead since
there was no return of fire. They walked straight into the pointing guns of
these veterans, their fingers squeezed the triggers,” said Damboa to a US
Consulate officer named Arp.
These
veterans were shooting at innocent Igbo civilians, too. Damboa further told
Arp, when he came back from the frontlines on 17 September 1967, that “federal
troops were shooting most Ibo civilians on sight, including women and children
except for women with babies in their arms. Initially they observed the rules
laid down by Gowon on the treatment of civilians. Then, after the takeover of
the Midwest, they heard stories that Ibo soldiers had killed all the
northerners they found residing in the Midwest. Since that time, Federal troops
have been shooting Ibo civilians on sight,” added Damboa.
The
Midwest Invasion
Something
was happening to Biafran soldiers, which the Federal troops observed but could
not explain. Indeed, the fortunes of the Federal troops were improving. Colonel
Benjamin Adekunle’s 3rd Marine Commando had landed on 25 July 1967 at Bonny
Island, establishing a heavy presence of federal forces in the creeks. Two L29
Delfins fighter jets from Czechoslovakia (NAF 401 and NAF 402) were at the Ikeja
Airport and battle ready.
Five
more, on board Polish vessel Krakow, were a week away from the Apapa Ports.
Major Lal, an ammunition ordnance officer seconded from the Indian Army to
Nigeria, had arrived from Eastern Europe, where he had gone to acquire information
necessary to utilize Czech aerial ordnance. Sections of 15 Soviet MiG bombers
hidden in NAF hangars were being assembled by 40 Russian technicians lodging in
Central Hotel, Kano. Bruce Brent of Mobil Oil was flying jet oil to Kano to
fuel these bombers. Captain N.O. Sandburg of Nigerian Airlines had flown in
seven pilots, who had previously done mercenary work in South Africa and Congo,
to fly the MiGs. Names, birthdates and passport numbers of 26 Russians, who
were to serve as military advisors had been passed to Edwin Ogbu, Permanent
Secretary, External Affairs Ministry. They were in Western Europe awaiting a
direct flight to Lagos.
But
George Kurubo, the Federal Air Force Chief of Staff, who had earlier joined the
Biafran high command, had defected back to the fold and had been sent to Moscow
as ambassador to facilitate the flow of more arms from the Soviets.
Lt.
Colonel Oluwole Rotimi, Quartermaster-General of the Nigerian Army, went to
western Europe with a fat chequebook.
What
followed was the arrival of Norwegian ship, Hoegh Bell, bearing 2,000 cases of
ammunition; and British ship, Perang, which discharged its own 2000 cases of
ammunition. A German ship Suderholm also arrived. Those in charge of it claimed
she was in Apapa to offload gypsum. But the US defense attaché reported that it
was carrying “300 tonnes of 60mm and 90mm ammo.” The Ghanaian vessel, Sakumo
Lagoon, was already in Lome, heading to Apapa to discharge its own ammo. A
cache of 1,000 automatic fabriquenationale rifles had arrived Lagos by air on 8
August 1967 from the UK.
Speaking
secretly to UK Defence Attaché, Lt. Colonel Ikwue said he too had gone to the
German Defence Firm, Merex, to buy ammunition: 106mm US recoilless rifles at
$86 per round; 84mm ammo for the Carl Gustav recoilless rifles at $72 per
round; 105mm HEAT- High Explosive Anti-Tank warheads at $47 per round. Ikwue
also bought three English Electra Canberra, eight Mark II Bombers at $105,000
each, 15 Sabre MK VI-T33 Jets at $100,000 each.
With
all of these, Awolowo, rejected Hassan Katsina’s request for funding of 55, 000
more rifles for new recruits. However, he agreed once Gowon intervened and
assured him it was not a request inspired by fraudulent intentions.
Federal
troops had captured Nsukka, 56km from Enugu. Over 200 non-Igbo Biafran
policemen had fled across the Mamfe border into Cameroun. In Ogoja, the
Ishibori, Mbube and other non-Igbo Biafrans welcomed the federal troops after
driving out the Biafran troops in a fierce battle.
The
Biafrans blew up the bridge over the Ayim River at Mfume as they retreated.
The
momentum was with the Federal side, but they knew their victories were not only
because of their military superiority. At critical stages of battle, even when
the Biafrans were clearly winning, they suddenly withdrew. An instance was on
15 July 1967, to the west of Nsukka on the route to Obolo. According to a
conversation Colonel J.R. Akahan, Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, had with
British Defence Advisor, the Nigerian infantry companies of the 4th Battalion,
totally unaware of the presence of the 8th Battalion of the Biafran army, were
buried under a hail of bullets and mortar.
Yet,
the Biafran forces began to retreat. This enabled the remnants of the federal
infantry company to regroup and successfully counter-attack. Even more senior
Biafran commanders that should have been aware that the area had come under
federal control were driving into the arms of the federal side. Nzeogwu and
Tome Bigger (Ojukwu’s half-brother) were victims of the mysterious happening.
Ojukwu initially put this down to breakdown of communication in the chain of
command. During a special announcement over Biafran radio on 15 July 1967,
Ojukwu said: “Yesterday, a special attack, which would have completely sealed
the doom of enemy troops in the Nsukka sector of the northern front, was
ruthlessly sabotaged by a mysterious order from the army high command…Our
valiant troops were treacherously exposed to enemy flanks.”
At
9.30p.m on 8 August 1967, Biafran forces invaded the Midwest. In the
recollection of Major (Dr.) Albert Nwazu Okonkwo, military administrator of
Midwest, made available in confidence through an American teacher living in
Asaba to Clinton Olson, Deputy Chief of Mission in Lagos on 1 November 1967, it
was known by 4 August 1967 in Asaba that the Midwest, West and Lagos would soon
be invaded.
On
5 August, Ojukwu had warned the Midwest government, headed by Colonel David
Ejoor, that if northern troops were allowed to stay in the Midwest, the region
would become a battleground. Many Midwestern officers knew of the plans; some
of them had gone to Biafra earlier to help in the preparations. Lt Col. Nwawo,
Commander of the Fourth Area Command at Benin, was probably aware. Lt Col.
Okwechime, according to the document, certainly knew of it. Lt Col. Nwajei did
not know and was never trusted by the anti-Lagos elements in the Midwest.
“After the Biafran takeover, Nwajei was sent back to his village of Ibusa,
where he was said to be engaged in repainting his home until just the arrival of
Nigerian troops in the area,” disclosed the document.
Major
Albert Okonkwo, later appointed military administrator, did not know in
advance. Lieutenant (later Major) Joseph Isichei and Lieutenant Colonel
Chukwurah were not informed in advance. “Major Samuel Ogbemudia participated in
the invasion, properly by prior agreement,” the document stated.
That
night of 8 August, Biafran army units blazed across the Onitsha Bridge and
disarmed the Asaba garrison that was then stationed at St Peter’s Teachers’
Training College. Then they went on to the Catering Rest House, where Midwest
officers were living, and disarmed the officers. The only exception was Major
Asama, the local commander, who escaped and drove to Agbor at about 22.30hrs.
There
were no casualties except for one officer with a gunshot wound in the leg. The
invading force drove to Agbor, where it split into three columns. One column
drove northwards towards Auchi and Aghenebode. A second column went to Warri
and Sapele.
“The
main force led by Victor Banjo was supposed to drive on to Benin and capture
Ijebu-Ode, reach Ibadan on 9 August, reach Ikeja near Lagos by 10 August,
setting up a blockade there to seal off the capital city,” the document quoted
Okonkwo as saying.
However,
this main column stopped in Agbor for six hours, reaching Benin at dawn. There
was no real resistance in Benin, where no civilian was killed. The main column
left Benin for Ijebu-Ode early in the afternoon. It stopped at Ore, just at the
Western Region’s border.
According
to US Defense Attaché report, three weeks before, Ejoor informed the Supreme
Headquarters that he had information that Ojukwu was planning to send soldiers
in mufti to conquer the Midwest. So, the 3rd Battalion, which was heading
towards the Okene – Idah route to join the 1st Division on the Nsukka
frontline, was ordered to stop at Owo. The first Recce Squadron from
Ibadan, which had already reached Okene, was reassigned to take care of any
surprise in the Midwest. By the time Lagos heard of the invasion, this squadron
was quickly upgraded from company strength to a battalion, with troops of
Shuwa’s 1st Division across the river, and another battalion was stationed at
Idah to hold a defensive alignment against any Biafran surprise from Auchi.
Upon
receiving the telephone call from Major Asama about the Biafran invasion at
Asaba, Ejoor hurriedly left his wife and children at the State House, went to
his friend, Dr Albert Okonkwo at Benin Hospital to borrow his car. He then
sought asylum in the home of Catholic Bishop of Benin, Patrick Kelly.
In
his first radio address to the people of Midwest on 9 August 1967, Banjo said
Ejoor was safe and “efforts were being made to enlist his continued service in
Midwest and in Nigeria.” Ejoor stayed in the seminary next door to the bishop’s
house for almost two weeks, receiving visitors including Banjo, Colonels Nwawo
and Nwajei, Major (Dr.) Okonkwo, who were trying to persuade him to make a
speech supporting the new administration.
Ejoor
refused. He was told that he was free to go wherever he wished without
molestation. Not trusting what they might do, he went back to Isoko his native
area, where he remained till federal forces captured it on 22 September 1967.
Before
Banjo knew the full score, he met with Mr. Bell, UK Deputy High Commissioner,
the evening of Benin invasion. Bell summarized his and Banjo’s words as:
a.
There were no fatal casualties though some were wounded.
b.
Ejoor and two senior officers were not in Benin when Eastern troops arrived.
Bell had firm impression that they had been warned about the day’s event.
c.
All the Midwest is now under the control of combined East/Midwest forces.
d.
East was asked to cooperate by certain Midwest officers because an invasion of
the Midwest by the North was imminent.
e.
That he does not agree with Ojukwu on the separate existence of Biafra. He is
convinced that a united Nigeria is essential.
f.
Bell said he saw only three officers at the army headquarters: one was a
Midwestern medical officer (Major Okoko). All others were Easterners.
Meanwhile
when Banjo made the first radio address, he announced the impending appointment
of a military administrator, but there was considerable difficulty among the
Biafran and Midwestern leaders in selecting a suitable man.
First
choice was to be someone from the Ishan or Afemai areas. Someone from the Delta
was next, preferably an Ika-Igbo. However, the stalemate continued until Ojukwu
intervened and selected Albert Okonkwo. Ojukwu knew Okonkwo only by reputation.
Okonkwo
had certain things that recommended him. First, he had an American wife, which
cut the family/tribe relationship problem of those times in half. Second, he
was considered to be politically “sterile,” having been in the US for 13 years
and was not associated with any political party or faction. Third, he was
commissioned a captain in the medical corps on 2 October 1965 and just made a
Major on 22 June 1967. The implication was that he was not tainted by army
politics. He was also very pro-Biafra.
As
soon as Okonkwo became military administrator, Banjo was recalled to Enugu to
explain the failure of the military campaign. During his absence, the Midwest
Administration was established (an Advisory Council and an Administrative
Council). Banjo succeeded in convincing Biafran leaders in Enugu that his halt
at Ore had been dictated by military expediency. He then returned to the
Midwest front. Banjo informed Okonkwo of the military situation through Major
Isichei, Chief of Staff of the Midwest. Isichei later commented that he had
noticed that Banjo’s headquarters staff never discussed plans or operations in
his presence. Through Isichei, Banjo told Okonkwo that Auchi had been lost
after a fierce battle when, in fact, it was not defended at all.
Suspicions
began to thicken around Banjo. Okonkwo, in a confidential statement made
available to the Americans, said he also noticed that Banjo obtained money by
requisition from him for materials, food and officers salaries’, thus drawing
on the Midwest treasury. On 19 September, when Okonkwo telephoned Enugu, he
discovered from the Biafran Army HQ that Banjo was simultaneously drawing funds
from Biafra for all these supplies. Okonkwo sent Major Isichei to arrest Banjo
for embezzlement, but they found that he had already left Benin and had left
orders for all Midwest and Biafran soldiers to fall back to Agbor.
Okonkwo
ordered his Midwest government to move from Benin to Asaba, which it did that
day. The seat of the government was behind the textile factory, in homes once
inhabited by expatriates. In August, Okonkwo tape-recorded five broadcasts to
be used when possible. Those included the Declaration of Independence and the
Proclamation of the Republic of Benin, as well as a decree setting up a Benin
Central Bank, a Benin University, etc. The Republic of Benin Proclamation was
delayed while the consent of the Oba of Benin was sought. Finally, just when
the Oba had been convinced that the Republic was “best for his people,” the
actions of Banjo were discovered and the Midwest seemed about to be lost, or at
least Benin was undefended. Okonkwo went ahead with the broadcast early on 20
September 1967 in order to record for history that the Midwest was separate
from Biafra. It was the last act of his government in Benin.
Early
afternoon on 9 August, Banjo’s main force left Benin for Ijebu-Ode. It was
composed of both Biafran and Midwest units. Midwest troops, who were mostly
Igbo, had joined the “liberation army”. Commanding the Midwest forces with
Banjo was Major Samuel Ogbemudia, who had been nursing the idea of defection.
When the troops reached Ore and halted, Ogbemudia disappeared to later rejoin
the Nigerian Army. Lt. Col Bisalla, acting Chief of Army Staff, confirmed that
Ogbemudia, in the morning of 9 August, telephoned him precisely at 7:20am to
inform him of the “trouble in Benin.”
According
to Standish Brooks, the US Defense Attaché, Ogbemudia was the first Nigerian
officer to attend American Military School’s counterinsurgency course in Fort
Bragg, 1961. Brooks said after his arrival in Lagos on 9 September 1967,
Ogbemudia said: “He escaped with a small group of non-Ibo troops from the Benin
garrison and have been waging a guerrilla warfare against Eastern units. Having
run out of ammo, he made his way back to Lagos.”
Army
Headquarters believed him and Brooks’ report further stated: “Ogbemudia would
be sent to the headquarters of Second Division in Auchi to assist in
operational planning because of his intimate knowledge of the Midwest area and
his recent experience in the Midwest under Eastern control.”
From
20 September onwards, the Midwest and Biafran Army began to fall apart. The
17th Battalion in Ikom mutinied and fled. So did the 12th and 16th Battalion in
the Midwest.
In
the evening of 22 September, the Midwest paymaster, Col. Morah, from Eze near
Onicha Olona, offered an American expatriate in Asaba £3, 000 if the American
would arrange for Morah to get $5,000 upon his arrival in the United States.
This would have been a profit of about $3, 400 to the American. The offer was
refused. Later on September 25, Morah disappeared with £33, 000, the document
said. This was the time six NAF planes went on reconnaissance and reported back
to the Defence Headquarters that they had noticed “heavy movements of civilians
over the bridge from Asaba to Onitsha,” but did not have the details. On 27
September, Okonkwo called a meeting of all Midwest civil servants, where he
said if the Nigerian Army reached Agbor, he would close the Onitsha Bridge. He
would not let the civil servants abandon the population of Asaba to the
inevitable massacre when the Federal Army reached the town. The people of Asaba
knew by this time of the killings of Igbos in Benin when the federal forces
reached it on 20 September. Everyone assumed that it would happen in Asaba.
From
20 September, there were no Biafran soldiers stationed west of Umunede, east of
Agbor.
On
1 October, Midwest commanders in Umunede and Igueben, south of Ubiaja on the
Auchi-Agbor Road, fled from their positions. Their Biafran subordinates
promptly retreated. Constant streams of retreating Biafran and Midwest troops
filed through Asaba on 2 and 3 October. The Biafrans were usually mounted in
vehicles, while the Midwesterners had to walk. The attitude of the Biafran
soldiers and officers was that they would not fight for the Midwest if the
Midwest Army did not want to fight. In Asaba on 2 October, the elders and
chiefs met to consider sending a delegation to the approaching Nigerian Army to
surrender the town and ask for protection in return for help in finding and
capturing Biafran soldiers in the town. Cadet Uchei, who brought soldiers to
stop the delegation with death threats, thwarted this effort. At this time,
some 35 non-Igbos were rounded up and given shelter at St. Patrick’s College,
Asaba.
Twice,
Cadet Uchei brought soldiers to kill the refugees and arrest the Americans in
charge of the school. On the first occasion, Lt. Christian Ogbulo, ADC to
Okonkwo, stopped the attempt. Cadet Williams from Ogwashi-Uku brought soldiers
to rescue only the Americans from Uchei’s second attempt. Also on 2 October,
Col. Chukwurah, who had been the commanding officer at Agbor, came to Asaba and
told the Midwest Army HQ staff that he had overthrown Okonkwo and he was now
military governor of the Midwest. Chukwurah fled across the bridge to Biafra
before nightfall.
Only
two of the officers of the Midwest Army were known not to have fled from battle
during the campaign: Major Joe Isichei (who was a Lieutenant on August 9) and
Lt-Col. Joe Achuzia. Gathering a few soldiers, they attempted to shoot their
way out. Okwechime was seen in Onitsha at this time; he had been wounded. By
the evening of 2 October, the Midwest Army was completely dissolved.
From
6 a.m on 4 October, machine gun-and mortar fire was heard near Asaba, but the direction
was uncertain. It was later discovered that the firing came from
Asaba-Isele-Uku Road. At about 1p.m, as the staff members of St. Patrick’s
College were leaving the dining room, the first mortar shell landed on the
school football field. Mortar shelling continued until dusk. Federal troops
reached the northern edge of the campus, along the Asaba-Agbor Road, at about
5p.m. By noon of 5 October, there were six battalions lining up on the road in
front of the college, according to Captain Johnson, who was third in command of
the 71st Battalion. By the evening of 6 October, Federal forces held the road
all the way into the Catholic Mission, two miles inside Asaba. Biafran
resistance west of the Niger was over.
Major
Alani Akinrinade commanded the 71st Battalion. (Akinrinade in a clarification,
said his command was the 6th Brigade and truly he was in Asaba at this time.
His
second in command was a Tiv officer, older than Alani. The men of this
battalion were mostly Yoruba and Tiv, with some Delta (Ijaw) men. “Most spoke
English. They were disciplined, courageous and polite,” the American report
stated.
Captain
Johnson ordered the Americans to leave Asaba by the morning of 6 October. The
reason was understood to be that the 71st Battalion was unable to guarantee
their safety from the “second wave” of federal soldiers, known as “the
Sweepers” coming behind. “The Sweepers” were only briefly observed, but they
wore long hair, had “cross-hatching tribal marks on both cheeks” and apparently
willing to live up to their reputation as “exterminators.” According to secret
cables sent from American embassies in Niger and Chad to the Embassy and
consulates in Nigeria, thousands of Nigeriens and Chadians crossed the border
to enlist for the war.
Ten
trucks of Nigerien soldiers were seen being transported for service in the
Nigerian Army from Gusau to Kaduna and over 2,000 more waiting on Niger-Nigeria
border for transportation to Kaduna. The secret document went on: “1,000
Chadian soldiers passed through Maiduguri en route Kaduna. These mercenary
soldiers constituted the “Sweepers.” The captured American teachers aptly
observed that there were soldiers regarded as fighting soldiers and there were
other units that came behind to conduct mass exterminations.
Major
Alani, it was understood, was trying to get as many civilians as possible into
the bush before the sweepers could arrive.
On
the 5 October, when they came, a lieutenant attempted to arrest the American
teachers at St. Patrick’s College and their non-Igbo refugees, who had hidden
from retreating but still vicious Biafran troops.
Captain
Johnson quickly summoned Major Alani. The lieutenant claimed to be acting for a
“Major Jordane,” but a check proved this as false. Alani sent the lieutenant
and his men away and posted a guard to the school until the staff and refugees
left Asaba. There were too many civilians to be executed that Captain Paul
Ogbebor and his men were asked to get rid of a group of several hundred Asaba
citizens rounded up on 7 October. Not wanting to risk insubordination, he
marched the contingent into the bush, told the people to run and had his men
fire harmlessly into the ground. Eyewitness accounts confirmed that he
performed the same life-saving deception in Ogwashi-Uku.
However,
other civilian contingents the sweepers rounded up were shot behind the
Catholic Mission and their bodies thrown into the Niger River. This incident
and many others were reported to Colonel Arthur Halligan, the US military
attaché in Nigeria at that time, the document concluded.
At
night on 19 September, Banjo was arrested in Agbor. He was court martialed in
Enugu three days later. Okonkwo participated in the court-martial and Ojukwu
was present too. Banjo was found guilty, together with Emmanuel Ifeajuna (“the
man from Ilaah who shot Abubakar” –the Prime Minister), Phillip Alale and Sam
Agbam.
Bob
Barnard, American consul in Enugu, said Ojukwu told him that he ordered the
killing of Banjo, Ifeajuna, Alale and Agbam because they had planned to oust
him from office, oust Gowon as well and install Awolowo as Prime Minister. The
American military attaché, Arthur Halligan and Brooks, the Defense Attaché who
had some prior intimation of the coup cabled the Defense Intelligence Agency in
Washington 3 August 1967 that “in the long run, Njoku will unseat Ojukwu.”
Ojukwu
told Barnard: “The plotters intended to take Brigadier Hillary Njoku, the head
of Biafran Army into custody and bring him to the State House under heavy armed
guard ostensibly to demand of him that Njoku be relieved of command on the
grounds of incompetence.” They had been behind the withdrawal of troops and
reverses of prior Biafran victories. He continued: “Once inside the State
House, Njoku’s guards would be used against him. Ifeajuna would then declare
himself acting Governor and offer ceasefire on Gowon’s terms. Banjo would go to
the West and replace Brigadier Yinka Adebayo, the military governor of Western
Region. Next, Gowon would be removed and Awolowo declared Prime Minister of
Reunited Federation…Victor Banjo, Ifeajuna and others kept in touch with
co-conspirators in Lagos via British Deputy High Commission’s facilities in
Benin.”
When
the American consul asked Ojukwu for evidence, Ojukwu replied: “Banjo is a very
meticulous man who kept records and notes of everything he did. The mistake of
the plotters was they talked too much, their moves too conspicuous and they
made notes. As a result, the conspirators came under surveillance from the
early stages of the plot’s existence. Their plans then became known and
confirmed by subsequent events.”
In
a separate document, Clint Olson, American Deputy Chief of Mission wrote: “Much
of the information recounted came from Major (Dr.) Okonkwo. Banjo freely
admitted in his testimony that a group of Yorubas on both sides of the battle
were plotting together to take over Lagos and Enugu governments and unite
Nigeria under Chief Awolowo. Gowon, Ojukwu, and Okonkwo were to be eliminated;
Gowon was to have been killed by Yoruba officers in the Federal Army.”
The
document stated further: “When arrested on the night of 19 – 20th September,
Banjo offered no resistance because he said then it was too late to stop the
affair and the plot was already in motion. His role, Banjo said, was already accomplished.
As far as is known, Banjo died without revealing the names of his collaborators
in Lagos.”
Before
Banjo got to Enugu after his arrest, Okonkwo had telephoned Gowon to warn him
of a threat to his life. Okonkwo said he was afraid that the assassination of
Gowon would prevent the Heads of State Mission of the Organization of African
Unity from coming to Nigeria. The OAU mission held the best hope of resolving
the war, Okonkwo believed.
Whether
Ojukwu knew of or agreed with Okonkwo’s warning to Gowon was not known. However
according to the American Olson, roadblocks appeared in many places in Lagos
and were severely enforced. They were removed after about 48 hours as
mysteriously as they had appeared.
Gowon,
in an exclusive interview with New Nigeria after Banjo revealed himself as the
head of an invading army, said he once met Banjo and Ojukwu in 1965 during the
crisis that followed the 1964 parliamentary elections. They were discussing the
merits of the army taking over governance.
–
Next WeeK: Part Two of the Biafran story
—Damola
Awoyokun/London
